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RETHINKING SULLIVAN: NEW APPROACHES IN
AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND ENGLAND
SUSANNA FREDERICK FISCHER*
"This is a difficult problem. No answer is perfect." - Lord Nicholls
of Birkenhead in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers1
SUMMARY
This Article employs a comparative analysis of some important recent
Commonwealth libel cases to analyze what has gone wrong with U.S. defa-
mation law since New York Times v. Sullivan and to suggest a new direc-
tion for its reform. In Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation,
Lange v. Atkinson, and Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, the highest
courts of the Australian, New Zealand, and English legal systems were con-
fronted with the same challenge faced by the U.S. Supreme Court in New
York Times v. Sullivan. They had to decide the proper constitutional bal-
ance between protection of reputation and protection of free expression in
defamation actions brought by public officials over statements of fact. This
Article's review of these Commonwealth decisions shows that none of them
followed Sullivan by creating a new and freestanding constitutional defense
like the "actual malice test." Instead, the Commonwealth Courts constitu-
tionalized the common law of defamation by expanding the existing com-
mon law defense of qualified privilege for some types of political expression.
U.S. scholars have largely ignored these Commonwealth cases, but a com-
parative look at them provides a new perspective on the Sullivan decision.
This Article contends that the U.S. Supreme Court in Sullivan took a
wrong turn by ignoring the existing defense of qualified privilege and its
inherent flexibility arising from the public interest rationale. As a result, the
Court unnecessarily created a new constitutional defense, when it could
have more simply held that the First Amendment requires the expansion of
the boundaries of state law qualified privilege. This wrong turn was com-
pounded in later cases, which built a complex maze of rules, based on overly
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America; LL.M., University of Virginia School of Law; B.A. Uurisprudence), University of
Oxford; A.B. (History), Princeton University. This Article was prepared with the aid of a
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1. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 1010, 1024D (Eng. H.L. 1999).
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rigid categories of plaintiff for liability, damages, and procedure in libel
actions. Serious problems have resulted for U.S. libel litigation, including
excess complexity, jury confusion, inconsistency with Sullivan's stated
Madisonian rationale, and widespread dissatisfaction with the current
state of the law. The three Commonwealth cases offer three different versions
of a more flexible common law alternative to the rigid categorical approach
of Sullivan. Critics of U.S. defamation law should bear these alternatives
in mind as models for reform.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses a difficult problem involving a clash of
rights: the right to protection of reputation and the right to free-
dom of expression. The following are hypotheticals illustrating
this problem:
1. A national politician, "A," brings a libel action in the courts of
another country over the broadcast of a television documentary. According
to A, the documentary alleges that A has abused his public position and is
unfit to hold public office.2
2. The same A, now in retirement from politics, brings another libel
action over a magazine article, this time in his home country. A claims that
the article bears the defamatory sting that, as a politician, he was irresponsi-
ble, dishonest, insecure, manipulative, and lazy.3
3. Another politician, "B, " sues a major Sunday newspaper in a neigh-
boring country for libel. B claims that an article published by the newspaper
defames him by accusing him of lying to government ministers and demo-
cratically elected representatives.4
Assume that the allegations are all false and defamatory state-
ments of fact.5 Can either A or B successfully sue for damages for
libel? To answer this question, the law must balance competing
rights: protection of reputation against freedom of expression. 6 As
recently noted by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, a judge of the
2. These are the facts of Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520, 521
(Austi.) [hereinafter Australian Broad.Corp.].
3. These are the facts of Lange v. Atkinson [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. 385 (C.A.).
4. These are the facts of Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1010.
5. This Article is limited to the problem of defamation actions involving factual alle-
gations. It will not address the separate, though related, problem of false and defamatory
statements of opinion.
6. Some readers may already be questioning the assertion that the right to freedom
of expression applies to a false statement of fact. They may contend that only opinion or
commentary could implicate freedom of expression, and moreover, that no society has an
interest in protecting falsehood. This Article is premised on the assumption that this argu-
ment is fallacious. In the words of Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough in Reynolds: "The
free discussion of opinions and the freedom to comment are inevitably liable to overlap
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English House of Lords, this is a difficult problem.7 ..It is a particu-
larly vexing problem for democratic societies where political
speech is concerned. A democratic society has an interest in pro-
tecting free expression for the media to ensure that sufficient pub-
lic debate occurs so that electors can receive enough information
to wisely exercise their voting responsibilities. 8 A democratic soci-
ety also has an interest in protecting an individual's reputation
against unfounded attacks, based on the importance of respecting
the dignity of every individual human being. 9
In the United States, the constitutional balance between these
competing rights was first established in the landmark U.S.
Supreme Court case, New York Times v. Sullivan, (Sullivan) and later
refined by thirty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence.' 0 Sullivan
constitutionalized state libel law by reading the First and Four-
teenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution as a significant
restriction on common law libel actions." The Sullivan Court
established a new constitutional defense, separate from the com-
mon law, for speech about public officials. The Court held, by a 6-
3 majority, that a public official was barred from recovering dam-
ages for libel unless he could prove "actual malice," namely that
the defendant published the statement "with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."12
Upon learning that the previous hypotheticals are based on real
cases, one will undoubtedly conclude from the discussion above
that, if Sullivan controls, both of the hypothetical politicians can
with factual assumptions and implications. Some degree of tolerance for factual inaccu-
racy has to be accepted; hence the need for a law of privilege." Reynold 3 W.L.R. at 1059G.
7. Id. at 1024D.
8. See id. at 1022H-23C; see also Campbell v. Spottiswoode, B & S 769, 777 (Q.B.
1863). In Campbell, Chief Justice Cockburn stated:
It is said that it is for the interests of society that the public conduct of men
should be criticised without any other limit than that the writer should have an
honest belief that what he writes is true. But it seems to me that the public have
an equal interest in the maintenance of the public character of public men; and
public affairs could not be conducted by men of honour with a view to the welfare
of the country, if we were to sanction attacks upon them, destructive of their
honour and character, and made without any foundation.
See id.
9. See Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1023F; see also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 388 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
10. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
11. See id. at 264.
12. Id. at 279-80. Justices Black, Goldberg, and Douglas separately concurred on the
basis that the First Amendment required absolute protection from liability in defamation
to be afforded to criticism of official conduct. See id. at 293-97 (Black, J., concurring,
joined by Douglas, J.), 297-305 (Goldberg, J., concurring, joined by Douglas, J.).
2002]
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only recover damages for libel if they can prove that the defendant
published the offending words with "actual malice." These cases,
however, were not brought in U.S. courts, nor did U.S. law govern.
They are all Commonwealth cases, considered by the highest judi-
cial bodies of Australia,' 3 New Zealand,' 4 and England 15 over the
past five years. The first case, Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corpo-
ration,16 (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) was brought in
Australia, under Australian law. The second, Lange v. Atkinson,17
(Atkinson) was brought in New Zealand, under New Zealand law.
The third, Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., (Reynolds) brought in
the United Kingdom, under English law.' 8 In all three of these
Commonwealth cases (collectively, the "Commonwealth Cases"), each
jurisdiction's highest judicial authority had to resolve the question
of whether there was any special constitutional protection for
defamatory facts concerning government or political matters that
had been published to the general public by the news media.
The resulting decisions in the Commonwealth Cases are interesting
and important for a number of reasons. '9 First, they are significant
because they are effectively the Sullivan decisions of their respec-
tive legal systems. It is notable that, like Sullivan, the highest courts
of three major industrialized democracies have now definitively
constitutionalized the common law of libel.20 In all three cases, the
13. The highest court in the Australian legal system is the High Court. For a discus-
sion of the High Court's operation, history, jurisdiction, and judiciary, see supra notes 40-
47 and accompanying text.
14. The highest court sitting in New Zealand is the Court of Appeal, although the
final judicial authority in New Zealand remains the Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun-
cil in London. For a discussion of these courts' operation, history, and judiciary, see supra
notes 48-62 and accompanying text. Both delivered interlocutory judgments in the New
Zealand libel case discussed in this Article, Lange v. Atkinson. See Atkinson [2000] 3
N.Z.L.R. at 385; Lange v. Atkinson [2000] 1 N.Z.L.R. 257 (P.C.); Lange v. Atkinson [1998]
3 N.Z.L.R. 424 (C.A.).
15. The highest judiciary authority in the English legal system is the House of Lords.
For a discussion of the House of Lords' operation, history, jurisdiction, and judiciary, see
supra notes 63-63 and accompanying text.
16. Australian Broad Corp. [1997] 189 C.L.R. at 550-51.
17. Lange v. Atkinson [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. 22, 27 (H.C.); see also supra note 14.
18. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1010, 1014.
19. There is no corresponding trilogy of decisions in the Commonwealth Cases because
in the New Zealand Atkinson case, both the highest court sitting in New Zealand (the New
Zealand Court of Appeal) and the highest judicial authority of New Zealand (the Privy
Council in London) issued decisions. Indeed, the New Zealand Court of Appeal ruled
twice. See supraa notes 298-361 and accompanying text.
20. In Atkinson, the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that New Zealand's common
law of defamation was subject to provisions guaranteeing freedom of expression in the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. Atkinson [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 465-68, affd, [2000] 3
N.Z.LR. at 400. Although these provisions are statutory, they have been treated as effec-
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Commonwealth courts confronted the same issue considered by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Sullivan, namely, the extent to which
the common law of libel was consistent with constitutional guaran-
tees of freedom of expression. As in Sullivan, the Commonwealth
Cases involved political speech about public officials. 21 Also, like
Sullivan, the courts deciding the Commonwealth Cases all agreed that
the common law was subject to the relevant Constitution.22
Additionally, the extent to which the Commonwealth Cases
diverged from Sullivan is also notable. Unlike Sullivan, none of the
courts ruling in the Commonwealth Cases found that applicable con-
stitutional guarantees of free expression dictated a freestanding
constitutional defense separate from common law (as well as statu-
tory, as applicable) defense of qualified privilege. 23 Rather, these
Commonwealth courts found constitutional requirements to be sat-
isfied by an expansion of the existing common law defense of qual-
ified privilege. 24 All these courts agreed that this expanded
defense must be capable of applying to statements broadly pub-
tively constitutional because they affirm rights contained in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. Id. In Reynolds, a five-judge panel of the House of Lords
accepted that the effect of pending human rights legislation, the Human Rights Act of
1998, was that the English common law of libel must be consistent with the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See Reyn-
olds, 3 W.L.R. at 1023A-B (opinion of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead), 1029FG-30A (opinion
of Lord Steyn), 1045A-B (opinion of Lord Cooke), 1055H (opinion of Lord Hope), 1059B
(opinion of Lord Hobhouse). Some sticklers for accuracy may object that Australian Broad-
casting Corp. is not the Sullivan of Australia because two badly divided earlier High Court
decisions had found the Australian common law of libel to be subject to an implied consti-
tutional right of freedom of communication about government and political matters. See
Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104 (Austl.); Stephens v.
W. Australian Newspapers Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 211 (Austl.). Australian Broadcasting
Corp., however, better deserves the label of the Australian Sullivan. First, as the High Court
pointed out in Australian Broadcasting Corp., it is strongly arguable that neither Theophanous
nor Stephens "contains a binding statement of majority support for their broadest constitu-
tional principle." This principle is that there was a constitutional defense to defamation
for certain discussions of government and political matters where the defendant could
prove that it was unaware the publication was false, it had not published recklessly, and the
publication was reasonable under all the circumstances. Australian Broad. Corp.[1997]
189 C.L.R at 554. Moreover, in Australian Broadcasting Corp., a unanimous High Court took
an approach that significantly departed from that of the Theophanous and Stephens plurali-
ties. The High Court rejected the existence of any freestanding constitutional defense
though, upholding the two earlier cases to the extent that they held that the common law
was subject to an implied constitutional right of freedom of communication about govern-
ment and political matters. See id. at 556, 573-74.
21. See Australian Broad. Corp. [1997] 189 C.L.R. at 421; Lange v. Atkinson [2000] 3
N.Z.L.R. at 385; Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1010.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Part V.
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lished to the general public by the media. 25 They also agreed that,
in keeping with the traditional common law approach, the defense
could be lost if the defendant misused the occasion of privilege;
however, none of them endorsed Sullivan's constitutional "actual
malice" test.26
Moreover, the extent to which the Commonwealth Cases differed
from each other is worthy of consideration. Although they all
endorsed a common law solution to the Sullivan problem, they did
not agree on the parameters of that solution. They diverged
sharply on the extent to which constitutional rights required the
expansion of the common law. In particular, they differed as to
the scope of the expanded defense of qualified privilege, as well as
the nature and extent of prerequisites for its applicability.
The Australian and New Zealand decisions endorsed a categori-
cal approach to the common law. Both held that the expanded
common law defense should protect a generic category of political
expression to the general public, though the New Zealand category
was narrower than its Australian counterpart.27 The English House
of Lords took a different approach, rejecting any addition of new
generic categories of protected political expression for the com-
mon law defense of qualified privilege. 28 According to this English
approach, justice could best be served only on a case-by-case
basis. 29
Both the English and the New Zealand courts rejected any pre-
requisite for the expanded common law defense, but the Austra-
lian courts upheld a prerequisite of reasonable conduct by the
defendant. 3°1 The Australian courts also differed from their New
Zealand and English counterparts by narrowing the common law
test for malice that would cause the expanded privilege to be lost.31
Surprisingly, despite the fact that these landmark Common-
wealth decisions have generated considerable scholarly commen-
tary in the Commonwealth,32 there has been virtually no scholarly
25. See infra Part V.
26. See infra Part V.
27. Atkinson [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 428; Australian Broad. Corp. [1997] 189 C.L.R. at
571.
28. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1027A, 1032G-H, 1042D, 10606.
29. Id. at 1024G-H, 1046E, 1051E, 1061H.
30. Atkinson [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 469-70; Australian Broad. Corp. [1997] 189 C.L.R.
at 573; Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1025E-F, 1034F-G, 1043A-B, 1059A-B.
31. See Australian Broad. Corp. [1997] 189 C.L.R. at 574.
32. For commentary on Australian Broadcasting Corp., see, e.g., GEORGE WILLIAMS,
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 186-92 (1999); Gavin W. Anderson,
Corporations, Democracy and the Implied Freedom of Political Communication: Towards a Pluralistic
[Vol. 34
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attention to them in the United States.33 This Article attempts to
plug that gap.
As background information on the legal systems of Australia,
England, and New Zealand, Part II of this Article briefly introduces
the courts that ruled in the Commonwealth Cases, focusing on their
jurisdiction, judiciary, and the binding effect of their judgments.
Part III provides background information on the law of defamation
in these Commonwealth legal systems by reviewing the extent to
which the defense of qualified privilege protected defamatory and
false statements of fact prior to the Commonwealth Cases. Each of
Analysis of Constitutional Law, 22 MELB. U. L. Rv. 1 (1998); Rupert Burns, Political Discus-
sion as a Defense to Defamation: Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Commission, 3 HIGH CT. REV. 2
(1997), available at http://www.bond.edu.au/law/hcr/302burns.htm; (last visited Nov. 26,
2001); Richard Jolly, The Implied Freedom of Political Communication and Disclosure of Govern-
ment Information, 28 FED. L. REv. 41 (2000); Adrienne Stone, The Limits of Constitutional Text
and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication, 23 MELB. U. L.
REv. 668 (1999); Adrienne Stone, Freedom of Political Communication, the Constitution and the
Common Law, 26 Fed. L. Rev. 219 (1998); Anne Twomey, Dead Ducks and Endangered Political
Communication; Levy v. State of Victoria and Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 19
SYDNEY L. REv. 76 (1997); Sally Walker, Lange v. ABC: The High Court Rethinks the "Constitu-
tionalisation" of Defamation Law, 6 ToRTs L.J. 9 (1998); F.A. Trindade, Note, Defamation in
the Course of Political Discussion-the New Common Law Defense, 114 L.Q.R. 1 (1998). For
commentary on Atkinson, see, e.g., Rosemary Tobin, Case Notes: Political Discussion, Freedom
of Expression and Qualified Privilege: Lange v. Atkinson, 7 TORTs L.J. 32 (1999); F.A. Trindade,
Note, Defaming Politicians - the English Approach, " 115 L.Q.R. 175 (1999) (also discussing
decision of the English Court of Appeal in Reynolds). For commentary on Reynolds, see,
e.g., IAN LOVELAND, POLITICAL LIBELS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2000) (also discussing Austra-
lan Broadcasting Corporation as well as the first New Zealand Court of Appeal decision in
Atkinson); Ian Loveland, Analysis, Reynolds v. Times Newspapers in the House of Lords,
[2000] P.L. 351; Katherine Rimell, A New Public Interest Defence for the Media? The House of
Lords'Decision in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2000] ENT. L. REv. 36; Rosemary Tobin,
Case Notes: Public Interest and the Defamation of Political Figures: The English Approach, 8 TORTS
L.J. (2000); Keith Schilling, The Americanisation of English Libel Laws, ENT. L. REv. 48 (2000);
F.A. Trindade, Note, Defamatory Statements and Political Discussion, 116 L.Q.R. 185 (2000)
(also discussing Atkinson); see also Paul Mitchell, Malice in Qualified Privilege, P.L. 328, 338,
340 (1999) (discussing all three Commonwealth cases).
33. At the time of writing, March 10, 2001, only a handful of articles were found in
U.S. scholarly or professional journals that discussed any aspect of the three Common-
wealth cases, and none that systematically compared them to Sullivan. See generally Marietta
Cauchi, UK Courts Reject Generic Qualified Privilege, 18 COMM. LAWYER 25 (2000) (very brief
case comment on Reynolds, that refers in passing to the Privy Council's decision in Atkinson
but not the later New Zealand Court of Appeal decision); Amber Melville-Brown, The
Impact of Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, 18 COMM. LAWYER 25 (2001) (short article on Reynolds
and subsequent English cases applying it); Russell L. Weaver & Kathe Boehringer, Implied
Rights and the Australian Constitution: A Modfied New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan Goes Down
Under, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 459 (1998) (brief discussion of Australian Broadcasting
Corp. but not of either Reynolds or Atkinson); Bonnie Docherty, Note, Defamation Law: Posi-
tive Jurisprudence, 13 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 263 (2000) (brief comparison of Reynolds to the
1994 Australian High Court decision in Theophanous without any discussion of the subse-
quent Australian Broadcasting Corp. decision overturning much of Theophanous).
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these cases can be viewed as the product of recent constitutional
developments over the last decade, in particular as the product of a
growing solicitude for human rights. Part IV examines this consti-
tutional activity in all three Commonwealth jurisdictions. Part V
reviews the Commonwealth Cases, comparing both similarities and
differences in their approach to the extended privilege. Part VI
examines the Sullivan decision from the comparative perspective of
the Commonwealth Cases. This examination shows that the Sullivan
Court erred by constructing a new constitutional defense, the
"actual malice" test, when it could have taken the approach later
taken in the Commonwealth Cases. The creation of this new constitu-
tional defense was a mistake because categorical rules tend to be
overly rigid, ill-adapted to do justice in particular cases, and likely
to result in doctrinal confusion. Part VII shows how the U.S.
Supreme Court's wrong turn in Sullivan was compounded by Sulli-
van's progeny, which extended Sullivan far beyond its initial cir-
cumstances and constructed an overly complex set of rules
governing not only liability but also damages, procedure, and evi-
dence. The result is a deeply flawed law of libel that has been
widely criticized for decades by commentators without improve-
ment. Finally, Part VIII concludes by suggesting that the flexible
extended common law approach of the Commonwealth Cases offers a
promising avenue of reform for U.S. libel law. It is true that, as
conceded by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds, there is no perfect answer
to the Sullivan problem. 34 However, a more flexible common law
approach would better serve the public interest than the current
unsatisfactory state of the law.
II. THE COMMONWEALTH DECISIONMAKERS
To assist those readers who may not be familiar with the court
structure of the Australian, New Zealand, and English legal sys-
tems, this Article begins by briefly introducing the courts that ruled
in the Commonwealth Cases. These courts, the Australian High
Court, the New Zealand Court of Appeal, the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council (Privy Council), and the House of Lords (col-
lectively, the "Commonwealth Courts"), share the exalted status of
34. See supra note 1. Lord Steyn has voiced a similar opinion, stating: "It is a hard case
in which it is unrealistic to say that there is only one right answer." Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at
1031; see also Atkinson [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 474 ("striking a balance between freedom of
expression and individual reputation is not easy.").
[Vol. 34
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the U.S. Supreme Court in their respective court hierarchies. 35
They are the highest courts in all three Commonwealth
jurisdictions.3 6
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of each of the
Commonwealth Courts is primarily appellate (in the case of the
Privy Council, exclusively appellate), and generally limited to cases
of great public importance.37 The judicial members of each Com-
monwealth Court are in practice, if not always in theory, profes-
sional judges, like U.S. Supreme Court justices.-3 As with the U.S.
Supreme Court, the decisions of all of the Commonwealth Courts
are binding on all lower courts in that jurisdiction (although the
Privy Council has recently backed away from requiring full compli-
ance with its decisions from the New Zealand Court of Appeal).39
The high status of the Commonwealth Courts means that their
decisions bear the weighty importance of U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions in their respective Commonwealth legal systems. This intro-
duction to the Commonwealth Courts will focus on their
jurisdiction, judiciary, and the binding effect of their judgment,
beginning with the High Court of Australia.
35. Henry J. Abraham has described the U.S. Supreme Court as "stand[ing] at the
very pinnacle of the judiciary: [t]here is no higher court, and all others bow before it-or,
at least, are expected to do so." HENRYJ. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 186 (7th ed.
1998).
36. In New Zealand, both the highest court in New Zealand, the New Zealand Court
of Appeal, and the highest court of New Zealand, the Privy Council, ruled on this issue. See
supra notes 298-361 and accompanying text.
37. See ABRAHAM, supra note 35, at 187 ("The U.S. Supreme Court has both original
and appellate jurisdiction, but it exercises the former only in rare instances."). Most appel-
late cases reach the U.S. Supreme Court through a screening procedure known as a "writ
of certiorari." The Rules of the Supreme Court provide that certiorari will be granted
"only for compelling reasons," and all of the (admittedly non-exclusive) factors set out in
the Rules indicate that an important federal question or important question of federal law
is required. See Sup. CT. R. 11. For comparative information on the Commonwealth
Courts, see supra notes 40-63 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 40-63 and accompanying text.
39. See ABRAHAM, supra note 35, at 247 ("When officially announced as decided [by
the U.S. Supreme Court], the case becomes binding on all lower and federal courts and on
all state courts when and where applicable."). For comparative information on the Com-
monwealth Courts, see supra notes 40-63 and accompanying text.
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A. The High Court of Australia40
The highest court in Australia is the High Court, established in
1901 by Section 71 of the Australian Constitution. 4 1 The High
Court sits primarily in Canberra, Australia's capital city, where its
building is located. 42 There are seven High Court Justices.43 The
bulk of the work of the High Court is hearing appeals, most requir-
ing special leave, from Australian federal and state courts. 44 The
High Court generally hears only cases of general public impor-
tance. 45 Additionally, pursuant to the Australian Constitution, Par-
liament has conferred nonexclusive original jurisdiction on the
High Court to determine "all matters arising under the Constitu-
tion or involving its interpretation." 4 6 The judgments of the High
Court bind other Australian courts.47
B. The Privy Council
The highest court of New Zealand, the Privy Council, is not tech-
nically a court at all, but an advisory body to the Queen. 48 New
Zealand is one of the few independent Commonwealth countries
to have retained the right of appeal to the Privy Council. In civil
cases where the final judgment of the New Zealand Court of
Appeal is at least $5000 (NZ), there is an appeal as of right to the
Privy Council. 49 Many other Commonwealth nations, including
Australia, have passed legislation abolishing appeals to the Privy
40. For regularly updated information about the High Court's operation, history,
judiciary, and judgments, see the High Court of Australia web page, http://
www.hcourt.gov.au/.
41. See HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1998-1999).
42. See id. at 11, 13; see also GERARD B. CARTER, AUSTRALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 104 (1995).
43. At the time of writing, March 27, 2001, the High Court justices are Chief Justice
Gleeson and Justices Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, and Callinan, High
Court of Australia Web Page, available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/justices_01.html (last
visited December 21, 2001).
44. See AUSTL. CONST. § 73 (providing for appellate jurisdiction). The High Court,
however, also has original jurisdiction in some circumstances. See id. §§ 75, 76 (granting
inherent jurisdiction over certain matters and empowering Parliament to confer original
jurisdiction in certain circumstances).
45. See CARTER, supra note 42, at 106.
46. See AUSTL. CONST. § 76; Judiciary Act 1903 § 30(a) (Austl.).
47. See CARTER, supra note 42, at 51.
48. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also MORAG McDOWELL & DUNCAN
WEBB, THE NEW ZEALAND LEGAL SYSTEM § 6.4.2 (a) (2d ed. 1998); ABRAHAM, supra note 35,
at 282 (providing list of courts, tribunals, and other bodies having rights of appeal to the
Privy Council).
49. See McDOWELL, supra note 48, § 6.4.2(b).
[Vol. 34
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Council.50 Despite this narrowing of its de facto jurisdiction, the
Privy Council retains great prestige. 51 This is because the Judicial
Committee's members include British Lords of Appeal in Ordi-
nary,52 as well as the British Lord Chancellor. 53 Consequently,
decisions of the Privy Council bear great precedential weight in
England, although they are not binding authority there.54 Deci-
sions of the Privy Council do bind New Zealand courts; recently,
however, the Privy Council has increasingly circumscribed its own
role as an appellate tribunal in New Zealand by permitting New
Zealand courts to develop New Zealand's common law when local
conditions differ from England. 55 Thus, in many cases, the final
judicial authority in New Zealand is defacto the highest court actu-
ally sitting in New Zealand, the New Zealand Court of Appeal.
C. The New Zealand Court of Appeal56
The New Zealand Court of Appeal, established as a separate
court in 1957, sits in Wellington, the capital of New Zealand. 57
There are eight judges on the New Zealand Court of Appeal. 58
Like the Australian High Court, the New Zealand Court of Appeal
mainly hears appeals from lower New Zealand courts, but it has
some limited original jurisdiction as well. 59 In civil cases appeals to
the New Zealand Court of Appeal may be brought as of right from
the High Court, but appeals from other lower courts require
50. See RICHARD WARD, WALKER & WALKER'S ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 191 (Butterworth
1998).
51. Id. at 190.
52. Lords of Appeal in Ordinary are the judges of the House of Lords, the highest
judicial body in the English legal system. Id.
53. See id.; see also McDOWELL, supra note 48, § 6.4.2(a); ABRAHAM, supra note 35, at
282.
54. See WARD, supra note 50, at 68.
55. See Atkinson [2000] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 262; see also Invercargill City Council v. Hamlin,
1 All E.R. 756, 764 (P.C.1996).
56. For additional up-to-the minute information about the New Zealand Court of
Appeal (as well as the role of the Privy Council in the New Zealand legal system), see New
Zealand Government's Courts web pages, available at http://www.courts.govt.nz/courts/
courts.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2001).
57. See McDOWELL, supra note 48, § 6.4.3.
58. The judges of the New Zealand Court of Appeal are the Chief Justice of New
Zealand (the head of the New Zealand judiciary), the President of the Court of Appeal,
and six other justices, who are all also justices on the High Court. 8 THE LAWS OF NEW
ZEALAND 181-82 (1993). At the time of writing (March 27, 2001), the ChiefJustice of New
Zealand is the Rt. Hon. Dame Sian Elias. President of the Court of Appeal is Sir Ivor
RIchardson. The other members of the Court of Appeal are Justices Gault, McGrath,
Thomas, Sir Kenneth Keith, Blanchard, and Tipping.
59. See id. at 187.
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leave. 60 Appeals to the New Zealand Court of Appeal are rehear-
ings, so the New Zealand Court of Appeal can hear fresh evidence
although it rarely does so in practice. 61 The decisions of the New
Zealand Court of Appeal are binding on lower courts sitting in
New Zealand. 62
D. The House of Lords6-
The House of Lords is the highest judicial authority in the
English legal system. 64 Like the Privy Council, the House of Lords
is not technically a court but is part of Parliament. The House of
Lords hears cases in a committee room of the House of Lords at
Westminster. The judges are, in theory (and, prior to the 19th cen-
tury, also in practice), the entire House of Lords. Today, appeals to
the House of Lords are heard only by appointed judges, who are
life peers. They are known as Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, or,
more popularly, "Law Lords." 65 There are currently twelve Law
Lords, as well as the Lord Chancellor, who is the head of the judici-
ary and also the presiding officer of the House of Lords.66
The jurisdiction of the House of Lords is predominantly appel-
late. 6 7 The House of Lords hears both civil and criminal appeals. 68
Appeals in civil cases are not limited to questions of law, but in
practice they generally involve legal questions of significant public
importance. 69
60. SeeJudicature Act 1908 §§ 66, 67 (N.Z.).
61. McDoWELL, supra note 48, § 6.4.4(b).
62. Id. § 8.8.4
63. For more information regarding the work of the House of Lords, see the Lord
Chancellor's Department web pages, http://www.open.gov.uk/lcd/lcdhome.htm (last
visited Nov. 26, 2001).
64. GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, SOURCEBOOK ON ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 55 (1996).
The House of Lords is also the pinnacle of the Scottish legal system, which is largely sepa-
rate from that of England and Wales. ABRAHAM, supra note 35, at 270.
65. WARD, supra note 50, at 166.
66. ABRAHAM, supra note 35, at 32, 280. The Lord Chancellor is currently Lord Irvine
of Lairg. The current Law Lords are: Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Slynn of Hadley,
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord
Clyde, Lord Hutton, Lord Saville, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, Lord Millett, and
Lord Scott of Foscote. See Lord Chancellor's Department Senior Judiciary List (Nov.
2000), available at http://www.open.gov.uk/lcd/judicial/senjudfr.htm (last visited Nov. 26,
2001).
67. WARD, supra note 50, at 167.
68. In civil cases, appeals are generally from the Court of Appeal, but there is a statu-
tory provision for "leap-frog" appeals from a trial court. Administration ofJustice Act 1969
§§ 12-13.
69. WARD, supra note 50, at 167.
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In 1966 the House of Lords changed its approach to the binding
nature of its own precedent, stating that it could now "depart from
a previous decision when it appears right to do so" while "treating
former decisions of this House as normally binding."70 Decisions
of the House of Lords, however, are binding on other English
courts.
7 1
The above section attempts to provide readers with an under-
standing of the high status of the Commonwealth Courts deciding
the Commonwealth Cases. In order to fully understand the changes
the Commonwealth Courts have wrought for the law of defama-
tion, it is also necessary to understand the preexisting law that was
the subject of these changes. Accordingly, the next section reviews
the preexisting libel defense of qualified privilege that the Common-
wealth Cases extended as a constitutional matter.
III. THE PREEXISTING DEFENSE OF QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE
For generations the courts of Australia, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom did give some protection to defamatory and false
statements through the doctrine of qualified privilege, both under
common law and as extended by various statutes. As the analysis of
these defenses below will show, however, this protection was rela-
tively narrow in all three countries. Only very rarely did their
courts find qualified privilege applicable to false and defamatory
statements that were widely published by the media. 72 Moreover,
this traditional defense of qualified privilege gave no particular
protection to political speech. The traditional defense was more
concerned with whether the occasion of publication was in the pub-
lic interest than with the status of the speaker or the nature of the
speech. 73 As Part VI will later discuss, at the time Sullivan was
decided, the state law of Alabama was very similar.
Since the Australian Broadcasting Corporation case was chronologi-
cally the first case of the trilogy, most of this article's comparative
sections begin with Australia. However, this section begins with a
discussion of the English law of qualified privilege prior to Reynolds.
The reason for this is that, prior to its constitutionalization, the law
70. Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), 1 W.L.R. 1234 (H.L. 1996).
71. WARD, supra note 50, at 74.
72. Under the common law of all three countries, the defense of qualified privilege
was limited to situations where there was a reciprocal duty and interest in the making of
the statement by both maker and recipient. See supra notes 74-146 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 74-146 and accompanying text.
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of qualified privilege in both Australia and New Zealand differed
very little from the English law from which both derived. It thus
seems most efficient to first describe the English law and then
explain the quite limited ways in which Australia and New Zealand
law departed from it prior to the constitutional developments of
the 1990s.
A. Traditional English law of qualified privilege
Prior to the Reynolds decision, the English common law of libel
clearly weighed the balance between protecting freedom of expres-
sion and reputation in favor of reputation. At common law, defam-
atory statements of fact are presumed to be false.74 To establish a
prima facie case in libel, a plaintiff need only prove that the offend-
ing words are defamatory, refer to the plaintiff, and have been pub-
lished to a third party.75 Thus, liability is strict. The burden
generally rests on the defendant to exonerate itself by proving that
the statement is true or that some other defense, such as innocent
dissemination, applies.76 The English common law has always rec-
ognized that some false speech should be protected from liability
for defamation on the basis of public interest, but, as we shall see,
this common law privilege was relatively narrow. 77 Political speech,
including speech about politicians or public figures, had no special
protection under traditional English common law. Rather, the law
focused on the occasion of the publication and whether it was in
the public interest to protect it at the expense of protecting
reputation.
The traditional common law recognized that the public interest
mandates that some publications, in certain circumstances, have
complete protection from liability. This is known as absolute privi-
74. Words are defamatory if their effect is, in the famous words of Lord Atkin, "to
lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally." Sim v.
Stretch, 2 All E.R. 1237, 1240 (H.L. 1936). Many commentators have criticized this defini-
tion as hopelessly vague. ERIC BARENDT ET AL., LIBEL AND THE MEDIA: THE CHILLING EFFECT
3 (1997); GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER § 1.4 (Patrick Milmo QC & W.V.H. Rogers, eds.,
9th ed. 1998) ("The starting point of the law is that the plaintiff is presumed to have and to
enjoy an unblemished reputation and it is up to the defendant to rebut that. . ."); see also
Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1015. For a critical assessment of the history of this presumption of
malice, see Paul Mitchell, Malice in Defamation, 114 L.Q.R. 639 (1998).
75. See generally PETER F. CARTER-RUCK & HARVEY N.A. STARTE, CARTER-RUCK ON LIBEL
AND SLANDER 93 (5th ed. 1997) (providing a good general overview of the English law of
defamation).
76. Id. at 93-94. This burden frequently determines the outcome of a libel action
because it is often impossible to prove an allegation to be true or false.
77. Toogood v. Spyring [1834] 1 C.M. & R. 181, 193 (1834) (per Parke B.); see also
Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1059B-G.
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lege. 78 Malice is irrelevant. 79 The classic example of a statement
with such absolute privilege is one made in the course of legal pro-
ceedings by counsel, witness, or judge.80 Another example is a
statement made by a Member of Parliament in parliamentary pro-
ceedings.8 ' Many other types of obviously political speech, how-
ever, do not have absolute privilege. For example, if a Member of
Parliament repeats to a journalist a statement that she previously
made in Parliament, the repeated words would not be absolutely
privileged because they were repeated outside of an occasion of
absolute privilege.8 2
The rationale underlying the common law doctrine of absolute
privilege is the public policy of ensuring freedom of speech in cer-
tain circumstances.83 But absolute privilege is a narrow defense,
covering only certain narrow and well-defined occasions of publica-
tion. The fear of the "chilling" effect arising from overprotection
of reputation led to protection for speech in some additional cir-
cumstances, though this protection was always weaker than abso-
78. See generally GATLEY, supra note 74, §§ 13.1-13.47 (providing a good general over-
view of the doctrine of absolute privilege); see also CARTER-RuCK & STARTE, supra note 75, at
121-34; Royal Aquarium and Summer & Winter Garden Soc'y v. Parkinson, 1 Q.B. 431, 451
(C.A. 1892).
79. See CARTER-RUCK & STARTE, supra note 75, at 135.
80. See, e.g., Munster v. Lamb, 11 Q.B.D. 588, 603-04 (C.A. 1883) (holding that advo-
cates have complete immunity for what they say in court); see also Rondel v. Worsley, 1 A.C.
191, 271 (C.A. 1969) (citing with approval the opinion of MathewJ., in Munster, which was
upheld by the Court of Appeal); More v. Weaver, 2 K.B. 520, 522 (C.A. 1928) (absolute
privilege applies to judges, counsel and witnesses); Bottomley v. Brougham, 1 KB. 584, 587
(KB. 1908) (finding report of official receiver, a judicial position, to be absolutely privi-
leged, and reiterating that absolute privilege applies to judges, advocates and witnesses).
81. This parliamentary privilege derives from the Bill of Rights Act (1688), which pro-
vides, inter alia, "[tihat the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament." See also
ExparteWason, 4 L.R.-Q.B. 573, 576 (Q.B. 1868) (stating, per Cockburn, C.J., that "[i]t is
clear that statements made by members of either House of Parliament in their places in
that House, though they may be untrue to their knowledge, could not be made the founda-
tion of civil or criminal proceedings, however injurious they might be to the interest of a
third person").
82. Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & El. 1, 114 (1839); see also Wason v. Walter, 4
L.R-Q.B. 73, 89, 93 (Q.B. 1868) (finding that a faithful newspaper report of a parliamen-
tary debate was protected by qualified privilege). For more information on qualified privi-
lege, see supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
83. Parkinson, 1 Q.B. at 451.
The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. [Vol. 34
lute privilege.8 4 One example of such a weaker privilege is the
doctrine of qualified privilege.85
Under pre-Reynolds English common law, the applicability of
qualified privilege did not depend on the type of speech (e.g.,
political speech) or on the status of the speaker (e.g., a public or
private figure) but rather on the circumstances of the communica-
tion. 86 As noted above, the rationale for qualified privilege is the
public interest. The seminal English authority on this point, the
nineteenth century case of Toogood v. Spyring expressed this as the
"common convenience and welfare of society."8 7 Although Toogood
appeared to contemplate that a statement could be privileged
where the speaker was under a social, moral, or legal duty to pub-
lish it, later English authority added an additional requirement for
qualified privilege: reciprocity. Maker and recipient had to possess
either a reciprocal duty and interest in the making of the statement
or a common interest in the making of the statement.88 In deter-
mining whether an occasion was privileged, the court had to con-
sider all the circumstances. 89 Classic examples of privileged
occasions are ajob reference, 90 a reply to an attack on a person's
reputation, 91 and a statement made to the police concerning the
commission of a crime.92
84. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1015F (stating that "[t]he common law has long recognized
the 'chilling effect' of this rigorous, reputation protective principle. There must be excep-
tions. At times people must be able to speak and write freely, uninhibited by the prospect
of being stied for damages should they be mistaken or misinformed. In the wider public
interest, protection of reputation must then give way to a higher priority.").
85. See id. The other major type of weaker privilege recognized under English com-
mon law is the defense known as "fair comment on a matter of public interest." This
applies to statements of opinion rather than fact. Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S. 769,
778-79, 781 (Ex.-Ch. 1863); see also London Artists Ltd. v. Littler, 2 Q.B. 375, 391B (C.A.
1969).
86. See Adam v. Ward, A.C. 309, 348 (H.L. 1917); see also CARTER-RuCK & STARTE,
supra note 75, at 137, 139, 142, 146.
87. Toogood, 1 C.M. & R. at 193 (per Parke B.).
88. Adam,A.C. at 334. As Lord Atkinson stated, "[t]his reciprocity is essential." Id.
89. London Ass'n for Prot. of Trade v. Greenlands, Ltd., 2 A.C. 15, 23.
90. Fountain v. Boodle, 114 Eng. Rep. 408, 411 (Q.B. 1842) (where Lord Denham
stated: "A character bona fide given to a servant of any description is a privileged commu-
nication, and in giving it bona fides is to be presumed."); see also Gardener v. Slade, 18
L.J.Q.B. 334, 336 (1849).
91. Adam, A.C. at 347; see also Watts v. Times Newspapers, 2 W.L.R. 427, 434F-G (C.A.
1996).
92. Croucher v. Inglis, 26 R. 774, 778 (Scot. Sess. 1889); see also Lightbody v. Gordon
9 R. 934, 938-39 (Scot. Sess. 1882). Although both Croucher and Lightbody are Scottish
Court of Session decisions, they are well accepted as representing English law. See GATLEY,
supra note 74, § 14.31.
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The common law's interpretation of the public interest as
requiring case-by-case analysis of the circumstances of publication
created an aversion to setting limits for the application of the
defense. The House of Lords has accepted that the categories of
qualified privilege are never closed. In London Association for Protec-
tion of Trade v. Greenlands, Ltd., Lord Buckmaster famously stated:
"[T]he circumstances that constitute a privileged occasion can
themselves never be catalogued."93
Nevertheless, establishing a mutual duty and interest has not
always been easy. For example, credit reports made by agencies
that are run for profit are not covered by the common law defense
of qualified privilege because the courts have not accepted that
such reports are made pursuant to a legal, moral, or social duty.9 4
Since the defense of qualified privilege does not attach to the
statement itself but rather to the circumstances of the publication,
the privilege is lost if misused. Some statements covered by com-
mon law qualified privilege in one circumstance have been held to
lose this privilege if made to a broader audience. 95 An example is a
job reference made to a potential employer (originally privileged)
that is subsequently published in a newspaper (not privileged).
Qualified privilege can also be lost if a statement is published
with an improper motive. The pre-Reynolds defense of qualified
privilege gave protection only if a statement was made honestly and
without "malice."96 Malice was traditionally defined as a dominant
motive of ill will, spite, or some other improper motive. 97 The clas-
sic statement of the meaning of "malice" in the context of the
93. London Ass'n, 2 A.C. at 22; see also Stuart v. Bell, 2 Q.B. 341, 346 (C.A. 1891)
(where Lord Justice Lindley stated: "The reason for holding any occasion privileged is
common convenience and welfare of society, and it is obvious that no definite line can be
so drawn as to mark off with precision those occasions which are privileged, and separate
them from those which are not.").
94. Macintosh v. Dun, A.C. 390 (P.C. 1908) (Austl.) (finding no privilege because it
was not in the public interest to protect a statement made with the motive of pecuniary
gain). Though the Macintosh decision has been heavily criticized, it remains the current
state of English law. See GATLEY, supra note 74, § 14.23.
95. Pullman v. Hill & Co., 1 Q.B. 524, 528 (C.A. 1891). A well-recognized example is
where the statement was made to a broader audience in the course of ordinary business
practice, such as where it was dictated to a secretary as part of the ordinary course of
business. Boxsius v. Goblet Frires, I Q.B. 842, 846 (C.A. 1894); see also Edmondson v.
Birch & Co. Ltd. and Horner, 1 KB. 371, 380 (C.A. 1907); Osborn v. Thomas Boulter &
Son, 2 K.B. 226, 234 (C.A. 1930); Bryanston Finance Ltd. v. deVries, 2 All. E.R. 609, 617
(C.A. 1975).
96. GATLEY, supra note 74, § 14.1.
97. For an excellent historical and comparative analysis of the malice requirement
under the English common law of qualified privilege see Paul Mitchell, Malice in Qualified
Privilege [1999] P.L. 328.
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English common law defense of qualified privilege is found in the
opinion of Lord Diplock in Horrocks v. Lowe.98 Lord Diplock stated:
[W]hat is required on the part of the defamer to entitle him to
the protection of the privilege is positive belief in the truth of
what he published or, as is generally though tautologously
termed, "honest belief." If he publishes untrue defamatory mat-
ter recklessly, without considering or caring whether it be true
or not, he is in this, as in other branches of the law, treated as if
he knew it to be false. But indifference to the truth of what is
published is not to be equated with carelessness, impulsiveness
or irrationality in arriving at a positive belief that it is true.99
Lord Diplock made clear that an improper motive could be
deduced from evidence that the statement was made without belief
in its truth or with reckless disregard as to whether it was true or
false.
Pre-Reynolds common law recognized no blanket privilege for
statements made by the press, whether political or otherwise,
unless there was a duty to report to the public. 00 There are certain
occasions of media publications to the general public, however,
that traditional common law has long accepted as privileged. For
example, fair and accurate reports of parliamentary proceedings
are covered by qualified privilege under traditional English com-
mon law,10' as are fair and accurate reports of English judicial pro-
ceedings before courts and tribunals, provided such proceedings
are open to the public. 0 2 In addition, fair and accurate reports of
foreign judicial proceedings have been found privileged under
pre-Reynolds English common law if the English public has a legiti-
mate interest in such reports.10 3 Other statements made by the
press, however, were protected by common law qualified privilege
only in circumstances where the reciprocal duty and interest test
98. Horrocks v. Lowe, AC 135 (H.L. 1975).
99. Id. at 150B-C.
100. Blackshaw v. Lord, I Q.B. 1, 26B-E (C.A. 1984).
101. Wason, 4 L.R.-Q.B. at 93-95; see also Cook v. Alexander, Q.B. 279, 288 (Eng. C.A.
1974).
102. See Allbutt v. Gen. Council of Med. Ass'n & Registration, 23 Q.B.D. 400, 410, 413
(C.A. 1889) (finding accurate and bona fide report of proceedings before the General
Medical Council to be privileged); Kimber v. The Press Ass'n, I Q.B. 65, 73 (C.A. 1893)
(finding report of ex parte proceedings to be privileged).
103. See Webb v. Times Publ'g Co Ltd., 2 Q.B. 535, 565 (1960) (finding privileged a
report of a Swiss criminal trial of a defendant who had been previously tried and sentenced
to imprisonment in England).
[Vol. 34
Rethinking Sullivan
was met; 0 4 this was a rare event.'05 In Blackshaw v. Lord, Lord Jus-
tice Stephens stated:
There may be extreme cases where the urgency of communicat-
ing a warning is so great, or the source of the information so
reliable, that publication of suspicion or speculation is justified:
for example, where there is danger to the public from a sus-
pected terrorist, or the distribution of contaminated food or
drugs. 106
English common law's emphasis on the circumstances of publi-
cation, rather than what was said or who said it, resulted in no spe-
cial protection for political speech. Nor did traditional English
common law give any special privilege to speech about public
figures. Statements made by the press were also not afforded any
special status. Nor were statements on a matter of public interest.
Privilege would not attach to any of these varieties of political
speech unless the general reciprocal duty and interest test were sat-
isfied, just like with any other type of speech.
Legislative developments did not significantly alter the common
law approach. Over the years, Parliament has enacted various stat-
utory categories of privilege. Some of the current statutory privi-
leges do protect certain publications that could include political
speech, such as fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings
both within and outside the United Kingdom, including proceed-
ings in the European Court of Justice. 07 None of the statutory
additions to the English common law of qualified privilege, how-
ever, has given political speech, whether journalism or not, any
104. See, e.g., Watts v. The Sunday Times, 2 W.L.R. 427, 44144 (C.A. 1996) (finding
that defendant newspaper had no lawful interest in publishing a defamatory statement in
an apology; the scope of defendant newspaper's privilege to reply to an attack was not as
broad as that of the person attacked). In limited circumstances, however, publication to a
wide or unlimited audience has been regarded as coming within the ambit of qualified
privilege. See Adam, A.C. at 319; see also Perera v. Peiris, A.C. 1, 21 (P.C. 1949) (report on
integrity of members of Executive Council of Ceylon held privileged where widely commu-
nicated to public, due to the public interest in such wide communication); Cox v. Feeney,
176 Eng. Rep. 445 (1863) (newspaper report, which was critical of plaintiff's management
of a college, by inspector of charities prepared under statute was held privileged even
though published to the general public).
105. See Tobin, supra note 32, at 38.
106. Blackshawm Q.B. at 27A (C.A. 1984).
107. Defamation Act 1996 §§ 14, 15, Sch. 1. This statute provides for absolute privilege
for fair and accurate contemporaneous reports of public judicial proceedings in the
United Kingdom and some other courts, including the European Court of Justice. See id.
§ 14. Reports of other judicial proceedings have qualified privilege. See id. § 15; see also
supra note 9.
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additional blanket protection. 08 The next section will show that
traditional Australian law, both common law and statute, generally
followed the English approach.
B. Traditional Australian law of qualified privilege
Not surprisingly, in light of Australia's British heritage, Austra-
lian defamation law is based on English common law. Australian
State defamation statutes also largely follow the narrow approach
of English statutory developments. As this subsection will show,
prior to the constitutionalization of Australian defamation law, the
traditional Australian common law defense of qualified privilege
did not differ much from the traditional English common law
defenseLike English common law, the Australian common law of
qualified privilege did not recognize any generic category of pro-
tection for political discussion by the media, nor did the legislative
extension of the common law create any such blanket category of
protection.
Although, like the United States, Australia has a federal system
of government, there is only one common law that applies
throughout Australia, except where supplanted by State statute. 10 9
The common law defense of qualified privilege applies in all Aus-
tralian jurisdictions except for Queensland and Tasmania. Both
Queensland and Tasmania have an analogous statutory defense
known as "qualified protection," which differs only slightly from
the common law (as will be explained in the next paragraph). 1°
The law of New South Wales (the governing law in Australian Broad-
108. Section 15 of the Defamation Act 1996 provides for other statutory categories of
qualified privilege, which are described in Schedule 1, for example, fair and accurate
reports of public legislative proceedings worldwide, fair and accurate reports of public
court proceedings in foreign courts, and fair and accurate reports of public proceedings of
international conferences and international organizations. See Defamation Act 1996, Sch.
I Part I. Some other statutory categories of qualified privilege, set out in Part II of Sched-
ule 1 of the Defamation Act 1996, are primajacie privileged, but can be lost if the defendant
neglects to publish a "reasonable letter or statement by way of explanation or contradic-
tion." Defamation Act 1996 § 15(2). Examples include fair and accurate copies of public
notices issued on behalf of governments of European Union Member States or interna-
tional organizations, fair and accurate reports of certain public meetings, such as the pro-
ceedings of United Kingdom local authorities, and fair and accurate reports of
proceedings at general meetings of United Kingdom public companies. Defamation Act
1996, Sch. 1 Part II. For a complete list, see id.
109. Australian Broad. Corp. [1997] 189 C.L.R. at 563; see also Kable v. Dir. of Prosecu-
tions (1996) 189 C.L.R. 51, 112 (N.S.W.) (per McHugh, J., stating: "Unlike the United
States of America where there is a common law of each state, Australia has a unified com-
mon law which applies in each State but is not itself the creature of any State.").
110. Defamation Act 1889 § 16 (Qld.); Defamation Act 1957 § 16 (Tas.).
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casting Corporation) has retained the common law, despite adding a
supplemental statutory defense of qualified privilege. This New
South Wales supplemental defense differs more substantially from
the common law than Queensland and Tasmanian "qualified privi-
lege" but has not established any generic statutory category of pro-
tection for political discussion by the media or discussion of public
figures."' Before considering the New South Wales statutory
extension to qualified privilege, this Article will first examine the
scope of the traditional Australian common law defense of quali-
fied privilege and its statutory replacements in Queensland and
Tasmania.
The traditional Australian common law defense of qualified priv-
ilege was virtually identical to its English counterpart. Like the pre-
Reynolds English law, the traditional Australian common law
defense of qualified privilege did not apply unless there was a
reciprocal duty and interest on the part of maker and recipient. 12
In this respect, the Queensland and Tasmanian statutory defenses
of qualified protection do differ from the traditional common law;
neither requires reciprocal duty and interest.1 3 This, however, is
one of only two material respects in which the Queensland and
Tasmanian statutory defenses differ from the traditional Australian
common law defense of qualified privilege."14
The other significant difference between the Queensland and
Tasmanian statutory defenses and the common law of Australia is
with regard to misuse of privilege. As under the traditional English
common law, the Australian common law defense of qualified priv-
ilege would fail if the plaintiff could prove that the defendant mis-
used the privileged occasion, often described as "malice," on the
part of the defendant. The English meaning of malice, namely ill-
will, spite, or other improper motive, applies under Australian
111. See Defamation Act 1974 §§ 4(2), 11, 22 (N.S.W.); see also Morosi v. Mirror News-
papers (1977) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 749, 772E; supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
112. SeeJohn Fairfax & Sons Ltd. v. Hook (1983) 72 F.L.R. 190, 198 (Fed. Ct.) (citing
Lord Adkinson's statement in English House of Lords decision in Adam v. Ward that "reci-
procity is essential"); see also Radio 2UE Sydney Pty. Ltd. v. Parker (1992) 29 N.S.W.L.R.
448, 459 (also citing to Adam v. Ward); MICHAEL GILLOOLY, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION IN
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, 171-72 (1998).
113. Defamation Act 1957 § 16 (Tas.); Defamation Act 1889 § 16 (Qld.); see also Mus-
grave v. Commonwealth (1937) 57 C.L.R. 514, 548 (applying Queensland statute); GIL-
LOOLY, supra note 112, at 210.
114. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
2002]
The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.
common law." 5 The Queensland and Tasmanian statutory quali-
fied protection defenses are defeated by an absence of "good
faith," 16 which requires something more than the traditional com-
mon law. Ill will or some other improper motive is necessary, but
there are also two additional requirements: first, that the matter
published is relevant to the occasion of privilege, and second, that
the "manner and extent of the publication does not exceed what is
reasonably sufficient for the publication."" 17
Another important similarity between Australian common law
and traditional English common law is the refusal to recognize any
general privilege for media publications to the general public." 8
Australian law also refused to provide such blanket protection even
where the subject matter reported was a matter of public inter-
est. 1 9 In tandem with the approach of traditional English com-
mon law, Australian common law only exceptionally found the
requisite duty and interest to exist where the defamatory material
was published widely to the general public.' 20
As in England, statutory developments in Australia have some-
what broadened the defense of qualified privilege, but not to the
extent of creating any general statutory protection for political dis-
cussion per se. There is no federal Australian defamation legisla-
tion; all of these statutes are State or Territory statutes.' 2 ' Most of
the statutory extensions to qualified privilege follow the English
statutory approach by providing that certain fair and accurate
reports are privileged. 22 New South Wales has enacted a statutory
115. See supra note 97 and accompanying text; see also Barbaro v. Amalgamated TV
Servs. Pry. Ltd. (1985) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 30, 51 (citing English case of Horrocks v. Lowe); Morgan
v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd. (1990) 20 N.S.W.L.R. 511, 549E.
116. Defamation Act 1889 §§ 16, 17 (Qld.); Defamation Act 1957 §§ 16, 19 (Tas.).
117. Defamation Act 1889 § 16(2) (Qld.); Defamation Act 1957 § 16(2) (Tas.).
118. See Telegraph Newspaper Co. v. Bedford (1934) 50 C.L.R. 632, 653-62 (Austl.).
119. See Radio 2UE Sydney v. Parker 29 N.S.W.L.R. at 461C; see also Lang v. Wills (1934)
52 C.L.R. 637, 672; Loveday v. Sun Newspapers Ltd. (1938) 59 C.L.R. 503, 513 (Austl.).
120. Loveday (1938) 59 C.L.R. at 515-16.
121. CARTER-RuCK & STARTE, supra note 75, at 298.
122. See, e.g., Defamation (Amendment) Act, 1909 §§ 5, 6 (Austl. Cap. Terr.) (provid-
ing for qualified privilege for certain newspaper reports, including inter alia, reports of
parliamentary proceedings and other public proceedings, and court judgments); Defama-
tion Act, 1974 §§ 24-26 Sch. 2 (N.S.W.) (providing for qualified privilege for publications
of certain fair reports of specified proceedings of public concern, public documents, or
public records); Defamation Act, 1989 §§ 5, 6 (N. Terr.) (providing for privilege for cer-
tain fair and accurate reports of court proceedings and public meetings); Defamation Act,
1889 § 13 (Qld.) (providing for qualified privilege for certain fair reports of parliamentary
and other proceedings, also certain reports/documents issued by government and the
police); Wrongs Act, 1936 §§ 6, 7 (S.A.) (providing for privilege for certain fair and accu-
rate contemporaneous newspaper reports of court proceedings, as well as fair and accurate
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defense of qualified privilege that is somewhat more powerful than
the common law or other State statutory privileges; However, this
New South Wales statutory defense does not extend to media
reports generally, whether or not they concern political matters,
politicians or public officials, or other subject matter in the public
interest.
This statutory defense is set out in Section 22 of the New South
Wales Defamation Act 1974.123 This section provides that qualified
privilege applies to material published to a person with an interest
or "apparent interest" in receiving the statement, provided that the
conduct of the publisher is reasonable under the circumstances. 124
A recipient will have an "apparent interest" if the publisher reason-
ably believes that he or she had that interest. 25 This statutory
defense may be defeated by evidence that the defendant has mis-
used the privilege.1 26 Although this defense is potentially far
broader than the common law defense of qualified privilege, it
does not create a generic category of protection for political discus-
sion, media publications, or publications about public figures. The
New South Wales Court of Appeals stated in Morosi v. Mirror News-
papers Ltd that Section 22
gives no carte blanche to newspapers to publish defamatory mat-
ter because the public has an interest in receiving information
on the relevant subject. What the section does is to substitute
reasonableness in the circumstances for the duty or interest
which the common law principles of privilege require to be
established. 1 27
The above discussion has shown that traditional Australian law,
both common law and statutory, did not evolve very far beyond its
English model. As the next section will show, this was also the case
in New Zealand.
newspaper reports of certain public meetings and publications issued at the request of
certain public bodies); Wrongs Act, 1958 § 3A-5A (Vict.) (providing for privilege for cer-
tain fair and accurate reports of parliamentary proceedings, court proceedings, municipal
council meetings, and reports issued by the police); Criminal Code Act, 1913 § 354 (W.
Austl.) (providing for qualified privilege for, inter alia, certain fair reports of court proceed-
ings, parliamentary proceedings, and public meetings).
123. Defamation Act, 1974 § 22 (N.S.W.).
124. Defamation Act 1974 § 22(1) (N.S.W.).
125. Id. at 22(2).
126. Morgan, (1990) 20 N.S.W.L.R. at 551F-G.
127. Morosi v. Mirror Newspapers Ltd. (1977) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 749, 797C.
2002]
The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.
C. Traditional New Zealand Law of Qualified Privilege
Prior to Atkinson, New Zealand also recognized a defense of qual-
ified privilege at common law and under statute. Traditional New
Zealand common law followed the English and Australian tradi-
tional common law approach to qualified privilege, requiring a
reciprocal duty and interest on the part of the speaker and recipi-
ent before the law would find an occasion of qualified privilege to
exist. 128 Thus, as in English law, an employment reference would
be privileged under New Zealand common law. 129 Another exam-
ple of a circumstance where the requisite duty and interest has
been found to exist is an internal report made by police officers to
their superiors.1 30
New Zealand common law accepted, and statute later confirmed,
that newspaper reports of court cases and parliamentary debates
were protected by qualified privilege. 31 New Zealand law did not,
however, extend this privilege more generally to cover journalism
in the form of news articles published to the general public, even if
these were in the public interest. In Truth (N.Z.) v. Holloway, Justice
North, delivering the judgment of the New Zealand Court of
Appeal, stated that "there is no principle of law.... which may be
invoked in support of the contention that a newspaper can claim
privilege if it publishes a defamatory statement of fact about an
individual merely because the general topic developed in the arti-
cle is a matter of public interest."'132 Justice North then drove this
point home, continuing, "the law does not recognize any special
privilege as attaching to the profession of journalism....
Similarly, in Templeton v. Jones, a 1984 decision of the New Zea-
land Court of Appeal, the court held that a parliamentary candi-
date's statement to the press concerning his opponent was not
privileged. 134 Delivering the judgment of the New Zealand Court
of Appeal, Justice Cooke stated: "As the common law of New Zea-
land stands, it is plain enough that the mere fact that the plaintiff
128. Wells v. Butler [1952] N.Z.L.R. 312, 318; see alsoJ.F. BURROWS, NEWS MEDIA LAW IN
NEW ZEALAND 57-58 (3d ed. 1990).
129. See Wells [1952] N.Z.L.R. at 319.
130. Dehn v. Attorney-General [1989] 1 N.Z.L.R. 320, 324 (C.A.).
131. Truth (N.Z.) Ltd. v. Holloway [1960] N.Z.L.R. 69, 82-83, affd, [1961] N.Z.L.R. 22
(P.C.) (the ruling on privilege was not appealed to the Privy Council). Under the current
New Zealand defamation statute, reports of parliamentary proceedings and court proceed-
ings are covered by qualified privilege. Defamation Act 1992 §§ 16-19, Sch. 1 (N.Z.).
132. Truth [1960] N.Z.L.R. at 83.
133. Id.
134. Templeton v. Jones [1984] 1 N.Z.L.R. 448, 460 (C.A.).
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was a declared parliamentary candidate cannot be treated as
imposing on the plaintiff a social or moral duty to make a defama-
tory statement about him to the general public."' 3 5 The Court of
Appeal refused to extend the common law to cover this situa-
tion. 136 Although Justice Cooke admitted in his judgment that the
New Zealand law of qualified privilege "is probably not wholly logi-
cal," he justified the refusal to extend the defense more broadly on
the basis of the public interest. Cooke claimed that the effect of
extending the defense in this way would be to discourage "sensitive
and honourable men" from entering politics.' 37
New Zealand case law consistently confirmed that media reports
would attract the defense of qualified privilege only exceptionally,
where a media defendant could establish a reciprocal duty and
interest in publishing material to the general public. 38 There was
some pressure to reform this aspect of the law, but efforts to
broaden the law of qualified privilege to cover political discussion
by the media did not bear fruit.
In 1977 the McKay Committee on Defamation recommended
altering New Zealand law to extend the defense of qualified privi-
lege. The Committee recommended an extension to media
reports of matters in the public interest, subject to a duty on the
part of the media defendant to establish that it had taken reasona-
ble care in preparing the report and also subject to the right of
reply. 139 The 1992 New Zealand Defamation Act, however, did not
follow this recommendation, although it did include some nar-
rower occasions of statutory privileges. These are similar to the
English statutory privileges recognized under the English Defama-
tion Act 1996.14 1
135. Id. at 459.
136. See id. at 458-60.
137. Id. at 458 (citations omitted).
138. See Dunford Publicity v. News Media [1971] 1 N.Z.L.R. 961, 968 (Sup. Ct. Christ-
church); see also R. Lucas & Son (Nelson Mail) Ltd. v. O'Brien [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 289, 296-
98 (C.A.); Isbey v. Broad. Corp. of New Zealand [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 721, 722-24 (Sup. Ct.
Wellington); Bradney v. Virtue [19091 28 N.Z.L.R. 828, 838-39; GILLOOLY, supra note 112,
at 175.
139. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEFAMATION RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE LAW OF
DEFAMATION ch. 10. The McKay Committee may well have been influenced, at least to
some extent, by Geoffrey Palmer, later Prime Minister of New Zealand and one of the
primary advocates of a bill of rights, who advocated a Sullivan-style privilege for New Zea-
land. Geoffrey Palmer, Politics and Defamation-A Case of Kiwi Humbug [1972] N.Z.L.J. 265.
140. See supra notes 107, 108. The New Zealand Defamation Act 1992 does not contain
the broad absolute privilege for contemporaneous reports of public judicial proceedings
provided by the English statute. Compare Defamation Act 1996 § 14 (U.K.), with Defama-
tion Act 1992 § 14 (N.Z.). The New Zealand statute provides that certain enumerated
2002]
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Although the New Zealand legislature has failed to grant any
broad statutory privilege for media news reporting, the 1992 Defa-
mation Act did alter the law on malice, but this change appears to
be merely semantic. Before 1992 the New Zealand defense of qual-
ified privilege shared a similar doctrine of "malice" with traditional
English common law. If the plaintiff established that the defen-
dant published with malice, the defense of qualified privilege
would fail. 141 New Zealand law applied the English test of
"improper motive" to determine whether malice existed. 142 As in
England, improper motive could be proved directly, though this
was generally difficult. Also like England, under traditional New
Zealand law malice could be established by proving that the defen-
dant lacked an honest belief in the truth of the publication, namely
that the defendant knew the publication to be false or published in
reckless disregard as to whether it was true or false.' 43 The 1992
New Zealand Defamation Act changed the law by rejecting the
term "malice." The statute provided instead that the defense of
qualified privilege "shall fail if the plaintiff proves that, in publish-
ing the matter that is the subject of the proceedings, the defendant
was predominantly motivated by ill-will towards the plaintiff or oth-
erwise took improper advantage of the occasion of publication." 44
It does not appear, however, that this statutory requirement is sub-
stantively different than the English common law requirement of
malice. 145 Instead, it was motivated by a desire to use simpler and
less confusing language. 46
publications are subject to qualified privilege, including fair and accurate reports of New
Zealand parliamentary proceedings and fair and accurate reports of proceedings of New
Zealand courts. See Defamation Act 1992 § 16, First Sch. Part I (N.Z.). Certain other
reports are prima facie privileged but will lose their privilege if the defendant refuses to
publish a "reasonable letter or statement by way of explanation or contradiction." Id. § 18.
An example of one more restricted occasion of qualified privilege is a fair and accurate
report of the proceedings of a court outside New Zealand. See id. at First Sch. Part II. For a
general discussion of these so-called "strong" and "weak" categories of privilege in the New
Zealand Defamation Act, see JOHN BuRRows & URSULA CHEEVER, MEDIA LAW IN NEW ZEA-
LAND 67-83 (4th ed. 1999).
141. BuRRows & CHEEVER, supra note 140, at 80-83.
142. See, e.g., Brooks v. Muldoon [1973] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1, 10 (Sup. Ct. Wellington) (citing
English case law, including the famous case of Horrocks v. Lowe, as precedent on what con-
stitutes "malice" under New Zealand law).
143. See id.
144. Defamation Act 1992 § 19(1) (N.Z.).
145. See Atkinson [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 34; see also GILLOOLY, supra note 112, at 186.
146. GILLOOLY, supra note 112, at 186.
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The above comparative examination of the law of qualified privi-
lege in the three Commonwealth countries shows that, despite
some limited statutory extensions of the common law of qualified
privilege, none of the countries departed far from the traditional
English common law model. In particular, before constitutional
developments in the 1990s incited the constitutionalization of defa-
mation law in all three Commonwealth jurisdictions, none of them
recognized any generic category of protection for speech about
public officials like the U.S. Supreme Court's "actual malice" test in
Sullivan.147 Nor did they recognize any generic category of protec-
tion for political speech, whether published by the media or
otherwise.
IV. THE CHANGING CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE
The past decade has been a period of intense constitutional
development in all three Commonwealth countries, although none
of them actually drafted a new constitution or an entrenched Bill
of Rights. Rather, they have all shown an increasing solicitude for
ensuring the protection of human rights, including the right to
free expression. In Australia, this has taken the form of judicial
activism; the Australian High Court found various civil and political
rights to be implicit in the Australian Constitution, despite the
absence of a written bill of rights. These implied rights include a
freedom of political communication. New Zealand's recent consti-
tutional development has occurred through both legislative and
judicial activity. New Zealand has recently enacted human rights
legislation, the Bill of Rights Act 1990, which, though technically
only having the force of a statute, has been treated by New Zea-
land's judiciary as though it has constitutional force. Even more
recently, the United Kingdom has also enacted human rights legis-
lation, the Human Rights Act 1998. As the millennium
approached, these constitutional developments would eventually
propel Commonwealth Courts to reexamine their English or
English-derived law of qualified privilege in a constitutional con-
text. To understand this reexamination, it is helpful to understand
the constitutional changes giving rise to it. This Article will con-
sider each of the three Commonwealth jurisdictions in turn, start-
ing with Australia.
147. See infra Part VI.
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A. Australia
Constitutional developments in Australia during the 1990s took
place in the context of a stable and democratic system of govern-
ment. Australia is a modern parliamentary democracy and consti-
tutional monarchy based on the twin principles of "responsible
government" and "representative government." These principles
are designed to ensure that Australia's constitutional monarchy is
sufficiently democratic. Executive power in Australia still vests for-
mally in the English Queen, exercised through the Governor-Gen-
eral. 148 In practice, however, under the system of "responsible
government," the Governor-General acts in accordance with the
advice of Australian government ministers, who must be members
of Parliament. 149 Under this system, the government and ministers
are responsible to the Australian Parliament. If the government no
longer has the confidence of the House of Representatives (usually
because the government's party has lost its majority in the House
of Representatives), it can no longer govern and must call an elec-
tion. Because the legislature is popularly elected, the government
is both representative and ultimately responsible to the Australian
people. 150
Australia has a written constitutiont 5' but no written bill of
rights.152 Although a handful of express individual civil, political,
148. AUSTL. CONST. § 61.
149. Id. § 64.
150. Id. §§ 7, 24 (providing for direct popular election of representatives to the Austra-
lian Senate and House of Representatives). It is true that the Queen, who is of course not
elected, is part of the legislative branch as well, id. § 1, but the Queen's parliamentary
activities are confined to giving royal assent through the Governor-General to draft legisla-
tion already passed by both houses of Parliament, id. §§ 57, 58. In modern Australia, such
assent is always given. Simon Heifer, How Powerful is the Queen, TIMES [TIMES NEWSPAPERS
LIMITED], Jan. 4, 1994.
151. The Australian Constitution, which resulted in the federation of the six Australian
colonies as ofJanuary 1, 1901, was enacted as part of a British Act of Parliament. See Com-
monwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., ch. 12 § 9. Although the
eligible electorate of each Australian colony had the opportunity to vote on the Constitu-
tion at several referenda held between 1898 and 1900, the Constitution was not initially
considered to be a manifestation of the will of the Australian people but of the British
Parliament, in the exercise of its power to legislate throughout the British Empire; how-
ever, attitudes have changed. By the 1990s the Australian High Court had largely endorsed
the view that the Australian Constitution derives its power from the Australian people. See
McGinty v. Western Australia (1996) 186 C.L.R. 140, 230 (Austl.) (McHugh, J.); see also
ITLLIAMS, supra note 32, at 28-29, 91.
152. Michael Coper has suggested that this lack may be attributable to an influenza
virus caught by Andrew Inglis Clark, a strong supporter of a Bill of Rights, who conse-
quently missed most of the 1891 Hawkesbury River cruise where the Australian Constitu-
tion was largely written. Michael Coper, The High Court and Free Speech: Visions of Democracy
or Delusions of Grandeur?, 16 Sydney L. Rev. 185, 194 (1994).
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and economic rights are scattered haphazardly through the Austra-
lian Constitution, 53 freedom of expression is not among them.
Although the High Court did not initially mandate a textual read-
ing of the Constitution, starting in 1920 a highly literalist approach
became ascendant.' 54 This held sway for the next thirty years.
Reflecting the primacy of this approach, Sir Owen Dixon opined at
his 1952 swearing-in as Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia
that: "There is no other safe guide to judicial decisions in great
conflicts than a strict and complete legalism."'155 This literal
method of constitutional interpretation focused strictly on the text
of the Australian Constitution. 156
Although in fact Australian High Court judges were not always
entirely consistent in applying a strictly literal approach to constitu-
tional interpretation, in practice literalism did result in a generally
narrow reading of the civil and political rights expressly included
in the Australian Constitution. 57 In contrast, express economic
rights, as well as grants of Commonwealth power, were generally
interpreted broadly. 5 8
One maverick Australian High Court judge, Lionel Murphy, a
staunch advocate of human rights, consistently challenged this lit-
eral approach to constitutional interpretation. In a number of
judgments during the 1970s and 1980s, Murphy interpreted
express constitutional rights broadly and also contended that the
Australian Constitution contained various implicit civil and politi-
153. These include Sections 41 (barring the enactment of laws prohibiting those eligi-
ble to vote in State elections from voting for the Commonwealth Parliament; the High
Court has held, by a majority, that this provision is merely a transitional provision, see R. v.
Pearson ex parte Sipka (1983) 152 C.L.R. 254, 261 (Austl.)), 51(xxxi) (guaranteeing just
compensation for property acquired by the Commonwealth), 80 (guaranteeing a right to
jury trial in certain Commonwealth trials), 92 (guaranteeing free "trade, commerce, and
intercourse among the States"), 116 (barring Commonwealth legislation "establishing any
religion," "imposing any religious observance," "prohibiting the free exercise of any relig-
ion," or imposing religious tests for government, officials), 117 (providing that Australian
citizens who are residents of one Australian state are not subject to any disability or dis-
crimination not equally applicable to citizens resident in another state).
154. Amalgamated Soc'y of Eng'rs v. Adelaide S.S. Co. (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129, 142
(Austl.) (Engineers Case) (contending that it is "the manifest duty of this Court to turn its
earnest attention to the provisions of the Constitution itself"); see also George Williams,
Engineers is Dead, Long Live the Engineers!, 17 SYDNEY L. REv. 62, 85 (1995).
155. Sir Owen Dixon, Swearing in of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice, in (1952) 85
C.L.R. xi, xiv. Leslie Zines has noted that Dixon did not always adhere to his strict literalist
principles. LESLIE ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 429-30 (4th ed. 1997).
156. ZINES, supra note 155, at 429-30.
157. WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 79.
158. Id. at 78, 22740.
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cal rights, including freedom of speech.1 59 Murphy did not suc-
ceed in persuading his High Court colleagues of the merits of this
approach, 60 but within only a few years of Murphy's death in 1986,
a more activist High Court shifted. its textual approach to constitu-
tional interpretation toward a broader, non-literal approach for
questions of civil and political rights.
In 1992, in two judgments delivered on the same day in the cases
of Nationwide News Party Ltd. v. Wills16 1 and Australian Capital Televi-
sion Party Ltd. v. Commonwealth,162 six members of the High Court
found that there was a freedom to discuss some political matters
implicit in the Australian Constitution.1 63 This implication arose
159. See Miller v. TCN Channel Nine Proprietary Ltd. (1986) 161 C.L.R. 556, 581-82
(Austl.) (Murphy, J., dissenting); see also PHILIP A. JOSEPH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 442 (1993); WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 156-58. Murphy was
an ardent supporter of human rights; as Attorney-General in the Whitlam government, he
proposed Commonwealth legislation to incorporate the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights into Australian law. JENNY HOCKING, LIONEL MURPHY: A POLITICAL
BIOGRAPHY 183-84 (1997).
160. WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 156, 158; see also Leslie Zines, A Judicially Created Bill of
Rights?, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 166, 167 (1994).
161. Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
162. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Australia (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106 (Austl.).
163. All the justices endorsing the implied freedom used slightly different terminology
to describe it, except for Deane and Toohey who delivered a jointjudgment. Five justices
endorsing the freedom (Chief Justice Mason and Justices Brennan, Deane, Toohey, and
Gaudron) depicted it as essentially a broad freedom to discuss political matters. SeeAustra-
lian Capital Television (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 138, 142 (per Mason, C.J., describing it as
"extending to all matters of public affairs and political discussion"), 149 (per Brennan, J.,
describing it as "freedom of discussion of political and economic matters which is essential
to sustain the system of representative government prescribed by the Constitution"), 169
(per Deane and Toohey, JJ, describing it as "extend[ing] to all political matters, including
matters relating to other levels of government within the national system which exists
under the Constitution"), 214 (per Gaudron, J., describing it as "freedom of political dis-
course"); see also Nationwide News (1992)177 C.L.R. at 50-51 (per Brennan,J., describing it
as "freedom to discuss governments and governmental institutions and political matters");
72-73 (per Deane and Toohey, JJ.) (describing it as "freedom of communication of infor-
mation and opinions about matters relating to the government of the Commonwealth");
94-95 (per Gaudron, J., reiterating that it was "freedom of political discourse"). In Nation-
wide News, three justices (Chief Justice Mason and Justices McHugh and Dawson) did not
consider the implied freedom of political communication, because they based their judg-
ments on an alternate contention that the challenged statutory provisions were outside the
implied incidental powers contained in § 51 (xxxv) of the Australian Constitution. Id. at
26-34 (per Mason, CJ.), 84-91 (per Dawson, J.), 99-105 (per McHugh, J.)). The sixth jus-
tice endorsing the implied freedom, Justice McHugh, took a significantly narrower
approach than his five colleagues. In Australian Capital Television, McHugh stated that the
implied freedom was limited to a "constitutional right to convey and receive opinions,
arguments and information concerning matter intended or likely to affect voting in an
election for the Senate or the House of Representatives." (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 232. The
seventh justice in Australian Capital Television, Justice Dawson, rejected the implied free-
dom of political communication, though he would have found invalid a law that denied
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from the system of representative government set out in the Consti-
tution and the provisions providing for election of representatives
to the Australian Senate and House ofRepresentatives.' 64
All of the justices endorsing this implied freedom expressed it as
a negative right barring legislation, not a positive right.1 65 Those
justices endorsing the implication also made clear that it was not
an absolute right without limitation.1 66 Despite these limitations,
the High Court in both cases invalidated federal legislation that it
found to be inconsistent with this implied right.167 Neither Nation-
wide News nor Australian Capital Television, however, was a defama-
tion case.1 68 Thus, the High Court left open the question of
whether the implied freedom of political communication applied
to defamatory speech, and if so, to what extent.
While in the United States, the application of the First Amend-
ment to libel actions was not resolved for some four decades after
the U.S. Supreme Court first began to take free speech seriously at
electors access to information necessary to exercise a "true choice," which he defined as an
"opportunity to gain an appreciation of the available alternatives." Id. at 184, 187.
164. AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. II, § 7; ch. I, pt. III, § 24.
165. Nationwide News (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 50-1 (per Brennan, J.), 76 (per Deane and
Toohey, JJ.), 94 (per Gaudron, J.).
166. See Australian Capital Television (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 142 (per Mason, C.J.); see
also Nationwide News (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 51 (per Brennan, J.), 76 (per Deane and Too-
hey, JJ.), 94 (per Gaudron, J.).
167. In Nationwide News, the High Court unanimously found the legislation at issue
invalid, although, as noted in note 163,supra, three judges did not base this finding on any
implied freedom of political communication. (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 22, 34 (per Mason,
C.J.), 48, 62 (per Brennan J.), 72, 84 (per Deane and Toohey,J.), 92 (per Dawson,J.), 95
(per Gaudron,J.), 105 (per McHugh,J.). In Australian Capital Television, fourjudges found
the legislation at issue invalid on the basis of the implied freedom of communication.
(1992) 177 C.L.R. at 147 (per Mason, C.J.), 174-75 (per Deane and Toohey, JJ.), 221, 224
(per Gaudron, J.). Justice McHugh found it invalid except in relation to the Territories,
on the basis that it was a "constitutionally unacceptable interference with the rights of
electors to be informed of policies and issues involved in a federal election." Id. at 238,
246. Justice Brennan found it valid in part. Id. at 167 (per Brennan, J.). Justice Dawson
found it wholly valid. Id. at 202-03.
168. Nationwide News concerned the validity of a Commonwealth statutory provision,
Section 299(1)(d) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988. (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 1. This pro-
vided that: "A person shall not.., by writing or speech use words calculated.., to bring a
member of the [Industrial Relations] Commission into disrepute." Industrial Relations Act
1998, § 299(1)(d) (Austl.). A newspaper, the Australian, had been prosecuted under this
provision. Nationwide News, (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 1. Australian Capital Television con-
cerned the validity of certain provisions in another Commonwealth statute, the Political
Broadcasts and Political Disclosures Act 1942. (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 106. This statute
banned political advertisements on television and radio during federal, state, and territory
election campaigns. Id. at 106. The challenged provisions established a system of "free
time" for political advertising, setting out elaborate rules on eligibility and the nature of
the advertisements. Id. at 107.
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the end of World War 1.169 The High Court of Australia confronted
this issue almost immediately in 1994, when it heard two defama-
tion cases: Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., (Theopha-
nous) and Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (Stephens) 170
Theophanous was a defamation action brought by Dr. Andrew
Theophanous, a member of the Australian House of Representa-
tives and the chairperson of the Joint Parliamentary Standing Com-
mittee on Migration Regulations, as well as the chairperson of the
Australian Labour Party's Federal Caucus Immigration Com-
mitee.1 7 ' The allegedly defamatory statements were made in a let-
ter to the editor, headlined "Give Theophanous the Shove," that
was published in the defendant's newspaper. 72 Mr. Theophanous
alleged that the letter accused him of bias and of idiotic actions
regarding immigration issues. 173  In its defense, the newspaper
argued that the implied freedom of political communication in the
Australian Constitution required the introduction of a freestand-
ing Sullivan "actual malice" constitutional defense in Australia,
and, alternatively, that the publication was covered by qualified
privilege.1 74
Although the High Court refused to introduce the Sullivan
"actual malice" test into Australian law, a majority of four justices
found that the implied freedom of political communication
required a slightly different freestanding constitutional defense.
They described the implied freedom very broadly.1 75 The majority
169. Throughout the nineteenth century issues of free speech barely figured into U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence. The First Amendment was given teeth as a result of a series
of powerful dissents and concurrences, starting with the dissent of Justice Oliver Wendall
Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-31 (1919). See also Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting); Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,joined by Holmes,J., concurring); United States
v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653-55 (1929) (Holmes, dissenting). It was not until 1931,
however, that the First Amendment was found to be applicable to the states and thus
potentially applicable to state defamation laws. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,
369 (1931); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931). Another three decades
passed before the U.S. Supreme Court found that state defamation laws were in fact
restricted by the First Amendment. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254.
170. Theophanous v. Herald Weekly Times, Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104 (Austl.); Ste-
phens v. W. Australian Newspapers, Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 211 (Austl.).
171. See Theophanous (1994) 82 C.L.R. at 104.
172. Id. at 117-118.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 118.
175. See id. at 122 (per Mason, C.J. and Toohey and Gaudron, JJ., stating that the
"implied freedom of communication is not limited to communication between the electors
and the elected. Because the system of representative government depends for its efficacy
on the free flow of information and ideas and of debate, the freedom extends to all those
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also found that the implied freedom required a new constitutional
defense for Australia, although this defense was different to that
established in Sullivan;176 however, at this point the majority
diverged.
A three-justice plurality, comprised of Chief Justice Mason, Jus-
tice Toohey, and Justice Gaudron, contended in a joint opinion
that the constitutional defense applicable in Australia placed the
burden on the defendant to establish that it had acted reasonably
in publishing the allegedly defamatory material. 177 This required
the defendant to "establish that it was unaware of the falsity, that it
did not publish recklessly (i.e., not caring whether the matter was
true or false), and that the publication was reasonable." 178 This
was quite different from the Sullivan "actual malice" test, which
presumed protection for speech about public officials unless the
plaintiff could prove publication with "actual malice"; that is, with
knowledge that it was false or reckless as to its truth or falsity. 179
Although Justice Deane agreed that the implied freedom
required a freestanding constitutional defense, Deane did not
agree with the scope of the joint judgment. Endorsing an absolu-
tist approach similar to that for which U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Hugo Black became renowned, Justice Deane interpreted the
implied freedom in a far more radical way than his High Court
colleagues. Deane interpreted the implied freedom, "to preclude
completely the application of State defamation laws to impose lia-
bility in damages upon the citizen for the publication of statements
about the official conduct or suitability of a member of the Parlia-
who participate in political discussion."), 164 (per Deane, J., stating that the freedom
"extends to all political matters, including matters relating to other levels of government
within the national system [of government] which exists under the Constitution" (quoting
Nationwide News Pty. (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 75)). Justices Dawson and McHugh both dis-
sented, denying the existence of any implied freedom of political communication in the
Australian Constitution. Id. at 194 (Dawson, J., dissenting), 197 (McHugh, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan did not deny the existence of an implied freedom of political communica-
tion, which he described as "freedom to discuss governments and governmental institu-
tions and political matters," but found that it could not be inconsistent with the common
law of defamation because it did not apply horizontally to "the rights and liabilities of
individuals inter se." Id. at 147, 153 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
176. See Theophanous (1994) 182 C.L.R. at 137 (per Mason, C.J., and Toohey and
Gaudron, JJ.), 187-88 (per Deane, J., disagreeing with the scope of the defense posited by
the majority but agreeing that Sullivan was inapplicable in Australia and also agreeing with
the majority that a constitutional defense applied to bar liability in damages in the present
case).
177. Id. at 137 (per Mason, C.J. and Toohey and Gaudron, JJ.)
178. Id.
179. See supra note 462 and accompanying text.
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ment or other holder of high Commonwealth office." 80 Due to
this split, the freestanding constitutional defense had a very shaky
foundation.
In Stephens, the companion case to Theophanous, the High Court
had to decide whether the implied freedom of political communi-
cation, as well as the Theophanous constitutional defense, applied to
discussion of state political matters. 8 1 The plaintiffs in Stephens
were six members of the Legislative Council of Western Australia,
who sued for defamation over three newspaper articles published
by the defendant, which accused the plaintiffs of "sneaking off in
secret" on an overseas trip that was "a junket of mammoth propor-
tions." 182 In Stephens, the same 4-3 majority as in Theophanous
found that the implied freedom of political communication
applied to political discussion of state government matters. 183 This
time, however, Justice Deane rather cryptically stated that he did
not adhere to his absolutist views expressed in Theophanous "for the
purposes of this case." 1 4 As a result, Deane concurred with the
answers to the case stated in the joint judgment of Chief Justice
Mason and Justices Toohey and Gaudron, including finding that
the Theophanous constitutional defense was not bad in law.815
Even if Justice Deane's cryptic statement should be interpreted
to mean that the High Court was slightly less split in Stephens than it
was in Theophanous, the High Court was still strongly divided.
Because of this division, the extent to which both of these decisions
would survive was open to question. The 1995 departures of Chief
Justice Mason and Justice Deane from the High Court raised ques-
tions as to how their successors would view Theophanous and Ste-
180. Theophanous (1994) 182 C.L.R. at 185.
181. See Stephens (1994) 182 C.L.R. at 231-32. The High Court also had to determine
whether the traditional defense of qualified privilege was applicable. Id. at 231.
182. Id. at 227-29.
183. See id., 182 at 232 (per Mason, CJ. and Toohey and Gaudron,JJ) (stating that "the
freedom of communication which applies in the Commonwealth Constitution extends to
public discussion of the performance, conduct and fitness for office of members of a State
legislature), 257 (per DeaneJ., concurring). Justice Brennan agreed that the freedom of
communication applied to discussion of state political matters but disagreed that it
affected the common law. Id. at 236 (per Brennan,J.). The remaining two justices, Justices
McHugh and Dawson, adhered to their view in Theophanous that there was no implied
freedom of political discussion, whether of state or Commonwealth matters, in the Austra-
lian Constitution. See id. at 258 (per Dawson, J., dissenting), 259 (per McHugh, J.,
dissenting).
184. Id. at 257.
185. Id.
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phens.186 To the surprise of virtually no one, it took only a few years
before the High Court was invited to reconsider the two cases in
the case of Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Before discussing
how the High Court met that challenge (which will be done in
Section V), this Article will trace constitutional developments paral-
lel to. Australia's in the two other Commonwealth jurisdictions,
starting with New Zealand.
B. New Zealand
Starting with a Westminster model form of government broadly
similar to Australia's, New Zealand also experienced significant
constitutional development in the 1990s, largely attributable to an
activist judiciary. Because New Zealand has no written constitu-
tion, the Australian technique of finding implicit rights in its Con-
stitution could be followed in New Zealand. Instead, New
Zealand's judges invoked a 1990 statute, the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990, which gave the statute a kind of constitutional
authority.
Although New Zealand's government differs from Australia's in
that New Zealand is not a federal system, both antipodean govern-
ments share many fundamental similarities. Like Australia, New
Zealand is also a modern parliamentary democracy and constitu-
tional monarchy.8 7 Under the Westminster model followed by
both New Zealand and Australia, the doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy establishes that there is no higher law than that enacted
by parliament (in the case of New Zealand, the unicameral New
Zealand House of Representatives). Also like Australia, New Zea-
land's government is based on the twin principles of "responsible
government" and "representative government."' 88
As in Australia, the principle of responsible government is
designed to ensure that New Zealand's system of constitutional
monarchy is democratic. Although Queen Elizabeth II of England
is the head of state for New Zealand, she exercises her executive
186. In 1995 ChiefJustice Mason retired andJustice Deane resigned to become Gover-
nor-General of Australia. High Court of Australia Web Page, availabe at http://
www.hcourt.gov.au/justices_02.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2001).
187. SeeJOSEPH, supra note 159, at I (noting that New Zealand's government is more
closely modeled on the Westminster system than any other Commonwealth nation). See
generally Constitution Act 1986 (N.Z.). New Zealand attained legal and constitutional inde-
pendence from Britain in 1947. McDOWELL, supra note 48, § 3.23.
188. McDOWELL, supra note 48, § 3.31(c).
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power through the New Zealand Governor-General, 89 who gener-
ally acts on the advice and consent of New Zealand government
ministers. 90 As Members of Parliament, these ministers are repre-
sentatives of the people.19' Under the principle of "representative
government," it is the New Zealand people, as electors, who are
sovereign.192 In keeping with this Diceyan notion of parliamentary
sovereignty, even the New Zealand Constitution Act of 1986, which
sets out New Zealand's government structure, could be invalidated
by the legislature. 193 Also like Australia, New Zealand has no writ-
ten bill of rights, but unlike Australia, New Zealand also lacks a
separate written constitution. 194
Despite the absence of a written bill of rights, in 1990 New Zea-
land entered into a new era of increased protection for human
rights by enacting legislation entitled the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990. This Act's Long Title states that its purpose is to
"affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental free-
doms in New Zealand," as well as to, "affirm New Zealand's com-
mitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights."' 95 Despite its grand title, the New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act technically does not have constitutional status. In theory, the
189. Constitution Act 1986 § 2 (N.Z.). The current Governor-General is Dame Silvia
Cartwright. Governor-General of New Zealand website available at http://www.gov-
gen.govt.nz/intro/list.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2001).
190. JOSEPH, supra note 159, at 5. The Crown maintains some reserve powers to act
without ministerial advice but these are rarely exercised. Id. at 590-620; see also McDOWELL,
supra note 48, § 3.3.1 (c).
191. Constitution Act 1986 § 6 (N.Z.). As a practical matter, if the government no
longer has the confidence of the House of Representatives, it must resign. See Cabinet Man-
ual on the Constitution of New Zealand: An Introduction to the Foundations of the Current Form of
Government, available at http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/manual/intro.html (last visited
Nov. 26, 2001).
192. JOSEPH, supra note 159, at 6-7, 12, 81; see also McDOWELL, supra note 48, § 3.3.1 (c).
The legislative branch of the New Zealand government is the unicameral House of Repre-
sentatives (formerly the General Assembly), together with the Queen. Constitution Act
1986 §§ 14, 15 (N.Z.). The Queen's parliamentary activities are confined to giving royal
assent through her representative in New Zealand, the Governor-General. Id. §§ 2(1), 16.
193. JOSEPH, supra note 159, at 12, 418, 429. The New Zealand parliament, however,
does not have the power to repeal the predecessor to the Constitution Act 1986 because
that is British Parliamentary legislation. Id. at 14 n.68.
194. McDOWELL, supra note 48, § 3.1.1(a). This does not mean that New Zealand is
entirely without a constitution. It does have constitutional law in many forms, including
statutes, common law, conventions, and the Treaty of Waitangi (an 1840 agreement
between the British and the Maori people, under which the British sought to attain sover-
eignty over New Zealand). See id. §§ 3.2.1 (a) (v), 3.7. New Zealand also has a statute setting
out its governmental structure, the New Zealand Constitution Act of 1986. Constitution Act
1986 (N.Z.).
195. Bill of Rights Act 1990, Preamble (N.Z.).
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New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is just an ordinary statute, subject to
being overruled by Parliament. 96
This "soft," or non-entrenched, nature of the New Zealand Bill
of Rights Act is the result of widespread public opposition to a 1985
proposal for an entrenched bill of rights for New Zealand. 197 This
caused proponents of a bill of rights, most notably Sir Geoffrey
Palmer, to retreat from advocating entrenchment and to substitute
a non-entrenched draft bill of rights legislation.1 98 This draft legis-
lation succeeded, though its enactment was probably less the result
of any particularly enthusiastic popular support, than of Geoffrey
Palmer's new and influential position as Prime Minister of New
Zealand.199
Despite this political compromise, critics of the enacted New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act remained legion. Many deemed the leg-
islation too weak to have much effect.20 0 Of particular concern
were fears that New Zealand's Parliament could take away the
rights in the legislation with impunity, as well as the absence of any
express remedies provision. These critics were proved wrong over
the next decade, the Bill of Rights Act effectively gained constitu-
tional force. 20 1
This constitutional status was achieved by a number of activist
New Zealand judges, who were staunch proponents of protecting
human rights. They invoked the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act to
serve as "the ultimate guardians of liberty."20 2 The New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act provides that New Zealand courts should prefer
196. See id. § 4 (barring a court from declaring legislation invalid or refusing to apply
legislation on the basis that it is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act); see also supra note
152 and accompanying text. When draft legislation is introduced, the Attorney-General
must promptly point out any inconsistencies between the legislation and the Bill of Rights
Act to the House of Representatives.
197. See A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NEW ZEALAND: A WHITE PAPER, 1985 A.J.H.R. A6; see also
Paul Rishworth, The Birth and Rebirth of the Bill of Rights, in RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 14-20
(Grant Huscroft & Paul Rishworth, eds. 1995).
198. See Rishworth, supra note 197, at 20-21 (noting that despite this political compro-
mise, Palmer has retained an abiding preference for an entrenched bill of rights).
199. JOSEPH, supra note 159, at 847, Rishworth, supra note 197, at 23-25.
200. Rishworth, supra note 197, at 23.
201. In the current political climate of New Zealand, repeal of the Bill of Rights Act is
an extremely remote possibility. Luke Nottage, New Zealand Law Through the Internet: The
Commonwealth Legal Tradition and Socio-Legal Experimentation, 6 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC
J.L. 115 (1999), available at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/ issues/v6nl/not-
tage6ltext.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2001).
202. R. v. Te Kira [1993] 3 N.Z.L.R. 257, 275 (P.C.); see also Paul Rishworth, Affirming
the Fundamental Values of the Nation: How the Bill of Rights Act and the Human Rights Act Affect
New Zealand Law, in RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 75 (Grant Huscroft & Paul Rishworth, eds.,
1995).
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interpretations, of legislation that are consistent with the New Zea-
land Bill of Rights Act, 203 but the New Zealand judiciary has gone
far beyond this provision in investing the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act with constitutional authority. For example, in one par-
ticularly significant case, Simpson v. Attorney-General (Paignent's
Case), the New Zealand Court of Appeal created a new sui generis
public law remedy for violating the New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act.20 4 The New Zealand Court of Appeal has also confirmed that
the rights contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act must be
read broadly. 20 5
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act provides for a right of free-
dom of expression in section 14, which provides: "Everyone has the
right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any
form." 20 6 There is a general limitations provision in section 5,
applicable to all rights in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act,
including section 14. Section 5 provides: "[T]he rights and free-
doms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society."20 7
After the passage of the Bill of Rights Act, New Zealand's courts
were confronted with a number of cases involving the right of free-
dom of expression. The issues included contempt of court,2 8
203. Bill of Rights Act 1990 § 6 (N.Z.) (providing "Wherever an enactment can be
given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of
Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning.").
204. See Simpson v. Attorney-General [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 667, 676-677, 692, 702-03, 718
(C.A.).
205. See, e.g., Flickinger v. Crown Colony of Hong Kong [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 439, 440
(C.A.) (interpreting Article 23 of the Bill of Rights Act to give broad meaning to "arrest"
and "detention").
206. The wording of Section 14 is very similar to the wording of Article 19(2) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides: "Everyone shall have
the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice."
207. As a general limitations provision, section 5 departs from Article 19 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which contains a specific limitation on the
right of freedom of expression at Article 19(3). This provides:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restric-
tions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a)
For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of
national security or public order or of the public health and morals.
208. Gisbourne Herald Co Ltd v. Solicitor-General [1995] 3 N.Z.L.R. 563, 571-75
(C.A.); Solicitor-General v. Radio New Zealand [19941 1 N.Z.L.R. 48 (H.C.).
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interim injunctions, 20 9 assessing the quantum of damages in defa-
mation actions, 210 televising courts, 21 and the libel defense of hon-
est opinion.21 2 In all of these cases, the courts have made it clear
that the right of free expression set out in Article 14 of the Bill of
Rights Act must be expressly taken into account in cases where it is
implicated. In some of these cases, the courts have concluded that
existing New Zealand law takes proper account of the right of free
expression in the Bill of Rights Act,213 but in other cases, the New
Zealand courts have invoked Article 14 to justify changes in the
law, including new guidelines for search warrants of media prem-
ises.214 Another change in the law was a finding that media publi-
cation of a correction was a tenable, though novel, remedy in an
action for defamation and malicious falsehood. 215 The treatment
of Article 14 as imposing a constitutional requirement of free
speech into New Zealand law clearly set the stage for a constitu-
tional challenge to other aspects of defamation law, including the
existing defense of qualified privilege.
Before considering the Atkinson case raising that issue, this Arti-
cle will complete this section's review of the constitutional develop-
ments leading to the Commonwealth Courts' constitutionalization
of defamation law by examining such developments in England.
209. Auckland Area Health Board v. Television N.Z. Ltd. [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 406 (C.A.).
210. Television New Zealand, Ltd. v. Quinn [1996] 3 N.Z.L.R. 24 (C.A.).
211. See Television New Zealand Ltd v. R [1996] 3 N.Z.L.R. 393 (C.A.).
212. SeeAwa v. Independent News Auckland Ltd. [1997] 3 N.Z.L.R. 590, 591 (C.A.).
213. See, e.g., Awa [1997] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 595-96 (upholding application of existing
defense of fair comment as justified under the Bill of Rights Act so long as the comment at
issue was factually based and expresses a genuinely held opinion, even where a judge or
jury might not agree with that comment); see also Gisbourne Herald [1995] 3 N.Z.L.R. at
571-75 (upholding existing common law of contempt of court governing pretrial publica-
tions by the media as consistent with Article 14, when balanced against the right to a fair
trial); Auckland Area Health Board [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 407 (finding Article 14 of the Bill
of Rights Act reinforced the common law approach to interim injunctions in defamation
cases, which was that their availability was restricted to cases where there were "clear and
compelling reasons" for ordering such relief); Television New Zealand Ltd. v. New-
smonitor Services Ltd. [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 91, 92 (upholding existing New Zealand copy-
fight law as consistent with Article 14); Quinn [1996] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 37-38, 45, 56-59
(upholding existing approach to assessing damages in defamation actions as consistent
with Article 14).
214. See Television New Zealand Ltd. v. Attorney-General [1995] 2 N.Z.L.R. 641, 646-
48.
215. See TV3 Network Serv. Ltd. v. Everready New Zealand Ltd. [1993] 3 N.Z.L.R. 435,
440-41.
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C. England
Like Australia and New Zealand, the United Kingdom has also
recently experienced constitutional development in the area of
human rights. Recent constitutional developments in the United
Kingdom have been closer to those of New Zealand than Australia.
This is largely because, unlike Australia but like New Zealand, the
United Kingdom has no written constitution or bill of rights. Thus,
it has not been possible for the English judiciary to follow the Aus-
tralian technique of finding implicit rights in a written constitu-
tion. Rather, the United Kingdom has followed the New Zealand
approach of protecting human rights through non-entrenched leg-
islation. This United Kingdom legislation, the Human Rights Act
1998, came into effect only recently, in October 2000.
Like both Australia and New Zealand, the United Kingdom is a
constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. Indeed the
paradigm Westminster model of government in the United King-
dom is founded on the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. 21 6
This doctrine has been somewhat narrowed to make United King-
dom legislation subject to European Community law where appli-
cable. 217 Parliament has also passed legislation (which it could, of
course, subsequently repeal) devolving some legislative power to
the Scottish regional assembly, 21 8 although this devolution has not
created a federal system of government for the United Kingdom. 21 9
Like the governments of Australia and New Zealand, the British
government is also based on the principles of responsibility and
representative government, frequently termed "ministerial respon-
sibility."2 20 The Queen is the head of state in the United Kingdom,
but she must exercise her powers largely on advice and consent of
government ministers. 22' The British government is ultimately
chosen by the British people, through the election of members of
Parliament. A government is generally formed from members of
the majority party in the House of Commons. 22 2 If the govern-
ment's party no longer holds the confidence of the House of Com-
216. ERIC BARENDT, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 105 (1998).
217. See Factortame Ltd. v. Sec'y of State for Transp. (No. 2) 1 A.C. 603, 658 (H.L.
1991) (per Lord Bridge).
218. See Government of Scotland Act 1998; see also Government of Wales Act 1998
(devolving only executive power).
219. BARENDT, supra note 216, at 51.
220. Id. at 120.
221. RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL PRACrIICE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH Gov-
ERNMENT 184 (3d ed. 1999).
222. JOHN F. McELDOWNEY, PUBLIC LAw 70, 89 (1998).
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mons, it can no longer govern and must resign. 223  The
government is thus ultimately responsible to the people.
The structure of the British government is not set out in a writ-
ten constitution, unlike most other countries of the world (New
Zealand being another notable exception). 224 Over the past few
decades there has been considerable pressure from many quarters
for constitutional reform in the form of a written bill of rights.225
In particular, there has been pressure to incorporate the European
Convention on Human Rights into national law. Although English
lawyers had been very influential in drafting the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (European Convention), by the end of the
twentieth century the United Kingdom stood alone among West-
ern European members of the Council of Europe by failing to
incorporate the European Convention into national law.226
By 1997 when a Labour government was elected after eighteen
years of Conservative rule, this pressure to incorporate the Euro-
pean Convention had borne fruit. The new government made leg-
islative incorporation of the European Convention a top
priority;2 27 the result was the enactment of the Human Rights Act
in 1998. Despite its history, it is important to understand that the
Human Rights Act does not, in fact, incorporate the European
Convention into English law, as many incorrectly believe. 228
Rather, it makes it possible to enforce certain, though not all,
European Convention rights in United Kingdom courts. 229 A right
to bring enforcement proceedings in the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg has been retained, provided national
remedies are exhausted.
The Human Rights Act of 1998 imposes obligations on courts
and "public authorities." Courts must interpret primary and
subordinate legislation "in a way which is compatible with the
223. BARENDT, supra note 216, at 121.
224. MCELDOWNEY, supra note 222, at 6.
225. See RICHARD CLAYTON & HUGH TOMLINSON, I THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 41-63
(2000).
226. Id. at 47-48.
227. Francesca Klug, The Human Rights Act: A General Overview, in HUMAN RIGHTS FOR
THE NEW MILLENNiUM 53 (Frances Butler, ed., 2000).
228. See Alasdair A. Gillespie, Human Rights Act 1998: The Five Minute Tour, available at
http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/ukcor3.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2001).
229. The Human Rights Act applies to all of the thirteen main European Convention
rights except Article 13, providing for an effective remedy for breach of the European
Convention. It does not include all of the European Convention's Protocols but only Arti-
cles 1-3 of the First Protocol and Articles 1-2 of the Sixth Protocol, to be read with Articles
16 and 18 of the European Convention. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 1 (1) (Eng.).
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[European] Convention rights [included in the Act] ,"230 If a court
finds itself unable to read legislation in such a way, it can make a
"declaration of incompatibility. '" 231 Thus, in keeping with the doc-
trine of parliamentary supremacy, English courts cannot strike
down primary legislation.
"Public authorities" are barred from acting "in a way which is
incompatible with a [European] Convention right."232  The
Human Rights Act's definition of "public authority" is somewhat
unclear; besides courts and tribunals, it includes "any person cer-
tain of whose functions are functions of a public nature" but not if
the act at issue is private. 233 In keeping with the doctrine of parlia-
mentary supremacy, Parliament is expressly excluded from the
definition.
Freedom of expression is one of the European Convention
rights included in the Human Rights Act of 1998.234 There is also a
special provision relating to freedom of expression at Schedule 1,
Section 12.235 This is applicable to courts that are "considering
whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect the exer-
cise of the [European] Convention right to freedom of expres-
sion."236 Such courts must give particular regard to the importance
of the European Convention right to freedom of expression. 237
Although prior to the Human Rights Act, there was no British
legislation giving effect to European Convention rights, including
the right to freedom of expression, there were hundreds of cases in
which the English courts considered English law in the context of
European Convention rights. 238 In Derbyshire County Council v.
Times Newspapers, however, the House of Lords held that Article 10
had no application to the interpretation of the English common
law, contrary to the approach of the Court of Appeal below. 239
After the Human Rights Act, the stage was clearly set for the impact
230. Id. § 3(1).
231. Id. § 4(2).
232. Id. § 6(1).
233. Id. §§ 6(3)(b), 6(5).
234. Id. Sch. 1 Art. 10.
235. Human Rights Act, 1998, Sch. 1 Art. 12.
236. Id. Sch. 1 Art. 12(1).
237. Id. Sch. I Art. 12(4).
238. STEPHEN GROSZ, JACK BEATSON, & PETER DUFFY, HUMAN RiGHTS: THE 1998 ACT AND
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 3 (2000) (noting that over 650 English cases referred to the
European Convention on Human Rights between 1964 and 1999).
239. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers, 1 All E.R. 1011, 1020-21 (H.L.
1993).
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of that legislation on the English law of defamation, including
qualified privilege.
V. THE COMMONWEALTH CONFRONTS THE SULLIVAN PROBLEM
The constitutional developments of the 1990s led to constitu-
tional challenges to the law of defamation in the Commonwealth
Courts. By the end of the decade, the Commonwealth Courts had
all confronted the same question faced by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Sullivan: what is the proper constitutional balance between the
right to protection of reputation and the competing right to free-
dom of expression? In Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Atkinson,
and Reynolds, these challenges all resulted in the constitutionaliza-
tion of the common law of defamation.
This section explores the nature of this constitutionalization by
first reviewing all three Commonwealth Cases and then comparing
them to each other. Each case is considered in turn, in the order it
was brought, which is not necessarily the same order as the date of
the final relevant decision. Australian Broadcasting Corporation is
reviewed first, then Atkinson, and finally Reynolds. The review of
each case examines its facts, procedural history, and the particular
constitutional solution it fashioned for the Sullivan problem.
Unlike Sullivan, none of the Commonwealth Courts endorsed a
freestanding constitutional defense like the "actual malice" test.
Nevertheless, all of the Commonwealth Cases resulted in broader pro-
tection for political speech than had previously been available
under traditional common law or statute. They all found that the
public interest of modern society necessitated expanding the
existing common law defense of qualified privilege. The philo-
sophical underpinning for this expansion was a fundamentally
Madisonian rationale based on a democracy's interest in ensuring
a sufficiently well-informed electorate.
This section will conclude by comparing these expanded com-
mon law defenses with each other. This comparison will focus on a
number of differences between the Commonwealth Cases- the scope
of the expanded common law privilege, the existence and nature
of any prerequisites for the privilege, and what is required to defeat
the privilege.
A. Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (Australia)
The Australian case of Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation
was the first of the Commonwealth Cases. In this case, the High
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Court of Australia unanimously held that an implied freedom of
political discussion in the Australian Constitution required an
extension of the traditional Australian common law defense of
qualified privilege. This extension took the form of a generic cate-
gory of privilege applicable to certain political discussion widely
published for the general public. The extended privilege was sub-
ject to a reasonableness requirement and could be overridden by
proof of malice, which was defined more narrowly than it had been
under the traditional common law.
The plaintiff in Australian Broadcasting Corporation was David
Lange, the former Prime Minister of New Zealand.2 40 Lange
brought a libel action in the Supreme Court of New South Wales
over an Australian Broadcasting Corporation television documen-
tary, which had been broadcast throughout Australia on the long-
running political affairs program "Four Corners."24 1 At the time of
the broadcast in April 1989, Lange was still Prime Minister; he left
that office a few months later.242 Lange complained that the docu-
mentary alleged that he was unfit to hold public office and that he
had abused his office. 243
The defendant raised, inter alia, a defense of common law quali-
fied privilege and also a constitutional defense based on the The-
ophanous and Stephens cases. 244 Lange sought to strike out both
defenses as bad in law; 2 4 5 he argued that the Theophanous/Stevens
constitutional defense did not apply to non-Australian politicians
and, in the alternative, that both Theophanous and Stevens were
wrongly decided. 246
The Australian High Court, where the case had been removed,
considered both of these issues. In a unanimous decision, the
High Court found that, as precedent, both Theophanous and Ste-
phens were lacking in weight. 247 Neither case clearly established a
"binding statement on constitutional principle." 248 Thus, although
five of the seven High Court Justices in Australian Broadcasting Cor-
poration had ruled in Theophanous and Stephens, the High Court
240. Australian Broad. Corp. (1997)189 C.L.R. at 521.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 550-52; see supra note 170.
245. Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. at 551.
246. Id. at 551-52.
247. Id. at 556.
248. Id. at 554.
[Vol. 34
Rethinking Sullivan
entirely reconsidered the legality of the pleaded defenses. 2 49 The
High Court found that Theophanous and Stephens were good law in
Australia only in part. They had been correctly decided to the
extent that they held that the common law of Australia was subject
to the Australian Constitution. 250 However, Theophanous and Stevens
had been wrongly decided insofar as they established a separate
constitutional defense for political discussion. 251
The Australian Broadcasting Corporation court confirmed that the
Australian Constitution contained an implied right of political
communication, which was necessary to enable the Australian peo-
ple to freely exercise their right to vote in Australia's democratic
political system. 2 52 The High Court gave unanimous support to a
broad interpretation of the implied freedom, like that of the joint
plurality judgment in Theophanous. This broad interpretation con-
sidered that, to be effective, the freedom had to be wider than
applicable only to election periods; 253 However, despite the
breadth of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation court's implied
freedom, it had some significant limitations.
One limitation was that the implied freedom was not a positive
right. Consistent with Nationwide News and Australian Capital Televi-
sion, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation court found that the
implied freedom only served to invalidate conflicting laws and did
not confer rights on individuals.2 54 Consequently, the implied
freedom could not create any private constitutional defenses like
the Theophanous constitutional defense. Another limit on the
implied freedom is that it is restricted to "what is necessary for the
effective operation of that system of representative and responsible
government provided for by the Constitution." 255 The combined
effect of these limitations was that the implied freedom could only
249. The five justices were Brennan, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, and McHugh. The
two new justices were Gummow and Kirby. Id. at 520; Theophanous (1994) 182 C.L.R. at
104; Stephens (1994) 182 C.L.R. at 211.
250. See Australian Broad. Corp. (1997)189 C.L.R. at 556.
251. See id. at 576.
252. See id. at 560. This implicit freedom resulted from Section 7 of the Australian
Constitution, which provides that "[t]he Senate shall be composed of senators for each
State, directly chosen by the people of the State, voting, until the Parliament otherwise
provides, as one electorate," and from Section 24, an analogous provision for the House of
Representatives, as well as other related provisions concerning electoral rights. Id.
253. Id. at 561. This breadth was also required by other Constitutional provisions pro-
viding for responsible ministerial government, including Sections 6, 49, 62, 64, and 83, and
also the provision providing for referendum before the Constitution could be amended,
Section 128. Id.
254. Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. at 560.
255. Id. at 561.
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invalidate Australian federal, state or territory statutes, or common
law that fails to meet two requirements. The first requirement, that
the federal, state or territory statutes, or common law were in keep-
ing with the Australian constitutional system of "representative and
responsible government," and the second was that they were pro-
portionate or "reasonably appropriate and adapted" to some lawful
purpose.256 Theophanous and Stephens had failed to expressly con-
sider these requirements, and hence reconsideration of those deci-
sions was necessary.257
The High Court then considered whether the existing Australian
common law of qualified privilege, as well as the New South Wales
statutory defense of qualified privilege, comported with the Austra-
lian Constitution. 25 It noted that the common law defense was
founded on the public interest or the "common convenience and
welfare of society."25 9 The defense of qualified privilege thus had
to strike the proper balance between protection of reputation and
freedom to discuss "government and political matters." 260 As soci-
ety changed and developed, the public interest might necessitate a
shift in this balance and require an adjustment to the parameters
of qualified privilege. 261
Modern Australian society experienced a number of changes
that mandated a shift in the balance of protections from that of the
traditional law of qualified privilege: a wider and more literate elec-
torate, changes in federal and state political structures, and the
development of a modern mass media.262 The High Court found
that the law of qualified privilege, both common law and statutory,
now needed expansion to include "information, opinions and
arguments concerning government and political matters that affect
the people of Australia." 263 The public interest of modern Austra-
lian society would be "advanced by discussion about government
and political matters." 264 The expanded privilege should be broad
enough to apply even to matters going beyond the choice of elec-
tors at the federal level. It would include discussions of politics at
256. Id. at 561-62.
257. Id. at 569.
258. Id. at 568.
259. Id. at 565 (citing the famous English case of Toogood, 1 CM & R at 193).
260. Australian Broad. Corp. (1997)189 C.L.R. at 565.
261. Id. at 565-66.
262. See id. at 565.
263. Id. at 571.
264. Id.
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the state and territory level, as well as discussions of politics of
other countries or of the United Nations. 265
The High Court, however, mandated a "reasonableness" require-
ment before the expanded privilege could apply to publications
that had been widely published to the general public. 266 This pre-
requisite was necessary to counter the risk of extensive damage to
reputation that could result from such a wide publication. 2 7 Mal-
ice, the only safeguard for reputation under other traditional occa-
sions of common law qualified privilege, was insufficient protection
where the privilege was extended to include publications made to
the public generally.26
To satisfy the Australian Broadcasting Corporation reasonableness
requirement, a defendant did not need to establish the extra ele-
ments of the plurality in Theophanous, which required a defendant
to establish that it was not aware that the material published was
untrue and that it did not act recklessly. 269 Rather, the Australian
Broadcasting Corporation reasonableness test required the defendant
to prove that she had acted reasonably under the circumstances.
Normally a court should not find Australian Broadcasting Corporation
reasonableness where a defendant had acted recklessly or with
knowledge that the material published was false. 270 Moreover, the
Australian Broadcasting Corporation reasonableness requirement
would not be met unless the defendant had a reasonable basis for
believing the statement was true, did not believe it was untrue, did
everything reasonably possible to verify the truth of the material,
and published the plaintiff's side of the story, where practicable. 271
Unlike the approach of the Theophanous plurality, Australian
Broadcasting Corporation retained, at least to a limited degree, the
common law safeguard of malice. As under the traditional com-
mon law of qualified privilege, if the publication was actuated by ill-
will, or some other improper motive in making the statement, the
privilege would be defeated. 272 The High Court stated: "We see no
reason why a publisher who has used the occasion to give vent to its
265. Id.
266. Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. at 572.
267. Id.
268. See id. The High Court did not really elaborate on its reasoning in this regard,
other than to say, "a test devised for situations where usually only one person receives the
publication is unlikely to be appropriate when the publication is to tens of thousands, or
more, of readers, listeners, or viewers." Id.
269. Id. at 573.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 574.
272. Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. at 574.
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ill-will or other improper motive should escape liability for the pub-
lication of false and defamatory statements." 273 The High Court
emphasized that the mere existence of ill-will on the part of a
defendant was insufficient to defeat privilege; what was needed was
a causal link between ill-will and publication or proof that the pub-
lication was "actuated" by some improper motive.274
The Australian Broadcasting Corporation test for misuse of privi-
lege, however, appears to be much narrower than the common law
test for malice. 275 First, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation court
interpreted "improper motive" in a limited manner. Only proof
that the statement was made for some improper purpose other
than for communicating government or political information or
ideas could amount to improper motive. 276 The court specifically
stated that seeking to cause political damage would not amount to
a sufficiently improper motive. 277 Second, Australian Broadcasting
Corporation appears to diverge from the traditional common law
rule that malice can be established by proof that a defendant
lacked belief in the truth of his publication. 278 Lack of belief is
irrelevant for the extended privilege; only an improper motive
would suffice to counter the extended privilege.2 79
Applying the law of qualified privilege, as expanded, to the facts,
the High Court refused to strike out the pleaded defense of quali-
fied privilege. The High Court also noted that once the common
law defense of qualified privilege was extended, the statutory
defense under Section 22 of the New South Wales Defamation Act
did not violate the Australian Constitution. 280 This was because it
was "reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieve the protection
of reputation once it provides for the extended application of the
law of qualified privilege. '" 28 1 The High Court warned, however,
that the statutory law of other Australian States might need
alteration. 28 2
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See Walker, supra note 32, at 23.
276. See Australian Broad. Corp. (1997)189 C.L.R. at 574.
277. Id.
278. See supra note 115.
279. See Australian Broad. Corp. (1997)189 C.L.R. at 574.
280. Id. at 575.
281. Id.
282. See id.
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B. Lange v. Atkinson (New Zealand)
The next case to be filed in the trilogy of Commonwealth Cases was
the New Zealand case of Lange v. Atkinson. In this case, the New
Zealand Court of Appeal held that the constitutional guarantee of
free expression required the extension of the traditional common
law defense of qualified privilege. This extension took the form of
a generic category of privilege applicable to certain political discus-
sion that was published widely to the general public. This
extended defense was not subject to any reasonableness or other
prerequisite, but could be overcome by proof of misuse of the
occasion of qualified privilege, which was effectively the same test
as common law malice.
Although this case was appealed to the Privy Council, the New
Zealand Court of Appeal had the final say. The Privy Council
decided that it should defer to the Court of Appeal in this type of
case where value judgments dependent on local conditions had to
be made. 2 3
The plaintiff in Atkinson was the same as in the Australian Broad-
casting Corporation. In the midst of fighting his Australian libel bat-
tle, Mr. Lange commenced a second libel action in New Zealand.
At this time, Mr. Lange was no longer Prime Minister but was a
Member of Parliament for Mangere electorate and a senior mem-
ber of the parliamentary opposition in New Zealand.28 4 In this
case, Lange was incensed about allegations regarding his perform-
ance as a politician found in an article and in an accompanying
cartoon published by a national magazine. 28 5 These allegations
were a mixture of fact and opinion, for example, "[f]or whatever
reason-angina pains, boredom, or some inner demon, he found
it hard to sit still and often turned over the Cabinet chair to Geof-
frey Palmer while he ambled off to the toilet, to his office, or even
to the self-drive car which he liked to take out for a recreational
spin on the Wellington motorway." 28 6 The cartoon showed Lange
seated at the breakfast table eating from a packet bearing the label
"Selective memory regression for advanced practitioners. '" 28 7
Lange claimed that the article and cartoon together bore the
283. See Atkinson [2000] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 261.
284. See Atkinson [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 25.
285. See id. The article was written by a political scientist and journalist, J.B. Atkinson,
and published in a magazine, "North and South," with a wide circulation throughout New
Zealand. Both Atkinson and the publisher, Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd., were
named defendants. See id.
286. Id. at 26.
287. Id. at 27.
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defamatory sting that he was "irresponsible, dishonest, insincere,
manipulative, and lazy."288
Among other defenses, defendants pleaded qualified privilege,
as well as a "defence [sic] of political expression" inspired by the
recent Australian Theophanous and Stephens cases. Lange applied to
strike out these defenses. 289
1. The High Court Extends the Common Law to Find a
Generic Category of Privilege for Certain Political
Discussion
The trial judge, Justice Elias, dismissed Mr. Lange's application,
though she ruled that the two defenses should be pleaded together
as one qualified privilege defense. 290 She found that New Zea-
land's "unitary legal system" did not require a freestanding consti-
tutional defense of political expression separate from qualified
privilege. 291 However, she found that constitutional guarantees of
human rights necessitated the expansion of the New Zealand com-
mon law of qualified privilege. 292
Invoking the public interest of modern New Zealand society, Jus-
tice Elias found that the proper balance of the right of free speech
against free expression was a new generic category of qualified priv-
ilege. This was applicable to "political discussion" published to the
general public, at least in the case of claims for damages for defa-
mation. 293 Relying on the plurality judgment in Theophanous, she
defined "political discussion" as "discussion which bears upon the
288. Id. at 25-26. Lange claimed that he was defamed in sixteen passages in the article.
For the curious, they are set out in the High Court judgment of Elias, J. See id. at 26-27.
289. See id. at 25, 29. Applicable New Zealand rules authorize striking out of pleadings
where these "disclose no cause of action." See id. at 29.
290. See Atkinson [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 48, 51.
291. Id. at 48.
292. Id. at 31-32 (applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act protections to the com-
mon law).
293. Id. at 46, 48. Justice Elias made clear that her ruling was limited to claims for
damages, stating:
Nothing I have said is intended to suggest that the privilege would be a defence to
an application for a declaration. The availability of qualified privilege as a
defence to a claim for declaration will need to be considered carefully in a case
where it arises. If the defendant is protected against liability for damages, a bal-
ance in keeping with the pragmatic approach of the common law may be that the
defence does not apply to a claim for declaration. Much will turn on the assess-
ment of whether the costs of litigation and the exposure to solicitor and client
costs in an application for declaration is unacceptably chilling of political
discussion.
Id. at 48.
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function of electors in a representative democracy by developing
and encouraging views upon government."294
Justice Elias rejected any Australian-style reasonableness-require-
ment for New Zealand, emphasizing that the balance between pro-
tecting freedom of speech and reputation "ultimately must be a
value judgment informed by local circumstances and guided by
principle."295 Moreover, this expanded defense should apply to
the media to the same extent as to any other publisher.296 She
admitted that the boundary between private conduct and conduct
that was sufficiently public to attract the privilege was a fuzzy
one,
2 9 7 but she did not consider that to be a mortal flaw.
2. The New Zealand Court of Appeal Affirms
Mr. Lange appealed to the New Zealand Court of Appeal. The
sole issue on appeal was the viability of the defense of qualified
privilege. The New Zealand Court of Appeal unanimously
affirmed the High Court's judgment, agreeing that New Zealand
law should expand the common law of qualified privilege. 298 This
expansion created a new generic category of qualified privilege.
This applied to "generally-published statements made about the
actions and qualities of those currently or formerly elected to Par-
liament and those with immediate aspirations to be members, so
far as those actions and qualities directly affect or affected their
capacity (including their personal ability and willingness) to meet
their public responsibilities."299 This defense was applicable to def-
amation claims seeking damages and probably to other remedies as
294. Id.
295. See id. at 43, 50 (finding such a requirement improper under New Zealand law
because it would introduce concepts of malice going beyond the statutory restatement in
the 1992 Defamation Act, and would also result in undesirable inconsistencies with the
statutory defence of honest opinion. Justice Elias also noted that "[a]s long as the publica-
tion does not exceed the occasion, qualified privilege as developed by the common law has
not been based upon fault.")
296. Atkinson [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 47.
297. Id. at 46-47.
298. SeeAtkinson [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 428. The leadingjudgment ofJustice Blanchard
was joined by three otherjustices, Justices Richardson, Henry, and Keith. Justice Tipping
concurred, agreeing "with some hesitation" with the result and most of the reasoning of
the leading judgment. Id. at 477-79. Where Justice Tipping departed from the majority
was in his analysis of whether the expanded defense should include a reasonableness
requirement akin to that laid down by the Australian High Court. Id.; see supra notes 323-
326 and accompanying text.
299. See Atkinson [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 468.
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well. 30 0 Thus,, the defendants' pleading should not be struck
out.
3 0 I
The New Zealand Court of Appeal supported its conclusion by
reviewing the law of qualified privilege in common law jurisdic-
tions. This review showed a steadily broadening defense of quali-
fied privilege, both common law and statutory, that was
increasingly being applied to new occasions of political discussion
even where widely published to the general public.30 2 In a novel
and somewhat dubious interpretation of previous English and New
Zealand case law, the court claimed that there was really no strict
requirement of reciprocity of interest and duty for the common
law defense of qualified privilege.30 3 The New Zealand Court of
Appeal also contended that, by reason of its foundation in consid-
erations of public good and public policy, the common law was
inherently extremely flexible and adaptable to changing circum-
stances. 30 4 In his leading judgment, Justice Blanchard stated: "This
is not an area of law controlled and regulated by precise rules."30 5
The New Zealand Court of Appeal, however, did note that even
this ever-widening defense of qualified privilege had some limits.
One limit was that it would not apply generally to any statement
that was not in the general public's interest.30 6
In determining the proper extent of the defense of qualified
privilege under New Zealand law, the court again employed a com-
parative approach. Justice Blanchard examined the legal protec-
tion afforded to statements about politicians and other public
figures under the laws of Canada, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Australia.30 7 He also considered the jurisprudence
300. See id. at 470 (not expressing a final view on remedies other than damages, but
indicating that the privilege would apply).
301. Id. at 471.
302. See id. at 440, 445.
303. See id. at 440-41 (pointing out that in Adam v. Ward, the House of Lords case
generally cited on in support of the reciprocity requirement, the requirement had only
been endorsed by one judge, Lord Atkinson). I would note that the Court of Appeal's
ruling seems rather inadequate. No New Zealand cases were cited in support of the
absence of the reciprocity requirement; my review of the traditional New Zealand common
law of qualified privilege indicates that there are many New Zealand cases that specifically
refer to the reciprocity requirement. The Court of Appeal contended that many of the
"infinitely various combinations of circumstances to which the privilege might apply" do
not have a reciprocal duty or interest. But they provided no examples. Id. at 441.
304. Atkinson [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 438-40.
305. Id. at 440.
306. Id. at 442.
307. See id. at 450-57. In fact, the Court of Appeal reviewed only English, not Scottish,
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of the European Court of Human Rights relating to Article 10 of
the European Convention, which guarantees freedom of expres-
sion. 30 8 He found the European cases "of real assistance" due to
the similarities between the wording of Article 10 and the analo-
gous section under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Sec-
tion 14). 309 This comparative exercise led Justice Blanchard to
conclude that solutions to the problem of the proper balance
between freedom of expression and the protection of reputation
were not uniform across cultures, but would vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction depending on values. 310 Influenced by Justice Bren-
nan's opinion in Sullivan, Blanchard emphasized that the balance
will depend on its "political and social context and history."311
An examination of the political, social, and constitutional con-
text of contemporary New Zealand led also to a conclusion that a
generic privilege for political discussion was applicable. New Zea-
land society had moved from a society in which the monarch was
sovereign to one in which the citizens of New Zealand had ultimate
political power. 31 2 This shift could be seen through the broaden-
ing of the voter base, the adoption of proportional representation,
greater access by citizens to government information under the
Official Information Act of 1982, and a growing transparency of
government information as a result of various pieces of legisla-
tion.313 As a result, it was important that New Zealand citizens have
access to information concerning the fitness for office of politi-
cians or those aspiring to political office. 314 Parliament had con-
firmed the importance of this goal by repealing certain criminal
offenses for political statements. 31 5 Also relevant to a changed con-
stitutional context for New Zealand was the enactment of the Bill
of Rights Act of 1990, which contained wide protections for free-
dom of expression. 31 6 The New Zealand Court of Appeal was also
influenced by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
308. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230.
309. See supra note 308
310. Atkinson [19981 3 N.Z.L.R. at 459.
311. Id. at 460.
312. Id. at 462-65. The Court of Appeal was heavily influenced by the writings of the
nineteenth century legal scholar Sir James Fitzjames Stephen. See id. at 461-61, 463.
313. Id. at 463-64.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 464 (namely, criminal libel and the offense of publishing untruthful matters
calculated to influence votes during an election campaign or local election or poll).
316. Atkinson [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 465.
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Rights, which it read to support a lesser reputational right for poli-
ticians acting in their public capacity.317
The New Zealand Court of Appeal rejected the contention that
any such extension of the law of qualified privilege should be left
to Parliament.3 1 8 There were three reasons for this. First, this
extension of the law of qualified privilege was only a "refinement"
of the law, not a sweeping change in the law.319 Second, it was
appropriate for courts to make value judgments in the context of
qualified privilege, and they had been doing so for hundreds of
years. 320 Finally, Parliament had declined to significantly rework
the defense of qualified privilege in the Defamation Act of 1992
because they had delegated the determination of the proper scope
of this defense to the courts. 321
The New Zealand New Zealand Court of Appeal indicated that
the proper scope of the extended defense of qualified privilege
might be even broader than statements made about the fitness for
office of politicians currently elected to or seeking election to the
New Zealand Parliament. Justice Blanchard stated that "[t]he
nature of New Zealand's democracy means that the wider public
may have a proper interest in respect of generally-published state-
ments which directly concern the functioning of representative
and responsible government."3 22
The New Zealand Court of Appeal, however, declined to follow
Australia by requiring any "reasonableness" prerequisite for the
privilege. 323 It is true that Justice Tipping, in his concurring opin-
ion, took the view that reasonableness could be a consideration in
determining whether the defendant had taken improper advan-
tage of the occasion of publication and thus lost the privilege.324
The New Zealand Court of Appeal, however, found that no reason-
ableness prerequisite had ever been laid down for the common
law, nor had it been added to the law by statute. 325 Moreover, it
contended that there was logical inconsistency inherent in such a
reasonableness requirement. Since the common law of qualified
317. See id. at 458-59.
318. Id. at 462.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Atkinson [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 468.
323. Id. at 469.
324. Id. at 477. Tipping was concerned about ensuring that reputation was adequately
protected, especially where "it is a sad fact that the necessary responsibility is not always
shown" by the media. Id. at 472-73.
325. Atkinson [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 469.
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privilege was premised on the proper interest in receiving informa-
tion, even if that information was false, that interest should in no
way be affected by how reasonably the defendant had acted to
ensure that any such information was true. 326
3. The Privy Council Backs Off
Mr. Lange appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council. 32 7 The Privy Council held that its limits as an appellate
tribunal were now circumscribed in New Zealand cases where there
was a "high content ofjudicial policy" making local conditions rele-
vant.328 This was such a case.329 It was for the New Zealand Court
of Appeal to make any value judgments because it was better
placed to do so as a local court.330
The Privy Council, however, was concerned that the New Zea-
land Court of Appeal had not had the benefit of the recent judg-
ments of the English Court of Appeal and House of Lords in
Reynolds, decided after the New Zealand Court of Appeal had
heard Atkinson.331 Since both English courts had considered the
Atkinson decision, along with the Australian High Court's decision
in Australian Broadcast Corporation, the Privy Council considered
that the New Zealand Court of Appeal should likewise have had the
chance to take Reynolds into account, even though Reynolds was not
binding in New Zealand. 33 2 The Privy Council thus formally
allowed Lange's appeal and remanded the case to the New Zealand
Court of Appeal for further rehearing. 333
The Privy Council emphasized that it was in no way attempting
to influence the New Zealand Court of Appeal to rule in tandem
with Reynolds or with Australian Broadcasting Corporation.334 It noted
that all of the judgments in the Commonwealth Cases had accepted
the importance of taking local politics and social conditions into
account when determining the proper balance between freedom
326. Id. at 469-70. They also argued that this would make the statutory reformulation
of malice (in the 1992 New Zealand Defamation Act) totally irrelevant. See id. at 471.
327. The New Zealand Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal. See Atkinson [2000] 1
N.Z.L.R. 258.
328. Id. at 263.
329. See id.
330. Id. at 261-62.
331. Id. at 263.
332. See supra notes 362-362 and accompanying text for an analysis of Reynolds.
333. Atkinson [2000] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 258. No costs order was made on the appeal to the
Privy Council; costs were said to be a matter for the New Zealand court. Id.
334. Id.
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of expression and protecting reputation. 335 The judgment of the
Privy Council, however, highlighted the similarities between the
governments and histories of all three parliamentary democracies,
stating: "[w]hether the differences in detail of their constitutional
structure and relevant statute law have any truly significant bearing
on the scope of qualified privilege for political discussion is among
the aspects calling for consideration." 336
4. Back to the New Zealand Court of Appeal
On reconsideration, a panel composed of the same five New Zea-
land Court of Appeal justices337 who had ruled earlier in the case
dismissed Mr. Lange's appeal after "carefully consider[ing]" Reyn-
olds.338 The court largely upheld its previous judgment stating that
"we would not strike the balance differently from the way it was
struck in 1998."3 9
The New Zealand Court of Appeal reconfirmed its five main pre-
vious conclusions, namely that (i) qualified privilege could apply to
statements that were published widely to the general public; (ii)
qualified privilege could apply to generally-published statements
that "directly concern the functioning of representative and
responsible government, including statements about the perform-
ance or possible future performance of specific individuals in
elected public office;" (iii) qualified privilege was capable of apply-
ing to statements made about those currently elected to New Zea-
land's Parliament or aspiring to be elected to Parliament, insofar as
those statements directly concern the "functioning of representa-
tive and responsible government;" (iv) qualified privilege would
only apply to matters of public concern; (v) the extent of the privi-
lege for a particular statement would depend on the extent of that
public concern..3 40
The New Zealand Court of Appeal, however, noted that in its
previous judgment, it had not meant to indicate that the circum-
stances of publication should be ignored in determining whether
qualified privilege was applicable to a particular statement.341 Even
335. Id. at 261.
336. See id. at 264.
337. The judges were Justices Richardson, Henry, Keith, Blanchard, and Tipping.
Atkinson [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 385.
338. See id. at 389, 405. Readers unfamiliar with Reynolds may wish to read supra notes
362-362 and the accompanying text before reading this subsection.
339. Id. at 399.
340. Id. at 390-91.
341. See id. at 391.
[Vol. 34
Rethinking Sullivan
if the subject matter of a statement was capable of being privileged,
the circumstances of publication might be such that the statement
should not be protected because maker and recipient had no
shared interest in publishing it.342 The New Zealand Court of
Appeal essentially agreed with the House of Lords in Reynolds on
this point.3 4
3
The New Zealand Court of Appeal, however, criticized the
House of Lords for blurring the difference between an occasion of
qualified privilege and its misuse. 344 This blurring resulted in too
much uncertainty and an excessive chilling effect on the media
and also arguably interfered too much with the role of the jury in
libel cases. 345 The jury's role in determining whether the privilege
was misused would be eliminated if factors relating to misuse were
included in the test for determining whether there was an occasion
of qualified privilege, which was for a judge alone to determine.3 46
The New Zealand Court of Appeal took up the Privy Council's
invitation to consider whether there were any significant constitu-
tional and political differences between New Zealand and the
United Kingdom and easily answered this in the affirmative. 347
There were three major differences. 348 First, the United Kingdom
did not share New Zealand's proportional representation sys-
tem.349  Second, New Zealand legislation had resulted in far
greater access to government information by New Zealand citizens
than British subjects had.350 Third, the New Zealand Bill of Rights
342. See id. at 393. Note that the New Zealand Court of Appeal seems here to be revert-
ing to a reciprocity requirement.
343. See supra notes 393-397 and accompanying text. The New Zealand Court of
Appeal criticized Lord Hope of Craighead for suggesting in Reynolds that the difference
between the English Court of Appeal's circumstantial test and the House of Lords'
approach was purely a semantic difference. Atkinson [2000] 3 N.Z.LR. at 394 (noting that
"[t]hat is debatable because a shared interest cannot be divorced from the circumstances
in which a communication is made").
344. They argued that the factors laid down by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead did not
adequately distinguish between occasion of privilege and misuse of privilege. Atkinson
[2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 395.
345. Id. at 394-95.
346. See id. at 395.
347. Id.
348. Besides the three differences listed in the text, the court also was influenced by a
few other matters that indicated that New Zealand law gave broader protection generally to
political discussion: first, New Zealand had repealed some laws relating to political expres-
sion whereas England had not, id. at 397, second, unlike England, New Zealand's defama-
tion act did not contain a provision reversing a common law case that upheld freedom of
political discussion, Braddock v. Bevans, see id.
349. Id. at 395.
350. Atkinson [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 395-96.
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Act had a narrower focus than the United Kingdom Human Rights
Act, and the United Kingdom Act seemed to specifically dictate a
case-by-case balancing approach in freedom of expression cases. 35'
The Australian system was also different from both New Zealand
and the United Kingdom in all three respects. With regard to vot-
ing and access to information, Australia was somewhat closer to the
New Zealand system, but Australia stood apart from New Zealand
and England in lacking human rights legislation. 352
Another potential difference, which the Privy Council had
invited the New Zealand Court of Appeal to take into account, was
the "responsibility and vulnerability of the press." 353 The court
pointed out significant differences between the British and New
Zealand press. While admitting that "[g]eneralisations in this area
are dangerous," they concluded that the British tabloid press was
generally less responsible than the New Zealand press. 354 They also
noted structural differences. Unlike the United Kingdom national
papers, New Zealand's newspapers tended to be regional and,
reflecting the smaller New Zealand population, have very small cir-
culations.355 Moreover, they were not engaged in such ferocious
competition as their United Kingdom counterparts.35 6
Finally, the New Zealand Court of Appeal considered the issue of
misuse of privilege. It noted that the common law "malice" rule
had been altered by statute in New Zealand, namely Section 19 of
the Defamation Act of 1992. Section 19 provided that qualified
privilege would be lost if the defendant was "predominantly moti-
vated by ill-will towards the plaintiff or otherwise took improper
advantage of the occasion of publication." 357 The court inter-
preted this provision as flexible and capable of being applied to
new categories of qualified privilege that developed as society
develops and changes.3 58 Under the statute, however, the common
351. Id. at 396. For example, the United Kingdom Human Rights Act expressly pro-
tected the right to privacy, unlike the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. Compare Human
Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 1, pt. 1, art. 8 (Eng.) with Human Rights Act, 1993, pt. 2,
§§ 21-69 (N.Z.). Also, the United Kingdom Human Rights Act contained directions for
courts with regard to freedom of expression that apparently dictated a case-by-case balanc-
ing approach. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 12 (Eng.).
352. Atkinson [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 396.
353. See Atkinson [2000] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 257 (P.C.), remanded to (2000) 3 N.Z.L.R. at 397
(C.A.).
354. See Atkinson [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 398.
355. Id.
356. Id. Also unlike United Kingdom papers, New Zealand papers did not generally
have close associations with particular political parties. Id.
357. See Defamation Act, 1992 § 19(1) (N.Z.).
358. See Atkinson [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 400.
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law test for malice still applied. Privilege would still be lost if the
speaker acted without a genuine belief in the truth of the state-
ment or recklessly, not caring whether it was true or false. 359 Here,
the New Zealand Court of Appeal stated that careless journalism,
though alone not determinative of misuse of privilege, could be
taken into account in ascertaining whether recklessness existed. 360
The court thus confirmed its previous holding that no prerequisite
of reasonableness should be imported into the law.361
C. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers (England)
The final case to be filed in the trilogy of Commonwealth Cases was
the English case of Reynolds. In this case, the House of Lords held
that constitutional guarantees of free expression required the
extension of the traditional common law defense of qualified privi-
lege. 362 The House of Lords did not endorse any new generic cate-
gories of common law privilege as had been approved in Australia
and New Zealand; rather, the House of Lords advocated a case-by-
case balancing approach. 363 This extended defense was not subject
to any reasonableness requirement like Australia's; it could be
defeated by proof of malice, as understood under the traditional
common law. 364
The Reynolds case arose out of a political crisis in Ireland in late
1994. Albert Reynolds, leader of the Fianna Fdil party, announced
his resignation as Ireland's Taoiseach (Prime Minister) in the Irish
Dd.il 365 on November 17, 1994.366 The following Sunday, a major
London newspaper, the Sunday Times, published an article about
Reynolds' resignation in its British mainland edition. The article
bore the headline "Goodbye gombeen man."367
359. Id.
360. Id. at 401-02.
361. See id. at 404-05. The New Zealand Court of Appeal noted that it had taken the
"newspaper rule" into account and it did not affect its overall conclusion. This is the rule
that a newspaper does not generally have to reveal its sources in interlocutory proceedings.
See id.
362. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1022H-1023A (1999).
363. Id. at 1027D, E, F (listing factors a court could consider depending on the circum-
stances of the particular case).
364. Id. at 1016D, G, 1021G.
365. The Ddil is the lower house of Ireland's Parliament. Mr. Reynolds had led a coali-
tion government between his Fianna Fdil party and the Labour party. A good summary of
the political background to this case appears in the judgment of the English Court of
Appeal, reported at 3 W.L.R. 862 (1998).
366. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1014A (1999).
367. Id. at 1014B. A "gombeen man," an Irish stock character, is a petty moneylender,
generally with exploitative tendencies, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INrr'L DICrIONARY 977 (1981).
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Reynolds brought suit against, inter alia, the publishers of the
Sunday Times for libel.3 68 He claimed that the article published in
the British edition contained the defamatory allegation that he had
"deliberately and dishonestly misled the Diil . . . by suppressing
vital information," that he had "deliberately and dishonestly misled
his coalition cabinet colleagues . . . by withholding that informa-
tion," and that "he had lied to them about when the information
had come into his possession." 369
The defendants challenged the meaning ascribed to the words
by the plaintiff. They raised the defenses of justification, common
law qualified privilege, statutory qualified privilege (as a fair and
accurate report of public proceedings in the Irish legislature), and
fair comment.370 By the time of trial, the defenses had been whit-
tled down to justification and common law qualified privilege.3 71
Ajury tried the action in the autumn of 1996.372 Delays and mis-
haps plagued the trial,373 but eventually the jury found the article
to be defamatory and rejected the Sunday Times' defense of justifi-
cation (truth).3 7 4 Despite this, the jury awarded no damages.37 5
The trial judge, Mr. Justice French, substituted a nominal damages
award of one penny; however, the issue of whether there was a
valid defense of qualified privilege remained relevant to the issue
of costs. 37" If the judge decided that the defense of qualified privi-
lege applied, plaintiffs would have to pay defendants' costs. 377
After hearing arguments on the applicability of qualified privilege,
the judge ruled that this defense did not apply to the article.3 7 8
Mr. Reynolds appealed to the English Court of Appeal on the basis
368. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 869A (1998). Reynolds also sued the story's author, Mr.
Alan Ruddock (the Irish editor for the Sunday Times) and the editor of the Sunday Times,
Mr. Witherow. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1014D-E (1999). He had originally also sued John
Burns but discontinued proceedings against Burns when it became clear that Burns had
not participated in the publication of the offending article. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 874A
(1998).
369. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 874A (1998).
370. Id. at 875A-C.
371. Id.
372. The trial of the Reynolds action took place in London's High Court of Justice
between October 14, 1996, and November 19, 1996. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1014F (1999).
373. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 875 (1998).
374. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1014G (1999).
375. Id. at 1014H. In his House of Lords judgment, Lord Cooke of Thornden com-
mented that this apparent inconsistency between the verdict and award was "odd." Id. at
1039C. Lord Cooke noted that the jury could have been influenced by evidence that Reyn-
olds did not sue on similar allegations made in the Irish press. Id. at 1039D.
376. Id. at 1014H.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 1015A.
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that the judge had misdirected the jury.379 Defendants cross-
appealed the costs order. 380
1. The Appeal to the Court of Appeal: Upholding the Common
Law
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the English Court of Appeal 381
agreed with Mr. Reynolds that the jury had been misdirected, and
"[w]ith very great regret, because we are mindful of the conse-
quences," ordered a new trial. 382 The order for a retrial made the
costs appeal academic, since costs would be at the discretion of the
judge hearing the retrial.3 83 The court did, however, fully consider
the defendants' argument that qualified privilege applied to deter-
mine whether the defendants could invoke this defense at the
retrial.3 84
At the hearing before the English Court of Appeal, defendants'
counsel, Lord Lester, contended that English law should recognize
a generic category of qualified privileged for political speech. He
argued that the defense should apply to "a publication to the pub-
lic at large, arising out of discussion of political matters, including
the manner in which a public representative or senior public
officer had discharged his public functions, or relating to his pub-
lic views and conduct in relation to those functions, or his fitness
for political office."3 85 In making this submission, Lord Lester
relied heavily on the recent antipodean case law. He cited the first
New Zealand Court of Appeal judgment in Atkinson to support his
argument for a generic privilege.38 6 He also relied on the Austra-
lian High Court's judgment in Australian Broadcast Corporation, con-
tending that the generic privilege should protect "information,
opinions and arguments concerning government and political mat-
ters that affect the people of the United Kingdom."387
379. Id.
380. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1015A (1999). The trial judge granted leave to appeal only
as to costs from the date of payment into court, but the English Court of Appeal, by a
single Lord Justice of Appeal, granted defendants leave to appeal as to costs prior to that
date. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 876E-F (1998).
381. The panel consisted of the Lord ChiefJustice, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, as well
as Lord Justice Hirst and Lord Justice Robert Walker.
382. See Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 891A-B (1998).
383. See id. at 892D.
384. Id. at 892F-G.
385. Id. at 893F-G.
386. Id. at 894B.
387. See id. at 894A.
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Even though he invoked this Australian definition, Lord Lester
was really asking the English Court of Appeal to follow the New
Zealand approach, steering a middle course between Sullivan's
actual malice rule and the limited freedom for political discussion
of Australian Broadcast Corporation.388 In support of his argument,
he cited a recent English decision, Derbyshire County Council v. Times
Newspapers Ltd. In Derbyshire, the House of Lords had found that
the public interest barred organs of central or local government
from recovering damages in defamation at common law.3 9 Lord
Lester also invoked European Court of Human Rights jurispru-
dence concerning Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (the provision guaranteeing freedom of
expression) .390
The English Court of Appeal did not find Lord Lester's argu-
ments persuasive. In a unanimous judgment, the court rejected the
Atkinson approach on the basis that it was contrary to the need to
balance concerns for reputation against freedom of the press
emphasized in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights. 391 The English Court of Appeal found the Atkinson
approach both too broad and too narrow. It was overbroad in that
it failed to adequately protect reputation, and it was simultaneously
too narrow because its generic category would fail to protect other
kinds of socially valuable speech.
Lord Bingham, in the leading judgment, stated:
While those who engage in public life must expect and accept
that their public conduct will be the subject of close scrutiny and
robust criticism, they should not in our view be taken to expect
or accept that their conduct should be the subject of false and
defamatory statements of fact unless the circumstances of publi-
cation are such as to make it proper, in the public interest, to
afford the publisher immunity from liability in the absence of
malice.392
This showed that the English Court of Appeal strongly prefers the
traditional English approach, which focused on the circumstances
of publication.
Although refusing to establish any generic category of privilege
for political discussion, the English Court of Appeal did define the
388. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 894A, E (1998).
389. Id. at 894B-C; see also Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., A.C.
534, 549 (H.L. 1993).
390. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 894D (1998).
391. Id. at 907G-H.
392. Id.
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scope of qualified privilege very broadly for contemporary condi-
tions. The Court of Appeal stated that the public interest, namely
the "common convenience and welfare of a modern plural democ-
racy," dictated an "ample flow of information" about the public
interest to the general public. 393 This included not only political
discussion but also discussion of other matters, such as corporate
governance. 394 The court stated that both the duty and interest
tests would be "rather more readily held to be satisfied" in modern
conditions than had been found to be the case in previous case
law.395 This can be regarded as a significant extension of the
English common law of qualified privilege.
The opinion of the English Court of Appeal can be regarded as
radical for another reason going beyond the breadth of their hold-
ing on the scope of common law qualified privilege. The court laid
down a new and additional prong to the duty/interest test for qual-
ified privilege, which they termed the "circumstantial test."396 This
test asked whether "the nature, status, and source of the material,
and the circumstances of publication, [were] such that the publica-
tion should in the public interest be protected in the absence of
express malice." 397  Although previous English common law
authority had indicated that circumstances were certainly relevant
to the application of qualified privilege, this articulation of a sepa-
rate circumstantial test by the English Court of Appeal was a novel
interpretation of English law.398 Previously, the test for qualified
privilege had been formulated only as one of reciprocal interest
and duty.
The introduction of the circumstantial test, however, did not
mean that it was easy to satisfy. On the facts of Reynolds, the Court
of Appeal found the duty and interest tests to be met, but not the
circumstantial test.399 Their consideration of the nature, status,
and circumstances of the Sunday Times publication led to the con-
clusion that it was not in the public interest for the law to protect
it.400 There were significant factors weighing against publication:
393. Id. at 909C.
394. See id. at 909D.
395. Id. at 909F.
396. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 899G (1998).
397. Id.
398. The Court of Appeal impliedly recognized this by stating that the circumstantial
test was not very different from the reasonableness test of Australian Broadcasting Corp. See
id.
399. See id. at 911E.
400. See id. at 911E-12A.
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the Article's reliance on an unreliable source, the failure to
include Mr. Reynolds' account of the incidents in question, the
failure to inform Reynolds of the damaging conclusions made
about him prior to their publication, and the inconsistency of the
allegations made by the English and Irish editions.40 1
The defendants were not satisfied with this judgment. They
obtained leave to appeal the ruling of the English Court of Appeal
to the House of Lords.40 2
2. The House of Lords: A Fear of Rigidity
The House of Lords dismissed the appeal by a 3-2 majority. 40 3
All five members of the House of Lords agreed with the Court of
Appeal that the common law approach was "essentially sound" and
comported with the European Convention.40 4 Although two Lords
of Appeal in Ordinary, Lord Steyn and Lord Hope of Craighead,
dissented as to the applicability of qualified privilege on the facts,
they agreed with the majority interpretation of the law of qualified
privilege.
Like the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords rejected Lord Les-
ter's argument that qualified privilege should be extended to cover
a generic category of political discussion.40 5 All five members
agreed with the reasoning on this issue of Lord Nicholls of Birken-
head, who delivered the leading judgment. Lord Nicholls
repeated the familiar common law mantra that there was a reci-
procity requirement for qualified privilege, namely that speaker
and recipient must have a corresponding interest or duty in a state-
ment's publication for it to be protected by the defense. 40 6 The
court had to "assess whether, in the public interest, the publication
should be protected in the absence of malice."40 7 Since the reci-
procity requirement was based on the public interest, the court
had to take all the circumstances into account. 40°8
Analyzing this public interest rationale, Lord Nicholls endorsed
the Court of Appeal's broad approach to the scope of qualified
privilege. Lord Nicholls clearly agreed with the Court of Appeal
401. See id. at 911E-H.
402. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1015C (1999). The House of Lords granted leave to appeal
because it viewed the issue as one of general public importance.
403. See id. at 1028A, 1038H, 1049D, 1059A, 1061E.
404. Id. at 1026C-27A; see also id. at 1032G-H, 1039A, 1056A, 1059B.
405. See id. at 1027A, 1032G-H, 1042D, 1056C, 1060G.
406. See id. at 1017D.
407. Id. at 1017G.
408. See Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1017F-H (1999).
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that qualified privilege was flexible and should adapt to changing
times. In modern social conditions, a media publication to the
general public often would be in the public interest.40 9 Nicholls
used strong, even ringing language to describe the importance of
the press in a modern democratic society:
It is through the mass media that most people today obtain their
information on political matters. Without freedom of expres-
sion by the media, freedom of expression would be a hollow
concept. The interest of a democratic society in ensuring a free
press weighs heavily in the balance in deciding whether any cur-
tailment of this freedom bears a reasonable relationship to the
purpose of the curtailment.410
In endorsing the English common law approach over the antipo-
dean common law approaches, the House of Lords also stressed
the importance of local conditions. They contended that the irre-
sponsibility and commercial interest of the English press necessi-
tated stronger safeguards for reputation than might be necessary
elsewhere. 4t t In these conditions, malice was insufficient because
it was too difficult for the plaintiff to establish. 41 2 Thus, the House
of Lords agreed with the Court of Appeal that English law should
not recognize a new generic category of qualified privilege.
Yet the House of Lords did not entirely agree with the reasoning
of the English Court of Appeal; all five law Lords rejected the addi-
tional circumstantial test.413 The need to take circumstances into
account was not a separate test from the duty/interest test.41 4
Underlying this view was a fear that departing from the flexible
approach of the common law would result in overly rigid law.415
Their Lordships believed that maintaining flexibility and elasticity
was key to ensuring that the law could adapt to changing circum-
409. Id. at 1023.
410. Id. at 1023C-D.
411. See id. at 1024E (Lord Nicholls stating that "the sad reality is that the.., national
press, with its own commercial interests to serve, does not always command general confi-
dence"); see also id. at 1040H ("[a]lthough investigative reporting can be of public benefit,
the commercial motivation of the press and other sections of the media can create a temp-
tation, not always resisted, to exaggerate, distort, or otherwise unfairly represent alleged
facts in order to excite the interest of readers, viewers, or listeners"), 1061A-B.
412. Id. at 1024D; see also id. at 1041H-42A.
413. See id. at 1020B (Lord Nicholls stating "there is no separate and additional ques-
tion"), 1035B (Lord Steyn), 1046E (Lord Cooke of Thornden stating: "I agree that the two-
fold classical test is enough once it is accepted that all the circumstances of the publication
are to be taken into account"), 1058H (Lord Hope of Craighead stating: "the circumstan-
tial test is confusing and it should not be adopted"), 1059A (Lord Hobhouse of
Woodborough).
414. See Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1020B (1999); see also id. at 1020C.
415. See id. at 1033A-B, 1038G.
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stances as society changed. 416 It was also important for the law to
be able to do individual justice in particular cases. 417 Their Lord-
ships also stressed that, in their view, this balancing approach was
more consistent with the European Court of Human Right's Article
10 jurisprudence than a generic category. 4 18
The House of Lords recognized that the price of flexibility in the
law was some degree of uncertainty, yet their Lordships felt that
this defect could, at least in part, be overcome by the provision of
some guidelines for future courts to follow. 4 19 Lord Nicholls listed
some nonexclusive factors to take into consideration, including the
seriousness of the allegation, the extent to which it was a matter of
public concern, the source of the information, what steps had been
taken to verify the information, the status of the information, the
urgency of the matter, whether the defendant sought a response
from the plaintiff, whether the article included the plaintiff's ver-
sion of events, the tone of the article, and the circumstances of
publication, including timing.420
In keeping with their fear of rigidity, the House of Lords
rejected other arguments made on behalf of both defendants and
plaintiffs. They rejected Lord Lester's alternate contention that a
qualified privilege should apply to political discussion unless the
plaintiff could prove the newspaper had not exercised reasonable
care. 421 In their Lordships' view, this would upset the proper bal-
ance of the law of qualified privilege; 422 the burden should remain
on the newspaper, which was in a better position to know the cir-
cumstances of publication. 423 Their Lordships also rejected the
plaintiff's contention that if a newspaper failed to report the other
side's version of events, it would automatically lose privilege, and
that the newspaper should bear the burden to show why it should
not have to prove truth.424 They felt that this was also a danger-
ously rigid interpretation of the law.425
A bare majority of the House of Lords agreed that, in the cir-
cumstances of this case, qualified privilege did not apply. In con-
416. Id. at 1027B.
417. See id. at 1024G-H, 1033B, 1046E, 1051E, 1061H.
418. Id. at 1026A, 1033A, 1045D, 1056H, 1059B.
419. Id. at 1027D.
420. See Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1027C-E (1999).
421. Id. at 1025E-F.
422. Id. at 1025G.
423. Id. at 1025H.
424. Id. at 1025H-26A.
425. Id.
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cluding that it was not in the public interest to report the Sunday
Times article to the general public, the majority was particularly
influenced by the article's failure to report Mr. Reynold's explana-
tion to the Ddiil. 426 This was contrary to "elementary fairness."
427
Lord Steyn and Lord Hope of Craighead disagreed, both believed
that, on the facts, qualified privilege should be considered at a new
trial.428
D. Comparing the Commonwealth Cases
The above review of the Commonwealth Cases has shown how they
all followed Sullivan by constitutionalizing the common law of
libel. Unlike Sullivan, however, they all rejected a freestanding
constitutional defense, and rather endorsed a different approach,
expanding the existing common law of qualified privilege. They
all agreed that the extended common law qualified privilege could
apply to statements that were generally published by the media.
They also all invoked an essentially Madisonian rationale for the
privilege. The Commonwealth Cases, however, differed among them-
selves on a number of issues, in particular as to the scope of the
expanded defense, the nature of any prerequisites for the defense,
and what was necessary to overcome the defense.
Both the Australian High Court and the New Zealand Court of
Appeal endorsed a new generic common law category of qualified
privilege, which the English House of Lords rejected in favor of a
case-by-case balancing approach. The Australian generic category
was broader in scope, applicable to "information, opinions, and
arguments concerning government and political matters that affect
the people of Australia." 429 The New Zealand category of generic
privilege was somewhat narrower, applicable to
generally published statements made about the actions and
qualities of those currently or formerly elected to Parliament
and those with immediate aspirations to be members, so far as
those actions and qualities directly affect or affect their capacity
(including their personal ability and willingness) to meet their
public responsibilities. 430
426. Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1028C-F, 1059B (1999). Lord Cooke endorsed the Court of
Appeal's approach, which was influenced by this fact but also took other facts into consid-
eration. See id. at 1048B-49B.
427. Id. at 1028F.
428. Id. at 1038D-E (Lord Steyn); 1058H-1059A (Lord Hope).
429. Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. at 571.
430. Atkinson [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 428, affd, [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 399-400.
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The New Zealand Court of Appeal did leave open the, possibility
that this generic category might not be the full extent of the privi-
lege and that it might be applicable to other "generally-published
statements which directly concern the functioning of representa-
tive and responsible government."431
Taking a slightly different approach to the antipodean courts,
the English House of Lords rejected any generic category of quali-
fied privilege for political discussion.43 2 Rather, in the interests of
justice, the applicability of qualified privilege is considered on a
case-by-case basis.4-3 3 Despite this absence of recognition for a new
generic category of privilege under English law, the English
extended privilege could be regarded as broader than the antipo-
dean generic categories. This was because the expanded English
privilege was not limited to overtly political speech, but could
potentially apply to other types of speech in the public interest.
Of the three Commonwealth Courts, only the Australian High
Court laid down a prerequisite for the expanded privilege. Under
Australian law, for the expanded privilege to apply, a defendant
had to establish reasonableness. To establish this, she had to prove
that she had reasonable grounds to believe the statement was true,
did not believe it to be untrue, took appropriate steps to verify the
accuracy of what was being published, and sought or published a
response, where practicable. 4 3 4 Both the English and New Zealand
courts rejected any prerequisite, whether reasonableness or other-
wise, for the expanded defense. 43 5
All of the Commonwealth Courts found that, in keeping with the
traditional common law of qualified privilege, the expanded
defense could be defeated by a misuse of the privilege, but they
differed as to the test for such misuse. All agreed that proof that a
defendant was actuated by an improper motive, such as ill-will or
spite, could defeat the privilege, 436 but under the traditional com-
mon law, a lack of belief in the truth of the publication could also
constitute malice. The Australian High Court held that this was no
longer the case for the expanded qualified privilege, 4 3 7 but it
431. Atkinson [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 390.
432. See Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1027A, 1032G-H, 1042D, 1060G (1999).
433. See id. at 1024 G-H, 1033B, 1046E, 1051E, 1061H.
434. See Australian Broad. Corp. (1997)189 C.L.R. at 573.
435. SeeAtkinson [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 469-70; [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 403-04; see also Reyn-
olds, 3 W.L.R. at 1025E-F, 1034F-G, 1043A-B, 1059A-B (1999).
436. See Atkinson [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 400-01; Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1023H (1999);
Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. at 574.
437. See Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. at 573-74.
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remained the case for the English and New Zealand versions of the
expanded qualified privilege. 438
VI. THE SULLIVAN DECISION: TAKING THE WRONG ROAD
The above section has shown how the Commonwealth Courts
declined to follow Sullivan by creating a new freestanding constitu-
tional defense for libel actions involving false statements of fact
concerning politicians or public officials; rather, all the Common-
wealth Courts agreed that the existing law of qualified privilege
must be extended to cover some political discussion by the media
to the general public. This section contends that the Common-
wealth approach was equally available to the Sullivan Court. The
U.S. Supreme Court erred by ignoring it in favor of the creation of
a new, rigidly categorical, constitutional defense. This wrong turn
away from the common law may have been more the result of con-
cerns for outcomes than for coherent legal doctrine. Sullivan was
part of one of the greatest political and social struggles of 20th
century United States. 439
A. Sullivan's Unique Place in History
The Sullivan dispute arose in the historically turbulent context of
the civil rights movement of the early 1960s. In 1960 the New York
Times ran an advertisement promoting the civil rights movement
(paid for by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King 4 40 ) that
criticized various actions taken against civil rights demonstrators by
the police in Montgomery, Alabama. 441 There were a number of
trivial inaccuracies in the advertisement. 442 A Montgomery city
438. See Reynolds, 3 W.L.R. at 1016H (1999); Atkinson [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 400.
439. See Richard Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong? 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 782,
787 (1983) (contending that the Court was "influenced too heavily by the dramatic facts of
the underlying dispute"); see also Kermit L. Hall, Justice Brennan and Cultural History: New
York Times v. Sullivan and its Times, 27 CAL. N. L. REv. 339, 342-344 (1991) (arguing that
Brennan's opinion in Sullivan represented the triumph of Northern liberal values, such as
the "public marketplace of ideas," at the expense of traditional Southern values of civility
in public discourse).
440. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-257. For a gripping and detailed description of Sullivan's
facts, see ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1991).
441. The fact that the advertisement was paid for did not affect the outcome of the
case; the Court believed that the speech in the advertisement was still entitled to the pro-
tection of the First Amendment. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265-66.
442. The ad wrongly claimed that students demonstrating on the steps of the Alabama
State Capitol sang "My Country 'Tis of Thee;" they actually sang the National Anthem. Id.
at 258-59. The ad also falsely stated that students were expelled from college for leading
the demonstration; in fact, they were expelled for another reason. Id. at 259. Another
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official, L.B. Sullivan, whose duties included supervising the police,
sued for libel in Alabama state court, although the advertisement
did not refer to him by name. 443 Nevertheless, the trial court
awarded Sullivan half a million dollars in damages, the largest
amount ever awarded in an Alabama libel case. 444 The Alabama
Supreme Court upheld the award. 445 When other state officials
brought separate lawsuits, cumulatively seeking more than $2 mil-
lion in damages, the New York Times was threatened with bank-
ruptcy.4 4 6 The historical importance of the Sullivan action went far
inaccuracy in the ad was the statement that "the entire student body protested to state
authorities by refusing to re-register;" in fact, only a majority of the student body had
joined in the protests and moreover, the protests were not refusals to register but rather
boycotts of classes. Id. at 257, 259. The ad also wrongly stated that padlocks were used to
keep students from a dining hall and "starve them into submission;" in fact, no padlocks
were ever used and only a few students had been kept out for lack of proper registration.
Id. Also inaccurate was the statement in the ad that the police had been ringing the cam-
pus. Id. at 259. Moreover, the ad made a number of false statements concerning civil
rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King; it wrongly numbered King's arrests as seven rather
than four. Id. It also inaccurately claimed that King had been assaulted in connection with
an arrest; this assault was denied by the arresting officer. Id. at 257-59. Finally, the ad
incorrectly charged that the police had been involved in bombing King's home, when in
fact they had tried to apprehend the perpetrators. Id. at 259.
443. As well as suing the newspaper, Sullivan sued four black Alabama ministers whose
names appeared in the advertisement, probably to defeat diversity and to keep the action
out of federal court. See LEwis, supra note 440, at 13.
444. See id. at 35. The trial judge, Judge Walter P. Jones, an advocate of segregation in
his courtroom and elsewhere, was clearly biased in favor of Sullivan. One blatant example
was the judge's finding that there was jurisdiction over the New York Times. The newspaper
argued that it did not do enough business in Alabama to be subject to the court's jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 25. Moving to challenge personal jurisdiction, the newspaper's counsel Eric
Embry (later a justice on the Alabama Supreme Court) attempted to avoid a finding of
personal jurisdiction over the newspaper by making only a special appearance in the case.
To ensure that he did so, Embry carefully followed the procedure set out in a standard
textbook on Alabama pleading that had been authored by Judge Jones. Id. In response,
Judge Jones took the extreme step of overruling his own book and found jurisdiction over
the newspaper on the basis of a general appearance. Id. at 26. Many years later, Embry's
anger about the judge's conduct of the trial remained strong; he accused the judge of
meeting with others to "concoct all these lawsuits." Id. Judge Jones instructed the jury
that, because the words were "libellous per se," Sullivan did not need to prove that they
were defamatory, and moreover, the law presumed them to be false. Id. at 32. According
to Jones, injury was also presumed under the law. Id. Since the New York Times had admit-
ted that the words of which Sullivan complained were not entirely error-free, the only
issues left for the jury to decide were publication and reference, that is, whether the words
had been published by the defendants, and whether the words were "of and concerning"
Sullivan. Id. at 32-33.
445. New York Times v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 51-52 (Ala. 1962) (upholding Jones',
Montgomery County Circuit Court Judge, decision in all respects, including finding that
the award of damages was not excessive).
446. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278 n.18. By the time the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in
Sullivan, only one of these additional actions against the New York Times had gone to trial,
resulting in a verdict awarding the plaintiffs $500,000. Id.
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beyond the question of one newspaper's viability; .at issue was a
more deeply political conflict: the extent to which the press could
cover the civil rights conflict then raging in the United States
South.447
B. Not Entirely Strict Liability: The Existing Alabama Qualified
Privilege Defense
As Justice Brennan emphasized in his majority opinion in Sulli-
van, Alabama libel law was a formidable barrier for press coverage
of the civil rights conflict.448 As Brennan noted, under Alabama
law defamatory statements of fact "tend[ing] to injure a person in
his reputation" or "bring [him] into public contempt" were "libel-
lous per se."449 Alabama law presumed "libels per se" to be defam-
atory, false, and injurious.450 Justice Brennan stated: "[0] nce 'libel
per se' has been established, the defendant has no defense to
stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in
all their particulars."451 Justice Brennan's opinion, however, over-
stated the extent to which Alabama libel law favored plaintiffs.
Justice Brennan mischaracterized Alabama libel law as being a
tort of strict liability for defamatory facts; 452 in fact, although Bren-
nan failed to point this out in his opinion in Sullivan, Alabama law
did in fact recognize a defense of qualified privilege that protected
certain statements of fact from liability for defamation. 453 As at
English common law, this defense arose when there was a recipro-
cal duty and interest in publishing the statement, whether this duty
was legal or moral.454 Also like English common law, the Alabama
447. See Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "the
Central Meaning of the First Amendment, "83 COLUM. L. REv. 603, 604-05 (1983).
448. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267.
449. Id; see alsoJohnson Publ'g Co. v. Davis, 124 So. 2d 441, 450 (Ala. 1960).
450. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267.
451. Id.; see also Starks v. Comer, 67 So. 440, 444 (Ala. 1914).
452. Brennan did recognize that Alabama law recognized a defense of fair comment
for honest statements of opinion based on true facts. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267.
453. See, e.g., Kenney v. Gurley, 95 So.z34, 38 (Ala. 1923) (finding privileged an alleg-
edly defamatory letter from school personnel sent to a parent of a dismissed student and
stating the cause of the student's dismissal); see also Bhd. of Ry. Trainmen v. Jennings, 168
So. 173, 179 (Ala. 1936); Interstate Elec. Co. v. Daniel, 151 So. 463, 467 (Ala. 1933), Berry
v. City of New York, 98 So. 290, 293 (Ala. 1923), Ferdon v. Dickens, 49 So. 888, 895 (Ala.
1909). In his opinion in Sullivan, Justice Brennan entirely failed to mention the existence
of a defense of qualified privilege in Alabama law. See Sullivan, 276 U.S. at 268. Brennan's
contention that the defendant had no defense as to misstatements of facts that were libels
per se apart from truth was thus not entirely accurate. Id.
454. See, e.g., Lawson v. Hicks, 38 Ala. 279, 285 (1862) (stating that qualified privilege is
applicable "where the author of the alleged mischief acted in the discharge of any public
or private duty, whether legal or moral, which the ordinary exigencies of society, or his
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defense of qualified privilege was defeated by proof of malice on
the part of the defendant. 455  Alabama courts had found the
defense of qualified privilege applicable to certain fair and accu-
rate press reports of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings that had
been published to the general public; 456 however, they had
declined to find the defense more broadly applicable to any state-
ment of fact made about public officials or candidates for public
office. 457 Thus, even though Alabama law did give some protection
to defamatory statements of fact at the time of Sullivan, the defense
of qualified privilege had not been broadly extended to protect
statements like those made in the New York Times advertisement.
Clearly concerned about the effect of Alabama libel law on press
reporting of the civil rights conflict, in conjunction with the prob-
lem of racist state judges, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Sullivan on the basis of important constitutional issues,
namely violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 458
The Court unanimously held that the award in damages against the
New York Times should be reversed. 459
own private interest, or even that of another, called upon him to perform" (internal cita-
tions omitted)).
455. See, e.g., Kenney, 95 So. at 39 (finding insufficient evidence of malice in the cir-
cumstances of the particular case).
456. See, e.g., Age-Herald Publ'g Co. v. Waterman, 81 So. 621, 626 (Ala. 1919) (finding
that qualified privilege extended to a fair and accurate report of a meeting of a bankrupt's
creditors).
457. See Starks v. Comer, 67 So. 440, 444 (Ala. 1914) (statement about candidate for
public office); Parsons v. Age-Herald Publ'g Co., 61 So. 345, 351 (Ala. 1913) (public offi-
cial). At the time of the Sullivan case, state courts in some other states had recognized a
qualified privilege for defamatory and false statements concerning the public conduct of
public officials. See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 293 (Kan. 1908) (holding that
qualified privilege did not apply to a false statement about the fitness for office of a candi-
date for a state office); see also Sniveley v. Record Publ'g Co., 185 Cal. 565, 570-76 (1921);
Lawrence v. Fox, 97 N.W.2d 719, 725-26 (Mich. 1959); Ponder v. Cobb, 126 S.E.2d 67, 82
(N.C. 1962); McLean v. Merriman, 175 N.W. 878, 881 (S.D. 1920); Salinger v. Cowles, 191
N.W. 167, 174 (Iowa 1920); Bailey v. The Charleston Mail Ass'n, 27 S.E.2d 837, 844 (W. Va.
1943). All of these cases were cited by Brennan in Sullivan to illustrate what he portrayed
as the minority rule. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280. According to Brennan, three other states
(New Hampshire, Arizona, and Minnesota), also afforded qualified privilege to defamatory
statements of fact about candidates for public office. Id. W. Wat Hopkins has argued that
Brennan was incorrect in characterizing these cases as representing the minority position
at the time of Sullivan because by that time at least 21 states, as well as the District of
Columbia, recognized a qualified privilege for certain false political statements. See W.
WAT HOPKINS, ACTUAL MALICE: TWENTY-FIvE YEARs AFTER SULLIVAN 76 (1989). Hopkins'
research, however, confirms that in 1964, Alabama law did not recognize such a privilege.
See id. at 76; see also Starks, 67 So. at 440.
458. Sullivan, 276 U.S. at 264 n.4.
459. Id. at 264, 293 (Black, J., concurring), 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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C. Constitutionalizing the Common Law: Sullivan's Actual
Malice Rule
A 6-3 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court established a new free-
standing constitutional defense for libel actions brought by public
officials. Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Brennan
constitutionalized the liability rules for defamation action on the
basis of the defendant's fault.460 According to Brennan, the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution demanded a rule
barring public officials from recovering damages for false and
defamatory statements regarding official conduct unless they could
prove "actual malice." 461 As defined by Justice Brennan, "actual
malice" did not carry the meaning of "spite" or "ill will" toward the
plaintiff but rather knowledge that the statement at issue was false
or made with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity. 4 6 2
In decisions subsequent to Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court
made clear that "actual malice" is a subjective test dependent on
the state of mind of the actual defendant. In his 1968 opinion in
St. Amant v. Thompson, Justice White, delivering an opinion for
eight members of the Court, stated:
Reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably pru-
dent man would have published or would have investigated
before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit
the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such
doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demon-
strates actual malice. 463
In Sullivan, not only did Justice Brennan establish a constitutional
rule for the standard of liability in libel actions brought by public
officials but also a corresponding rule for the standard of proof;464
Brennan held that proof of actual malice must be clear and con-
460. Brennan wrote for six members of the Court. Two others, Justices Black and
Goldberg, wrote separate concurring opinions stating that their view of the First Amend-
ment required absolute protection for criticism of official conduct. Id. at 293, 296 (Black,
J., concurring), 297-305 (GoldbergJ., concurring). Justice Douglas joined in the concur-
rences of both Justices Black and Goldberg. Id. at 293, 297.
461. Id. at 279-80.
462. Id. at 280.
463. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 335
n.6 (actual malice is "subjective awareness of probable falsity"). justice Fortas dissented,
contending that the defendant "had a duty to check the reliability of the libelous statement
about respondent." St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 734.
464. Defying the usual practice of the Court, Brennan examined the evidence of actual
malice to ensure that the Alabama state court could not get around the Sullivan judgment.
LEwis, supra note 440, at 149.
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vincing. 465 This is an unusually high standard of proof in civil
actions, where normally proof on the balance of probabilities
suffices. 4 66
Brennan's constitutionalization of the common law of libel in
Sullivan was based squarely on his belief in the importance of free-
dom of speech on public issues.467 The philosophical rationale
underlying this belief was a Madisonian conception of democracy
that, in the U.S. system of government, the people were sover-
eign.468 As a result, "free public discussion of the stewardship of
public officials was... a fundamental principle of the American
form of government." 469 Brennan stated:
Thus we consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials. 470
According to Brennan, the government could not use the civil
law of libel to prevent such attacks even if they were false and
defamatory. There were two reasons for this: first, the analogy
between the Alabama civil law of libel and seditious libel, and sec-
ond, the risk of "chilling" otherwise protected speech. Brennan
made the historical argument that the Alabama civil law of libel was
analogous to the ill-fated Sedition Act of 1798,47 1 which criminal-
ized speech that was critical of the government4 72 and was gener-
465. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86 (finding that the evidence of actual malice "lacks the
convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands").
466. See LEWIS, supra note 440, at 148.
467. Cass R. Sunstein, Hard Defamation Cases, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 891, 897 (1984).
468. Brennan made his Madisonian rationale clear in an article written the year after
the Sullivan decision. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Inter-
pretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1, 15 (1965). The most well-known propo-
nent of the Madisonian approach in the twentieth century is Alexander Meiklejohn. See
Alexander Meiklejohn, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); see also
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute [ 1961 ] SuP. CT. REV. 245. For an
excellent recent discussion of the Madisonian rationale, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
469. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 275.
470. Id. at 270.
471. See id. at 276-77 (referring to "the lesson to be drawn from the great controversy
over the Sedition Act," describing this controversy in great detail, and arguing passionately
that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional).
472. See Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596-97 (criminalizing, inter alia, speaking or writ-
ing about the government, President, or Congress with "intent to defame" or so as to
"bring them ... into contempt or disrepute"). Fourteen people were prosecuted under
the Sedition Act, some received jail terms. LEWIS, supra note 440, at 63-64. David Brown,
an itinerant "apostle of sedition," received a four-year jail sentence for the seemingly rather
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ally decried as unconstitutional. 473 Brennan also contended that
fear of being sued under Alabama libel law would lead to too much
self-censorship on the part of critics of public officials and would
improperly deter true speech that was clearly deserving of First
Amendment protection. 47 4  Therefore, the law should ensure
"breathing space" for false and defamatory attacks on public offi-
cials. 475 To achieve this goal, Brennan did not need to resort to the
drastic course of creating a new constitutional defense; as the Com-
monwealth Courts later recognized, there was another possibility.
D. A Missed Opportunity: Extending the Existing Alabama Defense of
Qualified Privilege
The alternative possibility was to employ the approach later
taken by the Commonwealth Courts, of simply expanding the
existing common law defense of qualified privilege. The conten-
tion that ignoring this approach was an error builds on the work of
Professor Richard Epstein. In a very well known essay published in
the University of Chicago Law Review in 1986, Epstein criticized
the development of a new constitutional "actual malice" defense in
Sullivan and recommended a return to the common law of libel. 476
Epstein, however, portrayed the common law of libel as a law of
strict liability.477 He did not consider an extension of the existing
trivial act of instigating the erection of a liberty pole in Massachusetts. SAMUEL ELIOT MORI-
SON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 354 (1965). Anthony Lewis disagrees
with Morison as to the length of Brown's sentence, stating that it was 18-months, but that
Brown remained in prison for an additional few months because he could not pay the fine
to which he had also been sentenced. LEWIS, supra note 440, at 64. Whoever is correct,
Brown received a sentence that seems disproportionate to his offense.
473. Protest that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional occurred almost immediately
after its passage, most notably in James Madison's Virginia Resolutions and Thomas Jeffer-
son's Kentucky resolves. MORISON, supra note 472, at 354. When Jefferson became presi-
dent in the "Revolution of 1800," he allowed the Sedition Act to expire and pardoned
those who had been convicted under it. LEWIS, supra note 440, at 65. Subsequently, there
has been general agreement that the Sedition Act violated the First Amendment. See Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. at 276 (citing, inter alia, the very influential dissent of Oliver Wendall Holmes
in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)).
474. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (where Brennan contended that a libel rule requiring
a critic of official conduct to prove the truth of all factual assertions "dampens the vigor
and limits the variety of public debate").
475. See id. at 272.
476. See Epstein, supra note 439, at 792, 795, 814-815 (endorsing a return to the com-
mon law of strict liability and suggesting various common law alternative solutions for the
Sullivan problem, including construing the "of and concerning" requirement, shifting the
burden of proving truth to the plaintiff, and/or limiting damages).
477. Id. at 795, 814.
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common law defense of qualified privilege; indeed, Epstein did not
discuss this defense at all.
This argument for a return to the common law is thus different
than Professor Epstein's. This Article does not advocate a return to
strict liability because the common law was never entirely a law of
strict liability. The common law has long contained the defense of
qualified privilege, which insulated some publications from strict
liability on the basis of the public interest. The Commonwealth Cases
illustrate how Sullivan could have been resolved differently, by
expanding the existing defense of qualified privilege rather than
adopting the more drastic and rigid alternative of creating a new
constitutional defense.
Although, as discussed above, Alabama law at the time of Sullivan
apparently did not find the common law defense of qualified privi-
lege broadly applicable to statements made by the press about offi-
cial conduct, 478 the public interest rationale underlying this
defense meant that it was inherently capable of expansion. The
Alabama defense of qualified privilege derived from the English
common law defense and shared the same basis in the public inter-
est. A frequently cited Alabama Supreme Court authority on the
defense of qualified privilege, the 1862 case of Lawson v. Hicks,
made clear the public interest rationale by citing to the seminal
English authority on qualified privilege, Toogood v. Spyring.479 Too-
good had held that the defense of qualified privilege was founded
on the public interest, namely the "common convenience and wel-
fare of society." 480 In keeping with that public interest rationale,
Lawson described the defense as applying "where the author of the
alleged mischief acted in the discharge of any public or private
duty, whether legal or moral, which the ordinary exigencies of soci-
ety, or even that of another, called upon him to perform." 481
This public interest rationale for qualified privilege was generally
endorsed in Alabama defamation cases before Sullivan.482 A
defense of qualified privilege founded on the public interest has
478. See supra note 458.
479. See Lawson v. Hicks, 38 Ala. 279, 285 (1862).
480. See Toogood, I C. M. & R. at 193 (per Parke, B.).
481. Lawson, 38 Ala. at 285
482. See, e.g., Kenney v. Gurley, 95 So. 34, 37 (Ala. 1923) (citing the "standard defini-
tion .. .of matter qualifiedly, conditionally privileged, given in Lawson v. Hicks"); Smith
Bros. & Co. v. Agee & Co., 59 So. 647, 649 (Ala. 1912); Ferdon v. Dickens, 49 So. 888, 894
(Ala. 1909) (noting the breadth of the defense of qualified privilege, describing it as "quite
large").
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no absolute limits, as the English case law has made clear.48 3 Thus,
it was open to the Sullivan Court to expand it to cover the New York
Times advertisement on the basis of the Madisonian rationale. This
would have represented an expansion of the common law, but, as
W. Wat Hopkins has pointed out, prior to Sullivan some other
states had expanded their common law doctrine of qualified privi-
lege to apply to political discussion by the mass media.48 4
Thus, the Sullivan Court could have taken the same approach
that was later taken by the Commonwealth Cases and expanded the
existing common law defense of qualified privilege. Why should it
have preferred this course of action? There are two reasons, one
theoretical and one practical.
The theoretical reason is this: Where the common law is capable
of adequately giving effect to constitutional rights, it should always
be preferred over the creation of new constitutional defenses like
Sullivan's "actual malice" test. Categorical rules, such as "actual
malice," are too black and white to do adequate justice in the indi-
vidual case. This is especially so in the area of libel, which requires
a delicate balancing of two important rights: the right of free
expression against the right of protection to reputation. The
"actual malice" rule does not allow the circumstances of an individ-
ual publication to be adequately taken into account. Moreover,
categorical rules create problems in hard cases; courts are often
forced to create exceptions or extensions of categorical rules for
such cases, and these tend to distort the original categorical rule.
The result is an overly complex and confusing doctrine.
The practical problems with Sullivan's categorical "actual malice"
rule are discussed in the next section, which traces the extension
and development of the categorical rule laid down in Sullivan to
show how the practical result for U.S. libel law has mirrored the
theoretical problems inherent in such categorical rules.
VII. CONTINUING DOWN THE WRONG RoArD: SULLIvAN's PROGENY
U.S. libel jurisprudence over the more than three decades since
Sullivan makes clear that Sullivan's establishment of a separate con-
stitutional "actual malice" defense was an unfortunate legal devel-
opment. Sullivan's progeny compounded the difficulties inherent
483. See supra note 94.
484. See HOPKINS, supra note 457, at 79 (noting that Michigan, New Jersey, and New
York expanded their common law defenses in this way and that Kentucky expanded it to
discussions about political candidates, though the Kentucky case expanding the law was
not a case involving a media publication).
2002]
The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.
in a categorical constitutional rule by extending the "actual malice"
rule far beyond its original circumstances and by distorting its
underlying rationale to fit new fact situations. The Sullivan rule
was initially limited to one situation: false and defamatory criticism
of the conduct of public officials. 485 Over the next thirty-five years,
a series of often badly divided U.S. Supreme Court decisions
extended the Sullivan rule in four major ways. First, they extended
the "actual malice" rule beyond "public official" plaintiffs to "pub-
lic figure" plaintiffs. Second, they constructed a complex, if not
byzantine, set of rules relating to the recoverability of damages in
defamation actions, hinging on the liability rules. Third, they built
even more rules governing procedure and evidence in defamation
actions. Finally, they extended the "actual malice" rule to causes of
action beyond libel. The results have been disastrous: overly rigid
and confusing doctrine, jury bewilderment, a high rate of appellate
reversals resulting in escalating libel litigation costs, and wide-
spread dissatisfaction with the state of the law.
A. Extension to "Public Figures"
The first extension of the Sullivan "actual malice" rule was to
"public figures" other than public officials, in the case of Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts. 48 6 This extension is now well established,4 7
despite the fact that the Curtis Court was very divided as to the
proper standard of liability for public figures. Only three members
of the Court in Curtis unreservedly endorsed the Sullivan stan-
dard.488  Two other members, Justices Black and Douglas, held
absolutist views on the First Amendment and advocated adoption
of "the rule to the effect that the First Amendment was intended to
leave the press free from the harassment of libel judgments."489
Led by Justice Harlan, four other justices in Curtis advocated a rea-
485. See supra notes 470-476 and accompanying text.
486. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (involving a college athletic direc-
tor accused of conspiring to rig a football game); see also Associated Press v. Walker, 388
U.S. 130 (1967) (decided simultaneously with Curtis and also involving another public fig-
ure who was not a public official: a former Army general suing for damages over a charge
of resisting school integration).
487. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 658
(1989).
488. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C. J., concurring), 172 (Brennan, J., joined by
White J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
489. Id. at 170 (Black J., joined by Douglas J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (stating that he concurred in the Walker case "in order for the Court to be able at this
time to agree on [a disposition of] this important case based on the prevailing constitu-
tional doctrine expressed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan . . . In agreeing to . . . [that]
opinion, I do not recede from any of the views I have previously expressed about the much
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sonableness standard, namely "highly unreasonable conduct con-
stituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by reasonable publishers." 490
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, a 1971 decision so fractured that it
lacked any opinion joined by more than three justices, a plurality
opinion authored by Justice Brennan advocated extending the Sul-
livan constitutional privilege even further.491 Brennan's view in
Rosenbloom was that the Sullivan test applied to all matters of public
interest or concern, regardless of the status of the plaintiff as a
public or private figure. 492 The philosophical basis for Brennan's
Rosenbloom opinion was an extended view of the requirements of
Madisonian democracy going beyond the seditious libel rationale
of his earlier opinion in Sullivan.493 In Rosenbloom, Justice Brennan
stated that an effective democracy required free and open public
debate on public issues as well as the actions of public officials. 494
This approach shifted the focus from the nature of the plaintiff to
the nature of the defamatory falsehood.
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom can be viewed
as the high water mark of the Madisonian application of the Sulli-
van rule. Three years later in its decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch,495
another badly divided Court stopped this expansion in its tracks,
retreating to a focus on the status of the plaintiff. In Gertz, a shaky
5-4 majority held that where the plaintiff was not a public official or
public figure, he did not have to establish Sullivan "actual malice"
wider press and speech freedoms I think the First and Fourteenth Amendments were
designed to grant to the people of the Nation." (internal citations omitted)).
490. Id. at 155 (plurality opinion of Harlan,J., joined by Clark, Stewart, and Fortas,JJ.).
491. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J.).
492. See id. at 43-44 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (stating: "We honor the commit-
ment to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, by
extending constitutional protection to all discussion and communication involving matters
of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous
or anonymous.").
493. See id.
494. Id. at 41 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (stating that "[s] elf-governance in the
United States presupposes far more than knowledge and debate about the strictly official
actions of various levels of government. The commitment of the country to the institution
of private property, protected by the Due Process and Just Compensation Clauses in the
Constitution, places in private hands vast areas of economic and social power that vitally
affect the nature and quality of life in the Nation. Our efforts to live and work together in
a free society not completely dominated by governmental regulation necessarily encom-
pass far more than politics in a narrow sense.").
495. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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to recover damages for libel. 496 States could determine their own
standards of liability for such cases, provided that they did not
impose standards of strict liability.497 Thus, negligence was the
minimum standard of liability for non-public officials or figures.
The Gertz majority, however, expanded the category of public fig-
ure to include what has come to be known as a "limited purpose
public figure." This was defined as a person who "voluntarily
injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and
thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." 498
In Gertz, the majority had clearly moved away from the seditious
libel rationale of Brennan's majority opinion in Sullivan.499
Rather, the majority's rationale was a balancing of the competing
interests of the press in being protected from the "chilling" effect
of libel actions and of the states in protecting the reputations of
private individuals. 500 Fearful of too much uncertainty in the law,
the Gertz majority rejected balancing on a case-by-case basis501 but
justified different treatment of public and private figures on the
basis that public figures generally assume the risk of being libeled
and generally have a far greater ability to resort to self-help. 50 2
Although Gertz limited the application of the Sullivan "actual
malice" standard to public figures or public officials, it represented
an expansion of the Sullivan principle of fault-based liability. After
Gertz it appeared that all libel actions were governed by categorical
liability rules. Thus the categorical reach of the Sullivan rule was
expanded; however, U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence after Gertz
has left some issues relating to liability unresolved, resulting in
some doctrinal confusion on the issue of liability in libel actions.
One open issue is whether the First Amendment protects
nonmedia defendants to the same extent as media defendants. By
discussing only media defendants, Gertz hinted at a possible differ-
496. See id. at 343 (majority opinion of Powell, J.). Justice Blackmun concurred to
"have a clearly defined majority position that eliminates the unsureness engendered by the
Rosenbloom diversity." Id. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Douglas, and White
dissented. Id. at 354-55 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 355-60 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 361-69
(Brennan, J., dissenting), 369-404 (White, J., dissenting).
497. See id. at 34748.
498. Id. at 351.
499. For a discussion of the seditious libel rationale in Sullivan, see supra, notes 471-475
and accompanying text. The approach of the Gertz majority was foreshadowed by the dis-
senting opinions ofJustice Harlan andJustice Marshall in Rosenbloom. See Rosenbloom, 403
U.S. at 63 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 78-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
500. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 34041.
501. See id. at 343.
502. See id. at 345.
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ence in treatment for nonmedia defendants, 50 3 but at least five jus-
tices later directly rejected this approach in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,504 and the other four justices in that case
appear to have implicitly rejected it.505 In two cases decided after
Dun & Bradstreet, however, the Court expressly stated that this issue
remains unresolved. -5 0 6
Another open issue is whether Gertz applies to libel actions
brought by public figures regarding speech that is not of public
concern.5 0 7 In Dun & Bradstreet the plurality had suggested that
Sullivan "actual malice" may be inapplicable to speech concerning
purely private matters. 50 8 Limiting Gertz in this way would be a step
closer to the Madisonian rationale for protecting some false and
defamatory speech in the interest of free debate on public issues.
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence following Gertz has also placed
some limitations on the recoverability of presumed and punitive
damages in libel actions. This will be considered in the following
subsection.
B. Expansion to Damages Rules
As well as refining the Sullivan liability rules, Gertz also moved
Sullivan beyond liability rules alone, beginning the development of
a complex set of rules governing recoverability of damages in libel
actions. These new rules added to the reach and complexity of
503. See id.
504. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.), 773 (White, J.,
concurring).
505. See id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring), 759 (plurality opinion of Powell,J.,joined
by O'Connor and Rehnquist, JJ.).
506. See Milkovich v. Lorain journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 10 n.5 (1990); see also Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986). Many commentators have argued
that a media/nonmedia distinction is unjustified. See Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet,
Hepps and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEo. L.J.
1519, 1564 (1987); see also Anne Benaroya, Note, Philadelphia Newspapers v. Nepps Revisited: A
Critical Approach to Different Standards of Protection for Media and Nonmedia Defendants in Pri-
vate Plaintiff Defamation Cases, 58 GEO. WASH. L. Riv. 1268, 1270 (1990).
507. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3:7 (2d ed. 1999).
508. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759 (per Powell, J., stating: "Speech on matters
of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern"), 773-74 (per White, J.,
stating: "Although Justice Powell speaks only of the inapplicability of the Gertz rule with
respect to presumed and punitive damages, it must be that the Gertz requirement of some
kind of fault on the part of the defendant is also inapplicable in cases such as this [i.e.
involving a matter of private concern]"). Dun & Bradstreet did not directly address the
issue of liability; it ruled only on the question of the availability of presumed and punitive
damages where the plaintiff was a private figure and the speech was not of public concern.
Id. at 757.
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constitutional, categorical rules. The Gertz majority held that a pri-
vate plaintiff could not recover punitive or presumed damages for
libel unless he or she could prove "actual malice" as defined in
Sullivan, that is, "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth."50 9 The rationale underlying this restriction on damages
rules was the unnecessary and excessive chilling effect of such
damages.5 1 0
An additional complication was introduced in 1985 by a highly
divided Court in the case of Dun & Bradstreet.511 In his plurality
opinion in this case,Justice Powell breathed new life into the Rosen-
bloom rationale by finding that the Gertz rule, which outlawed puni-
tive and presumed libel damages unless Sullivan "actual malice"
could be shown, was inapplicable to speech that was not of public
concern.512
C. Expansion/Extension of Procedural and Evidential Rules
After Sullivan, the Court added yet another level of doctrinal
complexity by constructing still more constitutional rules gov-
erning procedure and evidence in libel actions. The effect of these
rules is to shift the burden of proving truth to plaintiffs, limit appli-
cations for summary judgment, and permit de novo appellate review
in libel actions.
1. Shifting the Burden of Proving Truth to Plaintiff
At common law the defendant had the burden of proving that
the defamatory words were true.5 13  After Sullivan, the U.S.
Supreme Court has shifted the burden of proving truth to plain-
509. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
510. See id. at 349-50. The majority justification for this restriction on the recoverability
of presumed damages was that "[t]he largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award
damages where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of
liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment free-
doms." Id. at 349. The justification for limiting the recoverability of punitive damages was
that "[l]ike the doctrine of presumed damages, jury discretion to award punitive damages
unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship. ... I" d. at 350. In dissent,
White J. termed this "judicial overkill." Id. at 397.
511. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J. authored a plurality opinion,
joined by Rehnquist, J., and O'Connor, J. There were separate concurrences by Burger,
C.J. and White,J. Brennan,J.'s dissenting opinion was joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, JJ.).
512. Id. at 762-63 (per Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.) (advocating
permitting recovery of presumed and punitive damages for defamation without a showing
of actual malice where the speech "concern[ed] no public issue").
513. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) ("the com-
mon law's rule on falsity [is] that the defendant must bear the burden of proving truth").
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tiffs, at least where they are public figures or public officials. 514
The allocation of the burden of proof where the plaintiff was a
private figure remained unresolved until the Court's 1986 decision
in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.51 5 Although the Court was
badly divided on this issue, five justices agreed that such a plaintiff
must prove falsity.5 1
6
2. Limiting Applications for Summary Judgment
As mentioned above, Brennan's opinion in Sullivan itself estab-
lished a higher evidentiary standard ("clear and convincing evi-
dence") for establishing "actual malice" than the normal civil
preponderance of the evidence standard. 51 7 In 1986 a divided U.S.
Supreme Court applied this higher standard to summary judgment
motions in libel actions in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby.51 8 In Liberty
Lobby, Justice White, writing for a six-justice majority, argued that,
to successfully respond to a motion for summary judgment, a libel
plaintiff must do more than simply "present evidence from which a
jury might return a verdict in his favor."51 9 Rather, a plaintiff must
establish that a jury, applying the higher evidentiary standard
required by Sullivan, could reasonably find for the plaintiff.5 20 It
remains unclear after Liberty Lobby whether this higher evidentiary
standard applies to other elements of a libel claim beyond "actual
malice ."521
3. Standard of Appellate Review
In Sullivan, Justice Brennan independently reviewed the record
to determine whether the evidence of "actual malice" met the con-
stitutional requirements. Brennan claimed that such de novo review
was necessary due to "considerations of effective judicial adminis-
514. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74; see also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153,
176 (1979); Hepps, 475 U.S. at 775; (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J. (stating that "a
public figure plaintiff must show the falsity of the statement at issue in order to prevail on a
suit for defamation")).
515. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
516. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.,joined by Marshall and
Powell, 1].), 779-80 (Brennan and Blackmun JJ. concurring). Four justices dissented. See
id. at 780 (Stevens, J. dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., White and Rehnquist, IJ.).
517. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86 (finding that the evidence of actual malice "lacks
the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands").
518. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986).
519. Id. at 257.
520. Id. at 255.
521. See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 661 n.2.
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tration."522 Despite this language, however, it seems that Bren-
nan's true concern was with outcomes. Brennan feared that, in the
tense civil rights climate of the time, the Alabama state courts were
so biased that they would uphold the ruling against the New York
Times by simply finding evidence of "actual malice." 523 To prevent
this, Brennan had to independently determine that there was no
evidence of "actual malice."524 Although such an independent
examination of the record is a highly unusual procedure for the
U.S. Supreme Court, in 1984 the Court reiterated the constitution-
ality of this de novo review for the question of "actual malice. 525
4. Extension to Other Causes of Action
The U.S. Supreme Court has extended the Sullivan "actual mal-
ice" rule to other causes of action beyond defamation. In Garrison
v. Louisiana, the Court held that the "actual malice" rule also
applies to criminal libel.526 The rule has also been held applicable
to actions for false light invasion of privacy, in Time, Inc. v. Hill.527
Additionally, in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the Court extended
the rule to a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 528
E. Sullivan's Legacy: An Unsatisfactory State of Affairs
As set out in the preceding section, Sullivan's progeny has
resulted in a highly complex web of libel rules in the United States.
Both liability and the recoverability of various types of damages
depend on the status of the plaintiff (i.e., public figure or private
figure). Recoverability of damages depends, for private figures at
least, on the nature of the statement (i.e., public concern or pri-
vate concern). The extent to which the nature of the statement
may be relevant to cases involving public figures is uncertain. Pro-
fessor Sheldon Halpern has aptly described the law as "rococo...
in many ways similar to the ancient world of Ptolemaic epicycles: it
522. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284.
523. LEWIS, supra note 440, at 177.
524. Id.
525. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1985)
("Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evi-
dence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of
any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of "actual malice.")
(majority opinion of Stevens, J.).
526. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67 (1964).
527. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
528. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
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has so many complexities and legal curlicues that it too is intelligi-
ble, if at all, only to a learned few who, with more candor than
their priestly predecessors, confess largely to inability to predict the
future." 529 Although Halpern penned this comment over a decade
ago, U.S. libel law has not seen any substantial simplification since
that time.
Criticism of the current state of libel law is rife. Some commen-
tators contend that the balance of U.S. libel law is tipped too far in
favor of free expression and against the protection of reputa-
tion.530  Others believe that Sullivan has an excessively "chilling"
effect on speech; they charge the Sullivan line of cases with causing
too much libel litigation, skyrocketing libel damages, soaring and
excessive costs in libel actions, and jury confusion as to the "actual
malice" fault standard. 53 1 Still other commentators complain that
Sullivan and its progeny have made U.S. libel law too complex and
confusing. 53 2
529. Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Libel, Language, and Law: New York Times v. Sullivan at
Twenty Five, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 273, 295 (1990).
530. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 765-74 (con-
currence of White, J.); see also Richard A. Gonzalez, Comment, Pyrrhic Victories and Glorious
Defeats: Why Defendants Are Winning and Plaintiffs Are Losing the Struggle Over Actual Malice and
"Fictionalized" Quotations, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1037, 1061-62 (1990); Thomas D. Yanucci,
Debunking "The Big Chill "-Why Defamation Suits By Corporations Are Consistent with the First
Amendment, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1187 (1995).
531. See, e.g, LEwis, supra note 440, at 603 (advocating absolute protection for criticism
of the "public actions of public men" and commenting that "[i]t is a time of growing libel
litigation, of enormous judgments, and enormous costs. The press and its lawyers are
deeply worried; the protection that they thought was won for free expression in New York
Times v. Sullivan seems to them to be crumbling.... [T]his time even someone as skepti-
cal of press claims as I must admit that there is something to the concern."). Lewis also
charges that juries are confused by the "actual malice" standard. Id. at 612-14. The litera-
ture echoing or elaborating on Lewis' criticisms is enormous; this footnote does not pur-
port to provide a full list. See, e.g., David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Cases:
The Problem and Possible Solution, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1207, 1208 (1995) (arguing that defa-
mation actions are overly expensive, wrongly deter some cases that should be brought, and
have an excessive "chilling" effect on the media); Edward Costantini & Mary Paul Nash,
SLAPP/SLAPPback: The Misuse of Libel Law for Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7
J.L. & POL. 417 (1990); Susan M. Gilles, Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An Analy-
sis of Process in Libel Litigation, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 1753, 1755 (1998) (focusing on procedural
flaws in post-Sullivan libel litigation leading, inter alia, to excessive costs and delays); Irving
R. Kaufman, Press, Privacy and Malice: Reflections on New York Times v. Sullivan, 56 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 10 (1984) (criticizing the "actual malice" standard as confused and confusing, and
advocating the creation of alternative remedies in libel actions); Pierre N. Leval, The No-
Money, No Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its Proper Place, 101 -Liv. L. Rev. 1287 (1988)
(criticizing Sullivan as leading to excessive costs and other burdens on defendants and
proposing a non-damages libel suit, not subject to Sullivan's actual malice requirement).
532. See, e.g., Halpern, supra note 529, at 310-15, 323-24 (advocating simplification of
the law and adoption of a negligence fault standard for defamation actions).
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This Article does not take on the difficult question of whether all
of these criticisms are justified. The current state of the empirical
evidence is insufficient to draw solid conclusions on some of these
issues, especially as to whether Sullivan has caused libel actions to
proliferate, 53 3 libel damages awards to skyrocket,534 or made it vir-
tually impossible for plaintiffs to win libel actions against media
defendants. 535 It is clear nonetheless that the current U.S. law of
libel is deeply flawed and that these flaws are largely attributable to
533. A Libel Defense Resource Center (LDRC) study found 225 reported media libel
decisions for the period 1954-1964, 55 of which went to trial. LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE
CENTER, HIsToRIcAL TRENDS IN MEDIA LIBEL DAMAGE AwARDS 1 (1986) [hereafter "HIsTORi-
CAL TRENDS"]. These average 5.5 trials per year. For the period 1980-1999, the Libel
Defense Resouce Center reported 438 media libel and related trials, averaging 21.9 trials
per year. See LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, 2000 REPORT ON TRIALS AND DAMAGES 14
(2000) [hereafter "2000 REPORT"]. A recent trend appears to be that the number of trials
may be falling; the number of trials reported for the 1990s, 177 total, is much lower than
the 261 for the 1980s, or nearly ten fewer trials per year during the 1990s. Id. But even this
lower average of 17.7 trials per year for the 1990s is significantly higher than the average
number of trials per year for the period just prior to Sullivan of 1954-1964. It is not clear
whether the Libel Defense Resource Center reports cover the same universe of cases, since
the first report only covers "reported" trials and the second seems to cover trials "reported"
by the LDRC. Even assuming, however, that the universe is the same, it is also not clear
whether this rise in the number of trials is attributable to Sullivan rather than some general
increase in tort litigation over this period.
534. Studies by the LDRC show that libel damage awards have risen considerably since
Sulivan. Compare HISTORICAL TRENDS, supra note 533, at 2 (showing that the average pre-
Sullivan award in media libel trials for the period 1954-1964 was $127,434 and if two dispro-
portionately high awards were excluded, $49,513) with 2000 REPORT, supra note 533, at 31
(showing that the average damages award at trial for libel and related cases brought against
media defendants between 1980 and 1999 was $2,962,525, and even if one disproportion-
ately high award was excluded, $2,154,594). Even adjusting for inflation, this is an enor-
mous increase; however, the rise itself does not establish that it was attributable to Sullivan
and not just part of some general rise in tort damages over this period.
535. The LDRC study for the pre-Sullivan period 1954-1964 shows that plaintiffs won
damages in 40 of 55 reported libel trials against media defendants, or 73% of the time, so
the defendant win rate was 27%. See HISTORICAL TRENDS, supra note 533, at 1. For the
period 1980-2000, the LDRC studies indicate that defendants' win rates averaged 36.9%,
rising slightly for the 1990s only to 39.1%. See 2000 REPORT, supra note 533, at 15. This
does not include summary judgment motions; if those are taken into account, success rates
are much higher. See LDRC BULLETIN, SUMMARYJUDGMENT UPDATE PART II, SUMMARYJUDG-
MENT MOTIONS IN DEFAMATION ACTIONS 1986-1994 13 (1995) (showing that between 1980
and 1994, defendants won summary judgment in 82.2% of media libel and related cases
and obtained partial awards of summary judgment in another 3.5% of such cases). As
Susan Gilles has pointed out, this success rate may be inflated because the LDRC studies
reported cases, and many summary judgment motions never get reported. Gilles, supra
note 531, at 1774, 1775 n. 74. Also, as Gilles also notes, the absence of comparative data on
summary judgment in other tort cases means that it is not clear whether this is just part of
some general trend or whether it is really attributable to Sullivan.
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what Randall Bezanson has called a "confusing maze of categorical
rules."536 .
First, as Professor Halpern has charged, the actual malice test, as
extended, is overly complex; it confuses juries and leads to a signifi-
cant error rate at trial. The high rate of appellate reversals in libel
actions has an unduly escalating effect on the costs of libel litiga-
tion. Second, the actual malice rule, as extended, has become
inconsistent with its original Madisonian rationale; it is overly rigid
and ill equipped to do justice in particular cases. Thirdly, the
actual malice rule has resulted in doctrinal confusion. Reform is
clearly needed.
1. Complexity and Jury Confusion
Many lawyers find the "maze of categorial rules" confusing, but it
appears to be even more baffling to juries. In Stephen Brill's
famous study of the jury in the Tavoulareas libel action, Brill found
that the jury was seriously confused about the actual malice stan-
dard.537 Moreover, as Susan Gilles has pointed out, Libel Defense
Resource Center (LDRC) studies of libel and related actions
against media defendants between 1984 and 1994 show a very high
appellate reversal rate. In trials where actual malice was at issue,
the reversal rate ofjudgments for plaintiff was almost 70%.538 This
indicates that something is going wrong at libel trials where actual
malice is at issue. What seems most likely in light of Brill's study is
that the juries are confused by the complexities of Sullivan's cate-
gorical, constitutional rules. This premise is supported by the
LDRC's finding that appellate reversal rates for libel and related
actions not involving "actual malice" are far lower, around 40%.5 3 9
2. Lack of Consistency With the Madisonian Rationale and Ill
Equipped to Do Justice in Particular Cases
Sullivan's progeny has departed from the Madisonian rationale
on which Justice Brennan's majority judgment was explicitly based.
If the purpose of constitutionalizing the law -of libel is to ensure a
well-informed electorate by ensuring adequate "breathing space"
for "debate on public issues,"540 the expansion of Sullivan's reach
536. RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 200
(1987).
537. See Stephen Brill, Inside the Jury Room at the Washington Post Libel Trial, Am. LAW.,
Nov. 1982, at 1, 94.
538. Gilles, supra note 531, at 1781-82.
539. Id.
540. See Sullivan. 376 U.S. at 273-83.
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does not seem consistent with this goal. Moreover, the overly cate-
gorical "actual malice" rule is ill-equipped to do justice in particu-
lar cases.
For example, comedienne Carol Burnett, indisputably a public
figure, had to prove "actual malice" in a libel action brought
against the tabloid the National Enquirer over an article accusing
Burnett of drunken behavior in a restaurant.54' As Anthony Lewis
has noted, it is hard to see how a categorical legal rule giving tab-
loid commentary on purely private conduct the protection of
"actual malice" is justified under the rationale that it promotes the
free ability to criticize official conduct.5 42
Some may object because Burnett in fact won her case; however,
that does not expunge the law's failing. It does not seem consis-
tent with the Madisonian rationale for the law to equate a tabloid
publication like the one about Burnett, which could not be viewed
as contributing to a debate on public issues that would help elec-
tors rationally exercise their voting responsibilities, with a publica-
tion like the New York Times advertisement.
Others may argue that Dun & Bradstreet indicates that the First
Amendment protects speech of private concern less than speech of
public concern. Even if there are suggestions in Dun & Bradstreet
that the type of speech at issue in Burnett's case should be afforded
less First Amendment protection than political speech, there is no
definitive U.S. Supreme Court authority that says this is so. Thus,
not only is the current state of U.S. libel law apparently inconsis-
tent with the Madisonian rationale, but there is also a serious lack
of doctrinal clarity as to the limits of the "actual malice" rule.
3. Doctrinal Confusion
To ensure sufficient protection for reputation where speech is of
purely private concern, the law must carve out exceptions to the
actual malice rule. Dun & Bradstreet appears to represent a step in
that direction, although that case speaks definitively only on the
issue of the recoverability of damages in cases concerning speech
of purely private concern and not to liability. It is clear from Dun
& Bradstreet that it is difficult to carve out exceptions to an absolute
rule; where Dun & Bradstreet attempted to do so concerning the
issue of damages, it ended up only creating a serious lack of doctri-
nal clarity with regard to the issue of liability. This shows how the
541. See LEwis, supra note 440, at 197.
542. Id.; see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 255.
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theory discussed at the end of the previous section has come to life
in practice. Categorical rules, such as "actual malice," ironically
tend to result in a lack of doctrinal clarity while attempting to
impose absolute and clear constitutional rules.
VIII. CONCLUSION: LEARNING FROM THE COMPARISON
It appears that all of the problems examined above (jury confu-
sion, philosophical inconsistency, inflexibility, and doctrinal confu-
sion) are the unfortunate result of Sullivan's creation of a separate
constitutional defense, the "actual malice" rule. Even assuming
that the Sullivan Court could not predict the outcome of creating a
rigid rule based on forcing plaintiffs into constitutional categories,
it was clearly misguided to ignore the possibilities inherent in years
of common law, which contained a flexible qualified defense based
on the public interest. Indeed, creating rigid constitutional catego-
ries that did not permit the court to fully analyze the circumstances
of the publication plainly seems contrary to the established ratio-
nale for granting privilege to certain defamatory facts: the com-
mon convenience and welfare of society. The Sullivan Court could
have established a better balance between the competing rights of
free expression and protection of reputation by extending the
existing common law defense of qualified privilege instead of creat-
ing a new freestanding constitutional defense.
Although some may criticize this approach for introducing
uncertainty into the law and for giving judges too much power, the
gain in flexibility seems to offset that price. Ultimately, the ques-
tion of what defamatory publications should be permitted despite
their harm to reputation is a delicate balancing test, based on the
public interest of a society. The Commonwealth Cases show us three
different possible models of reform within a more flexible com-
mon law framework, which have all been developed to serve the
public interest of a particular modern society. The public interest
in the United States may merit a slightly different extension to the
common law, but the general Commonwealth approach of
extending common law better permits proper balancing of impor-
tant right than the rigid constitutional model developed by Sullivan
and its progeny. The Commonwealth approach is thus instructive
as a model for reform of the law of libel in the United States.
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